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We investigate two previously little studied aspects of favor-trading. First, we study whether and how
individuals who stand to gain from favor-trading can best form cooperative relationships in an environment
with private information about each agent’s ability and willingness to do favors. For agents with a low discount
factor (low types) cooperation is not incentive compatible, for agents with a high discount factor (high types)
it is. Both types receive privately observed opportunities to do favors with positive probability each period.
We show high types are always able to separate from low types. Separation is implementable as soon as a high
type receives a favor opportunity if the opportunities are independent across agents. If they are mutually
exclusive, high types continue to separate with probability one if one of the agents is designated to do the first
favor and that agent is a high type. Equilibria that designate an agent to act first implement separation
approximately twice as slowly as symmetric equilibria that task the first high type with opportunity to separate
first. Therefore the latter type of symmetric equilibria may dominate the former type of non-symmetric
equilibria. Second, we study two-player games of favor-trading in a complete information environment
standard to the literature, but in contrast to prominent models of favor-trading to date, we assume agents have
concave utility functions of the form u(x)=x^a; 0
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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS IN FAVOR-TRADING
Simo J. Kalla
Andrew Postlewaite
We investigate two previously little studied aspects of favor-trading. First, we study
whether and how individuals who stand to gain from favor-trading can best form co-
operative relationships in an environment with private information about each agent’s
ability and willingness to do favors. For agents with a low discount factor (low types)
cooperation is not incentive compatible, for agents with a high discount factor (high
types) it is. Both types receive privately observed opportunities to do favors with posi-
tive probability each period. We show high types are always able to separate from low
types. Separation is implementable as soon as a high type receives a favor opportunity
if the opportunities are independent across agents. If they are mutually exclusive, high
types continue to separate with probability one if one of the agents is designated to do
the first favor and that agent is a high type. Equilibria that designate an agent to act first
implement separation approximately twice as slowly as symmetric equilibria that task
the first high type with opportunity to separate first. Therefore the latter type of sym-
metric equilibria may dominate the former type of non-symmetric equilibria. Second,
we study two-player games of favor-trading in a complete information environment
standard to the literature, but in contrast to prominent models of favor-trading to date,
we assume agents have concave utility functions of the formu(x)=xα, 0<α<1, in-
stead of linear utility functions. We characterize equilibria in the concave case and
describe qualitative differences to the linear case. We also construct parametric mod-
els to numerically solve and analyze multi-state equilibria.
v
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Chapter 1
1 IntroductionIntroduction
This dissertation consists of the topical introduction (Chapter 1 ) followed by two essays
on favor-trading: “Favor-trading with Incomplete Information” (Chapter 2), and “Favor-
trading with Concave Utility Functions” (Chapter 3).
People frequently exchange informal services or favors in expectation of future recip-
rocation when these favors are efficient, in that the benefit generated is greater than the cost
of doing favors. When people are able to monitor opportunities by others to reciprocate,
building a long-term relationship based on such exchanges is easily enforced with tit-for-tat
tactics or a threat of a complete end to cooperation. The favor-trading literature on the other
hand focuses on how efficient long-term cooperative relationships can be supported when
the ability of agents to do favors is not perfectly monitored. This literature has furthermore
relied on models with risk-neutral agents and intrinsically efficient favors, in that the costs
involved are smaller than the benefits generated in absolute terms. In chapter 2 we investi-
gate the impact of the possibility of impatient (noncooperative) agents on whether and how
favor-trading relationships can best be maintained. In chapter 3 we drop the assumption
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of intrinsically efficient favors and linear preferences. Instead, we assign agents concave
utility functions and investigate trade in favors that derive their value from a risk-sharing
function.
Previous research has investigated strategies for favor-trading relationships when each
agent is sufficiently patient to wait for reciprocation. However, suppose the agents do
not know how patient the other is (her discount factor). How should they proceed? A
patient (cooperative) agent may not be willing to do a big favor initially when it is possible
that the other agent is impatient and therefore may not return the favor. Even if she were
known to be patient, it might still be better to wait for her to make the first move unless
the expected payoff was sufficiently large relative to the cost of the initial favor. On the
other hand, proposing a small first favor in return for the promise of bigger future favors
could motivate a generally noncooperative agent to cooperate temporarily only to shirk later
after some big return favors were realized. The question is whether or not some range of
initial favors exists such that they are small enough relative to future promises to convince
a patient agent to act first, but large enough that an impatient agent would be deterred from
mimicking the patient agent? Alternatively, could the two agents flip a coin to decide who
acts first? This would eliminate the temptation to wait for the other agent to make the first
move, but it would roughly double the expected time to the first agreed favor. Finally, how
does the distribution of the favor making opportunities affect the potential for cooperative
relationships?
We take as our benchmark a streamlined version of the favor-trading model by Abdulka-
diroğlu and Bagwell [1] (AB hereafter). In this model favors are efficient so agents can
form mutually beneficial favor-trading relationships provided they are sufficiently patient.
Opportunities to do favors, or favor opportunities for short, arrive with some probability
each period, but their arrival is only observed by the agent who receives the opportunity
to do a costly favor. She then decides whether or not to do the favor. Since reciprocation
2
cannot be conditioned on the arrival of favor opportunities, it must be conditioned on past
behavior or some form of a balance of previously exchanged favors. For example, consider
the following form of favor-trading known asequality matching.One agent is exogenously
designated as an advantaged agent, the other as a disadvantaged agent. The disadvantaged
agent owes the advantaged agent a favor. Once this favor is done, the roles are reversed and
the new advantaged agent simply waits until she receives a return favor, and so forth. This
is the simplest form of favor-trading and the easiest to enforce.
However, the exogenous designation of the advantaged and disadvantaged agent in AB
[1] would exclude equilibria of interest to us. To see why first note that in equality matching
the disadvantaged agent’s incentive to do a favor is to receive future favors. If she does not
do the favor, she will never receive favors herself. Now suppose the designation was not
exogenous. Suppose instead the agents started as equals, and the first one to do a favor
would become the first advantaged agent. Suppose further that an agent believes the other
will do the first favor, opportunity allowing. If the agent under this belief receives the
first favor opportunity herself, she would have two choices. Choice one would be to do
a favor, incur a cost, become advantaged and receive a favor in return the next time the
other agent receives a favor opportunity followed by the usual equality matching endgame.
Choice two would be to do no favor, incur no cost and receive a favor anyway the next
time the other agent receives a favor opportunity followed by the usual equality matching
endgame. Clearly choice two is always better, regardless how patient the agents are, since
the benefit is the same but with no cost. Since we consider equilibria in which agents are not
exogenously designated as advantaged and disadvantaged, we have to consider additional
incentives for an agent to act first even with complete information, that is both agents are
known to be patient. To this end we need to consider strategies such that first agent to act
only does a small favor in return for larger future favors.
Another reason to start with small favors specific to our model is uncertainty about
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whether the opposing agent is patient or impatient. Regardless of the endgame, the first
agent to do a sufficiently large favor to identify herself as patient also takes the risk that her
partner is impatient and will not reciprocate. If the endgame consists of equality matching,
only a patient agent will reciprocate because patient agents are defined as those who benefit
from equality matching, impatient agents are defined as those who do not. Hence equality
matching is an effective way to deter impatient agents from masquerading as patient agents.
The problem is finding a smaller first favor to trigger an equality matching endgame. If it
is too small relative to the expected reciprocation, an impatient agent with opportunity will
have incentive to mimic a patient agent by doing the small first favor herself and thereby
rendering the described strategy for separation ineffective.
Equilibria of greater value than equality matching do exist in most favor-trading games.
For example, M̈obius [12] (2001) studies equilibria in which agents may do multiple con-
secutive favors without reciprocation before suspending cooperation. In equality matching
cooperation is suspended after just one favor. Since favors are efficient, equilibria that
implement multiple consecutive favors generally dominate equality matching. Hauser and
Hopenhayn [8] (2005) and AB [1] (first draft in 2004) also construct equilibria that domi-
nate equality matching by use of multiple consecutive favors, but they use favors of varying
sizes. These equilibria are also more attractive to an impatient player than equality match-
ing. If she can mimic a patient agent with a small initial favor, she could receive multiple
favors in return rather than just the one in equality matching. Hence her incentive to mimic
patient agents would be higher and separation would be more difficult. That is why we
focus on equality matching to implement separation. However, we also show that the more
efficient equilibria are implementable either immediately or after some time is first spent
equality matching to deter impatient agents.
The distribution of favor opportunities, is important in the incomplete information ver-
sion of favor-trading even though the complete information models are generally robust
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to the arrival process of favor opportunities. For example, in Hauser and Hopenhayn [8]
favor opportunities are independent across agents while in AB [1] they are mutually ex-
clusive, yet both models find qualitatively similar equilibria. Case in point, both exhibit
debt forgiveness, that is favors owed depreciate over time, which gives agents an incentive
to continue doing small favors even when reciprocation has not been received for previous
favors. With incomplete information the distribution of favor opportunities is important be-
cause it affects agents’ beliefs. The more pessimistic an agent grows the smaller the initial
favor she is willing to do to identify herself as the patient type. If favor opportunities are
independent, both agents grow pessimistic at the same rate over time as no one does a favor.
If the opportunities are mutually exclusive, agents may grow pessimistic at different rates
if one or both of them ignore opportunities to do favors. We analyze favor-trading under
both an independent and a mutually exclusive favor opportunity distribution to understand
how the choice of favor distribution impacts the ability of patient agents to set themselves
apart from the impatient agents.
Our main result is that patient agents are always able to distinguish themselves from
impatient agents at the first available opportunity if favor opportunities are independent.
This can be accomplished by symmetric strategies such that a patient agent does a small
favor at first available opportunity, the recipient of such a favor reciprocates with a larger
or full favor if she is patient, and they subsequently form an equality matching relationship.
However, both agents grow more pessimistic about the other’s type as time goes by with no
favor done, so the first favor they are willing to do to prove that they are cooperative must be
decreasing over time. This introduces an inefficiency into the relationship because smaller
favors are less efficient than larger ones, and may lead to equality matching relationships
of lesser value. A way for patient agents to separate without this inefficiency is for them
to flip a coin or otherwise choose one of them at the beginning of the game to do the first
favor. This strategy leads to separation approximately twice as slowly as the symmetric
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strategies, but since the agent chosen to do the first favor does not grow pessimistic over
time about the other agent’s type, the first favor also does not have to be decreasing over
time nor does the value of the equality matching endgame that follows if both agents are
cooperative.
If favor opportunities are mutually exclusive achieving separation is more difficult.
Designating one of the agents to act first continues to work in the same manner as in the
independent case, but symmetric strategies are more problematic. In particular, for any
proposed size first favor, no matter how small, it is only a matter of time before a patient
agent would grow too pessimistic to do it. On the other hand, an impatient agent would
not grow significantly more pessimistic if she received a large enough share of the favor
opportunities. In such a case she would be willing to do the initial favor, if small enough,
to mimic a patient agent in and receive a large return favor. Hence the possibility of im-
patient agents mimicking patient agents can only be deterred for a fixed time in the above
described symmetric equilibria if favor opportunities are mutually exclusive. Despite this
difficulty with symmetric equilibria, we show that they are more efficient at times than
equilibria that designate one of the agents to do the first favor. An important consequence
of this result is that more information (mutually exclusive favor opportunities) may lead to
a worse outcome.
Our model also has the broad characteristic that agents first start small while they are
uncertain about the other agent’s type, but build up to more profitable relationships once
each of them has demonstrated she is sufficiently patient. Watson [19] (1999) found a qual-
itatively similar result in a prisoner’s dilemma model with both ’good’ and bad’ types of
agents. However, his model differs from ours in that he assumes deviations from coopera-
tive behavior are publicly observable, whereas we do not.
Chapter 3 is presented in part as a discussion paper and in part as an empirical (nu-
merical simulations) component for solving favor-trading equilibria. Our motivating ob-
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servation is that to date prominent models of favor-trading have assumed agents have linear
preferences (linear favor-trading models). In chapter 3, informal favor-trading is considered
to be a form of insurance. We study agents with concave utility functions (concave favor-
trading models), and favors that derive their value from risk sharing. With concave utility
functions that offer sufficiently high marginal returns at the start and low marginal returns
at the end, agents can beneficially exchange favors at some level for any discount factors.
This is in contrast to the linear favor-trading models, in which the incentive compatibility
of favors traded in certain equilibria is independent of the size of the favors because agents
are essentially risk-neutral with respect to favors.
Furthermore, we show qualitative differences in some types of equilibria. For example,
if utility functions are linear and agents’ discount factors are just large enough to satisfy
the incentive compatibility constraint for the simplest form of favor-trading called equality
matching (an agent does one favor, waits until reciprocation, then another, and so forth),
the best the agents can do is to equality match full favors. If the same agents have concave
utility functions, we show that the equivalent equality matching equilibria are dominated
by equilibria involving a smaller than full first favor, which will be followed by a small sec-
ond favor even if reciprocation has not yet been received (multi-state equality matching).
Consequently, the assumption of linear preferences drives some of the results in prominent
favor-trading models. The rest of chapter generalizes multi-state equality matching equi-
libria. We also define infinite state equality matching, but argue against their efficiency.
A key component of chapter 3 is the construction of two parametric models to numer-
ically analyze multi-state equilibria specifically, but these techniques may be of interest
for investigating other favor-trading problems or applied game theory problems in general.
The first model simulates a large sample of games for a given set of parameters, derives
payoff functions from the simulation results, then optimizes these functions to solve for
the optimal strategy. The second model solves directly the system of simultaneous pay-
7
off equations associated with an equality matching game, and uses the results to find the
optimal strategy. We use these models to compute a large set of solutions spanning the pa-
rameter space and interpolate the general equilibrium characteristics from these data points.
We also construct a model with favor-depreciation and compare our preliminary results to
multi-state equality matching. Most of the results in chapter 3 are presented as conjectures
because they are based on numerical results rather than closed-form proofs. We support
them with a number of plots and tables that illustrate our findings for data points that span
the parameter space. However, we could not carry out asymptotic analysis as numerical
models tend to fail at the boundaries.
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Chapter 2
2 Favor-trading with Incomplete InformationFavor-trading it Incompl te Information
2.1 Introduction
This chapter studies whether and how individuals who stand to gain from trading favors
can best form cooperative relationships in an environment with private information about
each player’s ability and willingness to do favors. Previous models in the favor-trading
literature focused on optimizing favor-trading relationships under complete information.
This chapter introduces incomplete information about player types. The central question
addressed is whether cooperation can be maintained in favor-trading relationships after
the introduction of non-cooperative players into the pool of potential trading partners, and
if so how can the cooperative players separate themselves most efficiently from the non-
cooperative types.
For the purposes of this dissertation favor-trading is considered to be non-monetary
trade in goods, services or opportunities and favors are assumed to be efficient. The model
contains a positive measure of players with a low discount factor (low types) who do not
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find cooperation beneficial, and a positive measure of players with a high discount factor
(high types) who do. Players receive opportunities to do favors for each other (favor op-
portunities) according to either a mutually exclusive or independent distribution, but these
opportunities are private information.
As an example, consider a firm with several parallel divisions that function indepen-
dently under separate managers. Suppose two new managers have been recruited to head
the marketing and finance divisions, respectively. Each manager’s job is to maximize pro-
ductivity within her own division, but every once in a while one of the managers receives a
new idea or opportunity that would be beneficial for her division but even more beneficial
for the neighboring division. Monetary side payments are not allowed, but reciprocation in
similar favors can provide a basis for mutual gains if both managers are sufficiently patient.
However, the managers do not know each other’s discount factor, which in this example
could be interpreted as the likelihood of staying with the firm long-term. So how should
the managers proceed?
The main result in this chapter is that the high type players are almost always able to
separate themselves from the low type players at the first available opportunity by using an
“equality matching” (EM) mechanism if opportunities to do favors arrive independently.
EM simply means that each agent waits for reciprocation of a previous favor before do-
ing the next one. In the case of mutually exclusive favor opportunities, separation is still
guaranteed for high types with probability one if one of the players is designated to do
the first favor, and separation will occur as soon as the designated player receives a favor
opportunity, assuming she is a high type.
However, such strategies induce separation only half as quickly (roughly speaking) as
strategies that call for the first player to receive a favor opportunity to do the first favor,
and hence separate if she is a high type. In equilibria based on such symmetric strategies,
separation is only guaranteed with probability one under independent favor opportunities,
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but not under mutually exclusive favor opportunities. The paper establishes a bound on the
number of periods in the mutually exclusive favor opportunity case during which the low
types will not mimic the high types with positive probability. An important consequence
of this result is that more information (mutually exclusive favor opportunities) leads to a
worse outcome.
The paper also compares the equilibria involving a designated first favor maker (DFFM
equilibria) to equilibria characterized by symmetric strategies (SS equilibria) and finds that
either may dominate depending on the parameter values. Numerical results suggest that SS
equilibria dominate DFFM equilibria in cases involving relatively impatient agents likely
to receive favor opportunities early on, whereas DFFM equilibria dominate when agents
are very patient, but the probability of receiving favor opportunities is low. To see why,
consider the case of mutually exclusive favor opportunities and suppose the probability of
receiving an opportunity to do a favor is approximately one half. Then it is almost certain
that one of the two agents will receive a favor opportunity during the first period, and
therefore under a symmetric strategy for signaling type, separation will almost certainly
occur during the first period, which is all the more important for relatively impatient high
type players eager to gain from the benefits of an EM endgame. Designating one of the
two players to do the first favor would halve the chance of separation in the first period,
which is all the more costly when the high type players are impatient to begin a cooperative
relationship.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 describes the model and our
equilibrium concepts including how key concepts from AB [1] translate to our streamlined
version of their model and how other favor-trading literature relates to this paper. In section
2.3 we analyze the case of a patient agent facing an unknown type, and investigate how the
two can best form a favor-trading relationship. In section 2.4 we analyze the case of two
unknown type agents when opportunities to do favors are mutually exclusive. In this section
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our focus is on the existence of separating equilibria, and how best to separate into the case
analyzed in one-sided incomplete information case analyzed in the previous section. In
section 2.5 we extend the analysis to the independent favor opportunity case, and compare
the results to the case of mutually exclusive opportunities. Section 2.6 concludes chapter
2. An appendix follows and the bibliography is at the end of the dissertation.
2.2 The Model
Consider the earlier motivating example: A firm has several parallel divisions that function
independently under separate managers. Suppose two new managers have been recruited to
head the marketing and finance divisions, respectively. Each manager’s job is to maximize
productivity within her own division, but every once in a while one of the managers receives
an opportunity to help the other division at a cost to her own. The ability or opportunity to
help is private information, but when possible the cost is known to be less than the benefit.
Monetary side payments are not allowed, but reciprocation in similar favors can provide
a basis for mutual gains if both managers are sufficiently patient. But the managers do
not know how patient the other is, or how likely she is to stay with the firm long-term. To
address whether and how they can form a cooperative relationship we analyze the following
formal model.
Two agents,a andb, are randomly picked from a population withμo ∈ (0, 1) of high
types with discount factorδH and 1 − μo of low types with discount factorδL. Each
agent has utility functionu(x) = x. They play an infinitely repeated stage game with the
following structure. At the beginning of each period nature allocates an opportunity to
do a favor (favor opportunity) according to either a mutually exclusive or an independent
distribution. Under a mutually exclusive distribution either agenta or b receives a favor
opportunity with equal probability,p ∈ (0, 1/2), or neither does with probability1 − 2p.
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Under the independent distribution each agent receives a favor opportunity with probability
p ∈ (0, 1). Favor opportunities are private information. An agent who receives a favor
opportunity may either keep it private and incur no cost, or do a full or partial favor of size
x, y ∈ (0, 1], for agentsa andb, respectively, at a cost equal to the size. The benefit to the
recipient isky or kx, for agentsa andb, respectively, wherek > 1. For example, if agent
a does a favor of sizex, flow payoffs to(a, b) are(1 − x, kx). Favors, including their size,
are public information. The stage game is repeated in each subsequent period.
To see how favor-trading works consider the following game calledequality matching
(EM). In EM of level z ∈ (0, 1], one agent is calledadvantaged, the otherdisadvantaged.
The disadvantaged agent is said to owe the advantaged agent a favor of sizez. If th disad-
vantaged agent does a favor of sizez, she becomes advantaged and the other disadvantaged.
If she does no favor, she remains disadvantaged. Favors of size other thanz are ot part of
equilibrium play and can be deterred by Nash reversion. Whenz = 1, the game is called
full equality matching.
For the moment, consider a game of full equality matching between two high types
in a complete information environment. Suppose agenta is disadvantaged,b advantaged.
Let (uem, ūem) denote the average discounted payoffs expected by agents(a, b), or more
generally by disadvantaged and advantaged agents, respectively. Letσem (uem, ūem) =
(σaem (uem, ūem) , σ
b
em (uem, ūem)) denote the EM strategy profile that implements the pay-
off pair (uem, ūem). Underσem the payoffs are
uem = pδ
H ūem + (1 − p)δ
Huem, (1)
ūem = p
(
1 − δH + δH ūem
)
+ p
(
(1 − δH)k + δHuem
)
+ (1 − 2p)δH ūem. (2)
The first equation consists of two events: (i) with probabilityp agenta receives a favor
opportunity, does a full favor(x = 1), and becomes the advantaged agent; that is, agent
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a is promised continuation payoff̄uem, (ii) with probability (1 − p) agenta receives no
favor opportunity so her flow payoff is zero and her continuation promise remainsuem
along with her disadvantaged status. The equation for payoffūem consists of three events
that occur with probabilitiesp, p and(1 − 2p), respectively: (i) agentb receives a favor
opportunity, does no favor and receives a flow payoff of1 instead, and her continuation
promise remains̄uem as she is still advantaged, (ii) agenta receives a favor opportunity,
does a full favor(x = 1) so agentb receives a flow payoff ofk, but her continuation payoff
drops touem because she now owes agenta the next favor, and (iii) neither agent receives a
favor opportunity, so agentb’s flow payoff is zero and her continuation payoff remainsūem.
The two previous equations contain two unknowns,uem andūem, solving for these yields
uem =
δHp2 (1 + k)
1 − δH(1 − 2p)
, (3)
ūem =
p
(
1 − δH(1 − p)
)
(1 + k)
1 − δH(1 − 2p)
. (4)
For the simple EM strategy profile to be aNash equilibrium(NE) in each stage game,
neither agent can have a profitable deviation available to them. It is trivial that the advan-
taged agent has no profitable deviations as she just waits for reciprocation, but does no
favors. Public (observable) off-equilibrium path deviations, such as the advantaged agent
doing a favor or one of the agents doing the wrong size favor, can easily be deterred by
threat of autarky (no more favors). Therefore, we only need to check that it is not profitable
for the disadvantaged agent to do no favor despite receiving a favor opportunity. As usual,
it is enough to consider a one-shot deviation. Agenta’s discount factor has to be high
enough that the incentive compatibility constraint below is satisfied.
ICCaem : δ
H ūem ≥ 1 − δ
H + δHuem
⇐⇒ ūem − uem ≥
(
1 − δH
)
/δH .
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Using equations (3) and (4),ICCaem may be written as
p(1−δH(1−p))(1+k)
1−δH(1−2p) −
δHp2(1+k)
1−δH(1−2p) −
1−δH
δH
≥ 0
⇐⇒ 1−δ
H
δH(1−δH(1−2p))
(
δHp (k − 1) −
(
1 − δH
))
≥ 0.
It follows δH ∈ (0, 1) must satisfyδHp (k − 1)−
(
1 − δH
)
≥ 0 for ICCaem to hold. Solving
δHp (k − 1) −
(
1 − δH
)
≥ 0 for δH yields δH ≥ 1
1+p(k−1) = δ
∗. We use this boundary
discount factor to define high and low type agents.
Condition (5): δH ≥ δ∗ :=
1
1 + p (k − 1)
> δL. (5)
Any observable deviation from the equilibrium path can be deterred by the threat of
reversion to autarky. It is also easy to verify thatuem = p for δ
H = δ∗ so the individual
rationality constraints of̄uem, uem ≥ p are satisfied. Therefore, this EM strategy profile
is a Nash equilibrium. In fact, we could use the stronger equilibrium concept ofublic
perfect equilibrium(PPE) following Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin.[5] A strategy for agent
i ∈ {a, b} is public if it depends only on her current period private information, in this case
whether or not the agent received a favor opportunity, and the public history, which for this
game consists of public favors done up to and including the last period. A PPE is a profile
of public strategies that form a Nash equilibrium for each period and the corresponding
public history.
Since the payoff pair(uem, ūem) is enforceable (implementable), it follows by symme-
try that(ūem, uem) is also enforceable, and therefore any utility pair on the line connecting
(uem, ūem) and(ūem, uem) is enforceable with the use of a public randomization device.
AB [1] aptly call these PPE with current and continuation payoffs restricted onto a sym-
metric line,symmetric self-generating line(SSGL) equilibria. The details of SSGL and the
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corresponding equilibria will be explained in more detail in the next two subsections. For
now it suffices to say that AB [1] solve for the highest such line; thehighest symmetric
self-generating line(HSSGL) and they show that condition (5) is exactly the right bound
necessary to implement HSSGL equilibria. In fact, the simple EM mechanism is a HSSGL
equilibrium forδH = δ∗. In the case whereδH > δ∗, we may use the extra wiggle room to
obtain a higher total payoff (and thus a higher SSGL) by requiring the advantaged agent to
make further small favors while she waits for reciprocation from the disadvantaged agent.1
Observe that for the first-best outcome both agents would have to exhibit full trust in
terms ofx andy. AB [1] (p. 12) call x + y the level of trust. Agent a (b) is said to
exhibitmore trustif x > y (y > x). However, if both agents exhibit full trust every period
regardless of history, neither agent has any incentive to do costly favors. Thus the first-best
outcome cannot be achieved. However, on the HSSGL line, the level of trust is maximized
subject to the restriction that continuation payoffs are picked from the same HSSGL.
It is perhaps natural to wonder if it is incentive compatible for low types to trade smaller
favors, that is, to cooperate on a lower SSGL. It is not. Decreasing the size of favors and re-
peating the analysis for the EM mechanism shows that discount factors above or equal toδ∗
are still necessary to sustain cooperation. Furthermore, cooperation on a lower line would
be less efficient. The discount factor required to support EM equilibria is independent of
favor size because agents have linear utility functions. They are effectively risk neutral with
respect to the size of favors. In terms of the mathematics, the lower cost of smaller favors
is directly proportional by factor one to the resulting lower continuation payoffs. A formal
proof will follow after we first introduce additional notation. For future reference, letσem(z)
denote the EM strategy profile when the size of exchanged favors isz ∈ (0, 1]. Let ūem(z)
1AB also constructed other types of equilibria that may lead to higher or lower total payoffs than HSSGL
equilibria depending on the parameter values. However, we concentrate on HSSGL equilibria because they
always exist if condition (5) is satisfied, and loosely speaking outperform other types of equilibria whenp is
not very high.
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anduem(z) denote respective continuation payoffs for advantaged and disadvantaged agent.
Unless otherwise noted, we use EM to refer to matching of full favors, or simply full EM.
2.2.1 Summary of notation and structure
The notation that follows is necessary to formally define the equilibrium profiles we will
use in the sections that follow, but we present it in a format well-suited for reference.
Payoffs are in average discounted values.
Model parameters:
i ∈ {a, b} : Agents.
ωi ∈ {L,H} : Agenti’s type;L = low, H = high.
p ∈ (0, 1) : Probability agenti ∈ {a, b} receives a favor opportunity.
Opportunities are either mutually exclusive or independent.
k > 1 : Benefit per unit of favor.
δi ∈ (0, 1) : Discount factor of agenti ∈ {a, b}.
μo ∈ (0, 1) : Fraction of high type agents inpopulation.
Actions:
x, y ∈ [0, 1] : Size of favor by agentsa, b, respectively.
Payoffs:
(u, v) : Current payoffs to agents(a, b).
(uo, vo) : Continuation payoffs to(a, b) when no one does a favor.
(ui, vi) : Continuation payoffs to(a, b) wheni ∈ {a, b} does a favor.
Table 1: Summary of notation
2.2.1.1 Information structure: Let t = 1, 2, . . . denote the time index. Letwit = 1 if
agenti receives a favor opportunity in periodt and 0 otherwise. Agenti privately observes
W it = {w
i
z}
t
z=1. Let τt = (x, y) denote favors(x, y) ∈ (0, 1]
2 agentsa andb, respectively,
do in periodt. If neither agent does a favor, then letτt = 0. Both agents observeTt =
{τz}tz=1. Private history of agenti and public history up to and including periodt are
denoted byhit = W
i
t ∈ H
i
t andHt = Tt ∈ Ht, respectively. A strategy for agenti,
denoted byσi, consists of a favor making decision,I it , for each period based oni’s type,
17
her private history up to periodt, and public history up to periodt − 1. More formally,
I it : {H,L} ×H
i
t ×Ht−1 → [0, 1] s.t. I
i
t = 0 whenw
i
t = 0.
2.2.2 Strategies and equilibrium concepts
For our solution concept we will usePerfect Bayesian equilibrium(PBE). PBE consist of
a strategy profile
(
σ =
(
σa, σb
))
and a belief system
(
μ =
(
μa, μb
))
such thatσ is sequen-
tially rational with respect toμ andμ is consistent withσ. That is, the strategies are optimal
at every stage of the game given the beliefs, and the beliefs are updated according to Bayes’
rule from equilibrium strategies and observed actions. We should, strictly speaking, also
specify beliefs for off-equilibrium path actions, however, we deter these actions with the
threat of autarky play, which is always an equilibrium response, so it is understood that be-
liefs consistent with autarky exist and would be straightforward if burdensome to specify.
Therefore we generally leave out off-equilibrium path beliefs from our belief functions.
But this brings us to the following two definitions.
Definition 2.1 Letσiaut be such thatI
i
t = 0, ∀t.
Definition 2.2 LetH∗t be the set of all public on-equilibrium path histories up to and in-
cluding periodt.
For example, if two agents are playing a full equality matching game and agentis
the initial disadvantaged agent, any history such that agentb did the first favor, one of the
agents did two consecutive favors, or a partial favor, would not be inH∗t . However, histories
that include only private deviations, that is, a disadvantaged agent does not do a favor when
she has the opportunity, would still be inH∗t . Next, let us define EM formally.
Definition 2.3 An equality matching strategy at levelz ∈ (0, 1] for agenti, denoted by
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σiem(z) or simplyσ
i
em whenz = 1, is such that
I it =



z if agenti is disadvantaged,wit = 1 andht−1 ∈ H
∗
t−1,
0 otherwise.
Lemma 2.4 (Necessary and sufficient condition for EM)δH ≥ δ∗ = 1
1+p(k−1) is neces-
sary and sufficient to implementσem(z), ∀z ∈ (0, 1] in a complete information environment.
Proof. In appendix.
While EM is generally not the most efficient way to trade favors, the first best outcome
is not enforceable, and in the AB [1] model, the second best outcome may be intractable.
Presumably that is why AB [1] focused on PPE restricted to symmetric lines rather than to
the whole space of feasible and individually rational payoffs. While our primary interest
is to implement separation efficiently, rather than to optimize subsequent endgames, we do
argue that after separation into an EM game, high types can achieve equilibria of higher
value. To this end, we explain AB’shighest symmetric self-generating line(HSSGL) equi-
librium concept [1] as it applies to our version of their model. While we do not repeat their
proofs, we do provide a basic explanation of how these results were obtained because our
model is sufficiently different that a direct transition of results from AB [1] would not be
immediate or even possible. Later we show formally that a pair of high types can move to
a HSSGL equilibrium after equality matching for long enough.
Definition 2.5 A self-generating line (SGL) is a line in the payoff space such that any
payoffs(u, v) on the line may be implemented using some actions(x, y) and continuation
payoffs(ui, vi, uo, vo) subject toui + vi = T anduo + vo = T for i ∈ {a, b}. A symmetric
self-generating line is a SGL such that(u, ū) → (ū, u), and the highest symmetric self-
generating line (HSSGL) is a symmetric SGL such thatT is maximized [1] (p. 12).
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The HSSGL equilibria are PPE restricted to symmetric lines. As is normal in the lit-
erature, AB [1] use the recursive approach introduced by Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti [2]
(APS). Let operatorB produce the largest self-generating set of PPE values,Ψ∗.2 Then for
any setΨ ⊂ R2, letB(Ψ) = {(u, v) ∈ Ψ : ∃ (ui, vi) ∈ Ψ, i ∈ {a, b} ; (uo, vo) ∈ Ψ; x, y ∈
[0, 1], s.t. (6)-(10) below are satisfied}. [1] (p. 10-11). In autarky each agent’s payoff isp,
so the individual rationality constraints are the following:
IR : u, v, ui, vi, uo, vo ≥ p. (6)
The relevant incentive compatibility constraints for agentsa andb state that when the agent
has an opportunity to do a favor, the flow payoff, which reflects the cost of the favor, and
the continuation promise for doing the favor exceed the flow payoff without cost and the
continuation payoff when neither agent does a favor:
ICCax :
(
1 − δH
)
(1 − x) + δHua ≥
(
1 − δH
)
+ δHuo, (7)
ICCby :
(
1 − δH
)
(1 − y) + δHvb ≥
(
1 − δH
)
+ δHvo. (8)
The current period payoffsu andv must be consistent with the flow payoffs and the con-
tinuation promises consisting of three possible outcomes: either agenti r ceives a favor
opportunity and does a favor forj, agentj receives a favor opportunity and does a favor for
i, or neither agent receives a favor opportunity:
u = p
((
1 − δH
)
(1 − x) + δHua
)
+ p
((
1 − δH
)
ky + δHub
)
+ (1 − 2p)δHuo, (9)
v = p
((
1 − δH
)
(1 − y) + δHvb
)
+ p
((
1 − δH
)
kx + δHva
)
+ (1 − 2p)δHvo. (10)
2To this end, assume that observable off-equilibrium path deviations, such as a favor of different size from
the on-equilibrium path favor, will be punished with reversion to autarky. Thus, the only relevant deviations
for the following analysis will be on-equilibrium path deviations, namely deviations that are not observable
to one of the agents.
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By restricting their analysis onto symmetric lines, AB [1] essentially reduce the prob-
lem to starting with the full EM profile,σem, and solving for the highest enforceable favor
by the advantaged agent, that is a favor that makes her incentive compatibility problem
bind, and all continuation payoffs must be chosen from the same symmetric line. That way
the value of the game remains the same regardless of who, if anyone, does a favor. In par-
ticular, AB [1] (p. 24-25) provide the equivalent of the following characterization of their
HSSGL equilibrium, which implies that the corner payoff pair,(u, ū), can be implemented
with (x, y, ua, ub, uo, va, vb, vo), such that
x = 1, y = δ
H−δ∗
δH+δ∗
, (11)
ua = u + (1 + y)
1−δH
δH
= ū, ub = u, uo = u + y
1−δH
δH
, (12)
va = u, vb = ū, vo = ū − y 1−δ
H
δH
, (13)
u = p + y (p (k − 1) + 1) = p + δ
H−δ∗
δH+δ∗
1
δ∗
, (14)
ū = pk − y = u +
2(1−δH)
δH+δ∗
. (15)
and by the threat of autarky if one of the agents publicly deviates off-equilibrium path.
The other corner payoff pair,(ū, u), can be implemented symmetrically. It then follows
that any payoff pair(u, v) between(u, ū) and (ū, u) may be implemented with a public
randomization device at the start of the game. Call this strategy profileσhssgl(u, v).
In a 2005 version of their paper, AB [1] further calculate a deterministic algorithm to
enforceσhssgl(u, v). From the corner solution we know the total trust,x + y = 2δ
H
δH+δ∗
, and
the total payoff,T = u + v = 2p + 2δ
Hp(k−1)
δH+δ∗
, ∀x, y, u, v on the HSSGL. We also have the
corner point values,(u, ū) and(ū, u), defined by (14) and (15), that are necessary for use
as maximal rewards to implement any HSSGL equilibria. In fact, we know thatua = u +
(x + y)1−δ
H
δH
= ū, ub = u, va = u andvb = ū. The incentive compatibility constraints must
also bind, so we can use identities mentioned previously, along with (binding) equations
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(7)-(10) to calculatex, y, uo andvo required to implement any payoff pair(u, v) on the
HSSGL defined by(u, ū) and (ū, u). Our equivalents of AB’s equations [1] are stated
below without proof:3
x = δ
Hδ∗
1−δH
[
v−(1−δH)p
δH
− u
]
, y = δ
Hδ∗
1−δH
[
u−(1−δH)p
δH
− u
]
, (16)
uo = δ
∗
[
u−(1−δH)p
δH
+ u(1−δ
∗)
δ∗
]
, vo = δ
∗
[
v−(1−δH)p
δH
+ u(1−δ
∗)
δ∗
]
. (17)
2.2.3 Previous favor-trading literature
Möbius [12] first investigated the type of 2-player favor-trading games we study (2001),
albeit with complete information and continuous time. He focused on an intuitive “chips
mechanism.” That is, each player begins withK chips, and each time an agent does a favor,
she earns a chip. If one agent accumulates all2K chips, she suspends favors until recipro-
cation. EM is effectively a chips game with only one chip held by the advantaged agent.
Hauser and Hopenhayn [8] continue Möbius’ [12] favor-trading research by allowing par-
tial favors (2005). Consequently, they let the cost of favors vary based on public history of
favor exchanges, notably including time passed since the last exchange. They characterize
a set of Pareto optimal PPE, and show numerically that partial favors lead to significant
efficiency gains over M̈obius’ chips mechanism. [12] Their findings display similar char-
acteristics to HSSGL equilibria formulated by AB [1] in discrete time (first draft in 2004).
Both Hauser and Hopenhayn [8] and AB [1] use PPE as their solution concept and allow
partial favors. Both find equilibria that call for larger favors to be followed by unlimited
smaller favors until reciprocation. This is in contrast to M¨ bius who assumed favors were
3A strategy profileσ(u, v) that begins at timet ∈ N, denotes a strategy profileσ that implements expected
payoffs(u, v) at that time. However,σ will not implement(u, v) every period aftert. The payoffs to be
implemented each period depend on the history andσ. For example,σhssgl(u, ū) at t = 1, denotes a HSSGL
strategy profile that at the beginning of period1 is expected to generate payoffs(u, ū). If neither agent does
a favor in the first period,σhssgl is expected to yield payoffs(uo (u, ū) , vo (u, ū)) at the beginning of period
2, whereuo andvo are given by the last equation above foru = u andv = ū.
22
all the same size, and an agent would suspend favors whenever she was owed2K favors.
Both Hauser and Hopenhayn [8] and AB [1] discover what the former call “debt forgive-
ness.” That is, the value of favors owed declines; debt is forgiven, unless “interest” in the
form of small favors is “paid” by the advantaged agent.
Therefore it seems that favor-trading in a complete information environment is robust to
the model’s timing structure (continuous versus discrete) and the arrival process of favors
(independent versus mutually exclusive). We show that with incomplete information, the
more efficient equilibria characterized by multiple consecutive favors are initially precluded
by the possibility of low types, but can always be achieved over time between high types.
We also show that the distribution of the arrival process of favors plays an important role
in strategies for separation. Furthermore, independent favor opportunities in discrete time
raise the possibility of both agents having the opportunity to do a favor for at the same time.
This possibility has not been studied in previous favor-trading models.
A notable difference between Hauser and Hopenhayn [8] and AB [1] is that AB in-
clude opportunities for immediate reciprocity with private information. However, AB [1]
show that immediate reciprocity is unnecessary for HSSGL equilibria, which is why our
streamlined version of their model does not include it. Further, AB [1] describe favor op-
portunities as income shocks, and favors as investments. We dropped this terminology
because favor-trading precludes side payments, and we felt that using monetary language
to discuss the topic confused the issue. We also normalized payoffs to average discounted
values for convenience.
Outside of the favor-trading literature, Watson [19] did study the sustainability of coop-
eration using a two-player infinitely-repeated prisoner’s dilemma model with incomplete
information about agents’ types. However, in his model deviations from cooperative be-
havior are publicly observable, whereas in favor-trading games only cooperative actions
are observable, and deviations are private Still, both models have the broad characteristic
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that agents start cooperation with small stakes, but form more profitable relationships over
time if each agent proves her willingness to cooperate.
2.3 One-sided incomplete information
For the rest of this section, we consider the case of mutually exclusive favor opportunities,
with one known agent;a is a high type, and one unknown agent;b is a high type with
probabilityμo, and a low type with probability1 − μo.
2.3.1 Separation with equality matching (EM) equilibria
A low type agentb facing a high type agenta would prefer to be seen as a high type in
order to receive favors froma even though she would not reciprocate. The high type wants
to separate herself from the low type as soon as possible and exchange favors witha. The
question is whether a separating equilibrium exists, and if so, how quickly and efficiently
can a high type separate?
The answer to the first part should be clear if we consider the EM strategy profile,
σem(z)
(
ūem(z), uem(z)
)
, discussed in section 2. Recall that the necessary and sufficient con-
dition for agentb to benefit from EM isδb ≥ δ∗. It follows immediately that a high type
may separate as soon as she receives a favor opportunity by doing a favor of sizez. Call
this immediate separation,that is, separation at first possible opportunity. To formalize this
answer, we first have to define beliefs.
Definition 2.6 μ ≡ μt ≡
(
μat , μ
b
t
)
whereμi0 ≡ μo andμ
i
t : H
i
t ×Ht−1 → [0, 1] represents
agenti’s belief. That is,μit is the probability assigned byi to the event that the other agent
is a high type based oni’s private history up to periodt and public history up tot − 1.
Sometimes we drop the time index for convenience(μ ≡ μt) . The domain of the belief
function consists of agenti’s private history up to the current period and the public history
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up to the last period because it refers to agenti’s belief at a point in periodt wheni has
observed her private signal (her favor opportunity is 0 or 1) but not the public signal (period
t favors, if any, are still pending). That is,μit captures agenti’s updated belief in periodt at
the point in time when she has either received a favor opportunity and is deciding whether
or not to do a favor, or she has received no opportunity and is waiting to see if the other
agent does a favor.
Lemma 2.7 (Separation with one-sided incomplete information)A strategy profile
(σ, μ) defined by equations (18)-(21) is a PBE forz ∈ (0, 1] .
σa :=σaem(z)
(
ūem(z), uem(z)
)
, (18)
σb :=



σbem(z)
(
ūem(z), uem(z)
)
if ωb = H,
σbaut if ω
b = L,
(19)
μbt :=1, (20)
μat :=



0 if Ht−1 /∈ H∗t−1 (off-equilibrium path move),
1 else if∃n < t s.t. τn = (0, z) ,
μat−1 else ifw
a
t = 1,
μat−1(1−2p)
1−(1+μat−1)p
otherwise.
(21)
Proof. The proof follows immediately from lemma 2.4 as long asσ is consistent with
μ. In this caseμ was constructed fromσ by Bayesian updating, so consistency follows.
Recall that part of the EM strategy is to stop doing favors (switch to autarky) if anyone
deviates publicly from the equilibrium path. Thereby such moves are deterred. Conse-
quently off-equilibrium path beliefs are moot (first row ofμat ). On the equilibrium path,
three possibilities exist: (i) agentb does a favor of sizez, in which casea believesb is a
high type (second row ofμat ). This belief is consistent withσ because only a high type
would do a favor perσ. (ii) If agent a receives the favor opportunity,b does not because
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favor opportunities are mutually exclusive, soa’s belief aboutb does not change (third row
of μat ). This is trivially consistent withσ. (iii) Agent a receives neither a favor opportunity,
nor a favor fromb. Either agentb did not receive a favor opportunity (neither agent did),
or she received the opportunity but did not do the favor perσ because she is a low type. In
this case, agenta’s updated belief per Bayes’ rule is
μat = P
(
ωb = H : {τt = 0 ∩ w
a
t = 0}
)
=
P(ωb=H∩τt=0∩wat =0)
P (τt=0∩wat =0)
=
μat−1(1−2p)
μat−1(1−2p)+(1−μat−1)(p+1−2p)
=
μat−1(1−2p)
1−(1+μat−1)p
.
Figure 1 depicts paths to events that agenta may observe and her subjective equilibrium
beliefs along these paths. For brevity we usew.t to denote the recipient of a favor opportu-
nity in periodt.
Agenta’s belief aboutb’s type
Prior: μat−1 1−μ
a
t−1
Type: ωb = H ωb = L
Probability:
Opportunity ( w.t):
(private info)
p
b
p
a
1-2p
∅
p
a
p
b
1-2p
∅
Observed
event:
Favor
received
Opportunity
received
No opportunity
and no favor
Posterior
belief:
μat = 1 μ
a
t = μ
a
t−1 μ
a
t =
μat−1(1−2p)
1−p+μat−1p
Figure 1: Baysian updating of beliefs
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2.3.2 Separation and highest symmetric self-generating line (HSSGL) equilibria
Next we investigate whether or not high types can separate immediately into a HSSGL
equilibrium profile. IfδH = δ∗, full EM and HSSGL equilibria coincide. This was shown
in section 2. Therefore, supposeδH > δ∗ for the rest of this subsection. As before we
assume agenta is a high type and agentb is an unknown type.
For the moment, suppose agenta’s strategy is to wait for a favor of sizez ∈ (0, 1], and
if b does such a favor,a will respond with HSSGL play withb as the advantaged player.
The point of the exercise is to find out if a HSSGL equilibrium can be directly implemented
after separation. To this end, we may setz = 1 without compromising the generality of
the result. This choice ofz minimizes the incentive for low types to mimic high types,
yet is incentive compatible for high types per subsection 2.2.2, in which AB’s HSSGL
equilibrium [1] results were adapted to our model with complete information. In particular,
equations (12)-(15) detail the incentive compatible HSSGL strategy profile to support a
corner solution. That is, the continuation payoffs necessary to support a full favor by a
disadvantaged high type agent, and a partial favor by the advantaged agent. Recall that
each high type agent’s incentive compatibility constraint binds in a HSSGL equilibrium, or
else we could use the available slack to move to a higher line. Therefore, we cannot lower
the continuation promise to agentb to deter low types further unless we deter the high types
as well.
In summary, it is enough to calculate if a low type agentb would be willing to do a
full favor in return forσahssgl (u, ū). Equations (16) and (17) specify all actions by agenta,
andb follows the autarky strategy after the initial full favor. Therefore we may calculate
the expected payoff to agentb and verify that for some parameter values she would have
incentive to pool with high types. The lemmas below formalize these claims.
Lemma 2.8 (HSSGL payoff to advantaged low types)The expected payoff to a low type
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agentb under strategy profileσ =
(
σahssgl (u, ū) , σ
b
aut
)
is
vL0 = p + pk
δH(δH+δ∗−2δLδ∗)
(δH+δ∗)(δH−δLδ∗(1−p)) . (22)
Proof. In appendix.
The next proposition defines a strategy for agenta of doing no favors unlessb does a
full favor first. If the favor is received,a will play according to HSSGL strategy profile that
implements the corner payoff pair(u, ū) favoring agentb. Given such a strategy, the propo-
sition will prove that condition (5) alone does not guarantee that high types can separate
immediately into a HSSGL endgame, and a stronger condition is required.
Proposition 2.9 (Immediate HSSGL separation)Consider HSSGL payoffs(u, ū)
defined by (14)-(15) and lett∗ denote the first time agentb does a full favor. Then for
strategy
σa :=



σaaut for t ≤ t
∗ (no favors untilb does a full favor)
σahssgl (u, ū) starting att = t
∗ + 1 (HSSGL play ifb does a favor)
wheret∗ := inf {t ∈ N : τt = (0, 1)} and inf {∅} ≡ ∞,
immediate separation is enforceable only ifδL is low enough orδH is high enough. The
technical condition they must is
δHk p(1+(k−1)p)(1−2δL+δH(1+(k−1)p))
(1+δH(1+(k−1)p))(δH(1+(k−1)p)−δL(1−p)) ≥
1−δL
δL
. (23)
Proof. Given σa, a low type agentb will only do a full favor if the following incentive
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compatibility constraint is satisfied:
ICCLhssgl : δ
LvL0 ≥ 1 − δ
L + δLp. (24)
Substituting infor vL0 from lemma 2.8 and simplifying yields condition (23).
Lemma 2.10 (Simple lower bound forδ̄L) Let δ̄L be defined by (25),
δL ≤ δ̄L := 2
B̂+
√
B̂2−
4α(B̂+p(k−1))
1+α
< δ∗
whereB̂=1+α(1−p)+pk andα≡δ∗/δH .
(25)
thenδ̄L ≥ δL := 1/ (1 + pk) .
Proof. The expressions for̄δL is derived in the appendix. The continuation promise for a
low type that mimics a high type is in HSSGLis vL0 = p (k + 1) because with probability
p she receives a favor of valuek from the other agent and with probabilityp she receives
the favor opportunity of value1. SubstitutingvL0 = p (k + 1) into ICC
L
hssgl (inequality
24), assuming it binds, and solving forδL produces solutionδL = 1/ (1 + pk) . Therefore
it suffices to showthatvL0 ≤ p (k + 1) . Rewriting v
L
0 from lemma 2.8:
vL0 = p + pk
δH
(
δH + δ∗
)
− 2δHδLδ∗
δH (δH + δ∗) − (1 − p) (δH + δ∗) δLδ∗
< p + pk
δH
(
δH + δ∗
)
− (1 − p)
(
δH + δ∗
)
δLδ∗
δH (δH + δ∗) − (1 − p) (δH + δ∗) δLδ∗
∵2δHδLδ∗>(1−p)(δH+δ∗)δLδ∗ ⇐= 2>(1−p)(1+δ∗/δH)
=⇒ vL0 < p (k + 1) . (26)
=⇒ δ̄L ∈
(
1
1+pk
, 1
1+p(k−1)
)
≡
(
δL, δ∗
)
.
The point of presenting lemma 2.10 was to demonstrate that fork large,δL → δ∗ and
thereforeδ̄L → δ∗. Suppose thatδL ∼ U (0, δ∗), then the subpopulation of low types with
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incentive to mimic high types in a game involving separation into HSSGL is bounded from
above byδ∗ − δL per lemma 2.10. As a fraction of all low types
δ∗−δL
δ∗
=
1
1+p(k−1)−
1
1+pk
1
1+p(k−1)
=
p
(1+pk)(1+p(k−1))
1
1+p(k−1)
= p
(1+pk)
→ 0 ask → ∞.
The discount factor bounds,δ∗ and δ̄L, are directly proportional to the expected contin-
uation payoff from
(
σaem (uem, ūem) , σ
b
aut
)
and
(
σaem (u, ū) , σ
b
aut
)
, respectively. Since the
difference betweenδ∗ andδ̄L is generally speaking small, it follows that the low type would
generally not stand to benefit greatly from HSSGL play over EM play. The reason is that
in EM the advantaged low type is guaranteed a favor worthk as soon as agenta receives a
favor opportunity, whereas in HSSGL play, low type agentb will only receive a full favor
if agenta receives a favor opportunity the very next period afterb gains the advantaged sta-
tus. After that the size of the favorb is owned keeps decreasing unlessb keeps doing small
favors to remain fully advantaged, and even then her continuation payoff would depreciate
each period when neither agent received a favor opportunity.
As for condition (23), we can writẽδH = k
(1+p(k−1))2 −
1
1+p(k−1) . It is then easy to
see that̃δH → 0 as k → ∞. The exception to this rule is ifp → 0 at a faster rate
than1/
√
k. That is, condition (23) is generally violated only ifp is significantly smaller
thank in relative terms. The reason whyδH is even a factor in the low types incentive
compatibility constraints is because of the way HSSGL equilibria are calculated; namely,
the size of partial favors are chosen so that ICC of high types binds. The higher the high
type’s discount factor, the greater the favors. We have now established conditions under
which low types would not mimic high types. Next we use these results to formally define
an equilibrium profile that implements immediate separation if agentb is a high type and
δL ≤ δ̄L.
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Lemma 2.11 (From EM to HSSGL) SupposeδL ≤ δ̄L as defined by equations (25). Let
t∗ := inf {t ∈ N : τt = (0, 1)} whereinf {∅} ≡ ∞, and consider strategy profile(σ, μ)
defined by equations (27)-(30).
σa :=



σaaut for t ≤ t
∗,
σahssgl (u, ū) for t = t
∗ + 1,
(27)
σb :=



σbhssgl (ū, u) starting fromt = inf
{
s ∈ N : wbs = 1
}
if ωb = H,
σbaut otherwise,
(28)
μbt :=1, (29)
μat :=



0 if Ht−1 /∈ H∗t−1 (off-equilibrium path move),
1 if Ht−1 ∈ H∗t−1 and∃n < t s.t. τn = (0, z) ,
μat−1 if w
a
t = 1,
μat−1(1−2p)
1−(1+μat−1)p
otherwise.
(30)
Then(σ, μ) is a PBE profile.
Proof. Sinceσhssgl (u, ū) is a PPE profile (restricted to a symmetric line) with complete
information, it is also a PBE profile post separation since beliefs become trivial at that point,
andσhssgl (u, ū) implements a Nash equilibrium at each stage of the game that follows. For
t ≥ t∗, μa = μb = 1 on the equilibrium path, so the beliefs are consistent withσhssgl (u, ū).
And givenσa, it is incentive compatible for a high type agentb to do a full favor(y = 1)
when she first receives a favor opportunity per subsection 2.2.2, and equations (11)-(15) in
particular. The belief systemμ is clearly consistent withσ, and given̄δL, low types would
not try to mimic the high types per proposition 2.9.
The next step is to consider what happens if low types have discount factors betweenδ̄L
andδ∗. We know immediate separation can always be implemented with an EM endgame
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per lemma 2.7, but not with a HSSGL endgame per proposition 2.9. However, sinceδ∗ is
the threshold discount factor required for equality matching to be incentive compatible, and
δL < δ∗ by definition, it follows that EM is strictly not incentive compatible for low types.
Suppose we promise an agent a payoffT periods from now preceded by full EM. This
strategy profile would be incentive compatible for high types for anyT in the absence of
low types, so we can makeT sufficiently large that low types are deterred by the prospect
of T periods of EM play prior to the promised higher value payoff.
Corollary 2.12 SupposeδL ∈ (δ̄L, δ∗). Lett∗ := inf {t ∈ N : τt = (0, 1)}, whereinf {∅} ≡
∞, and consider(σ, μ) defined by (31)-(34).
σa =



σaem (ūem, uem) for t < t
∗ + T ,
σahssgl (ū, u) starting att = t
∗ + T if a advantaged,
σahssgl (u, ū) starting att = t
∗ + T if b advantaged,
(31)
σb =



σbem (ūem, uem)
if ωb = H starting att = inf
{
s ∈ N : wbs = 1
}
for T periods,
σbhssgl (ū, u) starting att = t∗ + T if a advantaged andωb = H,
σbhssgl (u, ū) starting att = t∗ + T if b advantaged andωb = H,
σbaut if ωb = L,
(32)
μat =



0 if ht−1 /∈ H∗t−1,
1 if t ≥ t∗ andht−1 ∈ H∗t−1,
μat−1 if w
a
t = 1,
μat−1(1−2p)
1−(1+μat−1)p
otherwise,
(33)
μbt = 1. (34)
Then(σ, μ) is a PBE forT ∈ N large enough.
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Proof. In appendix.
There are several other methods to deter low types before a move to a HSSGL endgame
Some of these methods are probably more efficient in some circumstances. For example,
if δH > δ∗, there exists some slack in the high type agentb’s EM incentive compatibility
constraints, that could be used to implement a lower first return favor by agent. Given
a large enough difference betweenδL andδH , this tactic might deter the low types after
just one round of favor trades, albeit atb’s expense. Another method would be to play
according to a HSSGL equilibrium profile for someδ̂ ∈
(
δ∗, δH
)
. In particular, if the
optimal time required to deter a low type were measured in continuous time, then it would
land on aT ∈ N with probability 0. That is, a small inefficiency is generated by the
discrete time structure of our model, which necessitates rounding off to the nearest integer.
Such inefficiencies could be removed, at least partly, by playing according to a HSSGL
equilibrium profile, in the last period ofT , for an appropriately chosen̂δ ∈
(
δ∗, δH
)
.
However, while we recognize that such small efficiency gains are possible, we chose to
focus on the EM separation because it is more general.
2.4 Two-sided incomplete information
When incomplete information is two-sided, a high type agent may attempt to separate her-
self from the low type by doing the first favor. Denote such a favor byzt at periodt. If
the initial favor necessary to trigger cooperation between high types is sufficiently large, it
will deter low types from mimicking high types, providing a way for high types to separate
themselves. After an initial separation, we are back to the one-sided incomplete informa-
tion case described by the results in the previous section. The question is, can we find a
sequence of sufficiently large initial favors to deter the low types from pooling with high
types, but still low enough that high types would have incentive to do the favor and risk not
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receiving reciprocation if the other is a low type, instead of just waiting for the other agent
to go first. Recall that in AB’s EM and HSSGL equilibria [1], advantaged and disadvan-
taged designations are determined exogenously, so there is no first mover problem.
In the first subsection, we will follow the same approach. We investigate equilibria
in which one agent is designated to do the first favor. Such a strategy takes care of the
first mover problem. The designated agent, or thedesigneefrom now on, will not grow
increasingly pessimistic when the other agent does no favors (since the strategy profile
doesn’t call for it), and she has no option to wait for the other to go first, so her incentives
to separate are increased. However, the trade-off is that separation between high types takes
roughly twice as long as it would if both agents were attempting to separate. This is why
we investigate symmetric strategies for separation in the second subsection.
2.4.1 Designated first favor maker (DFFM) equilibria
Consider a strategy of designating an agent at the beginning of the game to do the first favor
of pre-agreed sizez, while the other waits. In separating equilibriaz has to be high enough
to deter low types from pooling with high types. If the designee does a favor of sizez, she
earns the advantaged status in an full EM game that follows, provided of course the other
agent is a high type. A formal description of this strategy, and a proof are below. For now,
suppose without loss of generality that agenta is the designee. For now we abstract from
how the agents determine the designation, but for some later results we will assume agents
can randomize, at least with even odds (coin flip), to see who is to do the first favor.
Proposition 2.13 (Existence of DFFM equilibria) Let t∗ := inf {t ∈ N : τt = (z, 0)},
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t∗∗ := inf{s ∈ N : was = 1} and consider strategy profile(σ, μ) be such that
σa :=



σaem(z)
(
uem(z), ūem(z)
)
if ht−1 ∈ H∗t−1, ω
a = H, t ≤ t∗∗,
σaem (ūem, uem) starting att = t
∗ if ht−1 ∈ H∗t−1, ω
a = H,
σaaut otherwise,
(35)
σb :=



σbem (ūem, uem) starting att = t
∗ if ht−1 ∈ H∗t−1, ω
b = H,
σbaut otherwise,
(36)
μat :=



0 if ht−1 /∈ H∗t−1,
1 if ht−1 ∈ H∗t−1 and∃n < t s.t. τn = (0, 1) ,
μo if ht−1 ∈ H∗t−1 and@n ≤ t s.t. τn = (z, 0) ,
μat−1 if ht−1 ∈ H
∗
t−1 andw
a
t = 1,
μat−1(1−2p)
1−(1+μat−1)p
otherwise,
(37)
μbt :=



0 if ht−1 /∈ H∗t−1,
1 if ht−1 ∈ H∗t−1 and∃n < t s.t. τn = (z, 0) ,
μbt−1 if ht−1 ∈ H
∗
t−1 andw
b
t = 1,
μbt−1(1−2p)
1−(1+μbt−1)p
otherwise,
(38)
z ∈ [z, z̄] ≡
[
μopδLk
1−δL(1−p) , min
{
1,
μopδH(1−δH)k+δHp(k−1)
(1−δH)(1−δH(1−2p))
}]
. (39)
Then(σ, μ) is a PBE profile.
Proof. Off-equilibrium path beliefs do not need to be consistent in a PBE, so they are
moot. During publicly observable equilibrium path play, agentb believesa is a high type
with probability 1 if she receives the pre-agreed initial favorz. In the meantime she grows
more pessimistic according to Bayesian updating when she receives neither a favor from
a nor a favor opportunity during the same period. Her beliefs remain unchanged when
she receives the favor opportunity because opportunities are mutually exclusive so there
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is no new information about the other agent. However, even though agentb grows more
pessimistic over time if she does not receive a favor, this does not affect the equilibrium
outcome because she is not called upon to do any favors until agents parates first.
Agent a’s beliefs on the other hand remain unchanged until she does the first favor
unless there is a public off-equilibrium path action by one of the agents. After the first favor,
agenta believesb is a high type once the favor is returned according to (full) EM matching.
Until such time her beliefs are updated according to Bayesian updating when she receives
neither a favor opportunity, nor a favor fromb. Agenta’s beliefs remain unchanged when
she is the one to receive the favor opportunity. These beliefs are clearly sequentially rational
on the equilibrium path so it is enough to solve forz such that the incentive compatibility
constraints hold for each agent.
The incentive compatibility constraints obviously hold for agentb since she simply
waits until the other does a favor and then plays the EM strategy starting as the disadvan-
taged agent if she is a high type, and the autarky strategy otherwise. A deviation (favor) on
her part would cost her today and result in autarky play.
For a low type agenta we need to solve for the largest size favor, call itz, she is willing
to do to mimic a high type. Similarly we need to solve for the largest size favor, call it
z̄, a high type agenta is willing to do to signal her type and begin a full EM game as the
advantaged agent provided agentb is also a high type. If not,a receives the autarky payoff
instead. Boundsz andz̄ can be computed from the incentive compatibility constraints for
the low and high type of agenta, respectively. To end the proof, we show that[z, z̄] 6= ∅.
We show thatz is increasing inδL and z̄ in δH (as well as all other arguments), so using
δL = δH = δ∗ we obtain the maximum value for the lower bound and the minimum value
for the upper bound, each of which isμo. Hence[z, z̄] 6= ∅, and in particular,μo ∈ [z, z̄] for
any values ofδL, δH , p andk. The calculations to prove this are essentially straightforward
but tedious and have therefore been relegated to theapp ndix.
36
2.4.1.1 Characteristics of a designated first favor maker (DFFM) equilibrium: Sup-
pose for the moment that agenta is still, without loss of generality, the designated agent
in a DFFM game. Ifa is a low type, no favors will be exchanged on the equilibrium path,
and both agents simply receive their autarky payoff,p. However, ifa is a high type facing
a low type, her expected payoff would be
uHLD = p
(
(1 − δH)(1 − z) + δHp
)
+ (1 − p)δHuHLD
=
p((1−δH)(1−z)+δHp)
1−δH(1−p) = p − p
1−δH
1−δH(1−p)z, (40)
and the corresponding payoff for the low type agentb would be
vHLD = p
(
(1 − δL)kz + δLp
)
+ p
(
(1 − δL) + δLvHLD
)
+ (1 − 2p)δLvHLD
=
p((1−δL)(1+kz)+δLp)
1−δL(1−p) = p + pk
1−δL
1−δL(1−p)z, (41)
and if agenta is facing another high type, then after the initial favor, her continuation payoff
will be ūem instead ofp, so her payoff would be
uHHD = p
(
(1 − δH)(1 − z) + δH ūem
)
+ (1 − p)δHuHHD
=
p((1−δH)(1−z)+δH ūem)
1−δH(1−p) = p
1−δH+δH ūem
1−δH(1−p) − p
1−δH
1−δH(1−p)z,
and the corresponding payoff for the high type agentb would be
vHHD = p
(
(1 − δH)kz + δHuem
)
+ p
(
1 − δH + δHvHHD
)
+ (1 − 2p)δHvHHD
=
p
(
(1 − δH)(1 + kz) + δHuem
)
1 − δH(1 − p)
= p
1 − δH + δHuem
1 − δH(1 − p)
+ p
(1 − δH)k
1 − δH(1 − p)
z.
The following table summarizes the results with payoffs(u, v) for each type combina-
tion.
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ωaωb uω
aωb vω
aωb
LL p p
LH p p
HL p − p 1−δ
H
1−δH(1−p)z p + p
(1−δL)k
1−δL(1−p)z
HH p1−δ
H+δH ūem
1−δH(1−p) − p
1−δH
1−δH(1−p)z p
1−δH+δHuem
1−δH(1−p) + p
(1−δH)k
1−δH(1−p)z
The total value of the game is
TD = (1 − μo) 2p + μo (1 − μo)
(
uHLD + v
HL
D
)
+ μ2o
(
uHHD + v
H
D
)
(42)
= (1 − μo) 2p + μo (1 − μo)
(
2p − p 1−δ
L
1−δL(1−p)z + p
(1−δL)k
1−δL(1−p)z
)
+ μ2o
(
p1−δ
H+δH ūem
1−δH(1−p) + p
1−δH+δHuem
1−δH(1−p) + p
(1−δH)(k−1)
1−δH(1−p) z
)
.
Substituting in the values for̄uem anduem from (4) and (3) and taking the derivative
with respect toz, the initial (separating) favor, yields
∂TD
∂z
= μop
(
(1 μo)
(
(1−δL)k
1−δL(1−p) −
1−δH
1−δH(1−p)
)
+ μo
(1−δH)(k−1)
1−δH(1−p)
)
> 0
⇐=
(
(1−δL)k
1−δL(1−p) −
1−δH
1−δH(1−p)
)
> 0 and other terms clearly positive
⇐= 1−δ
L
1−δL(1−p) >
1−δH
1−δH(1−p) ∵ δ
L < δHandk > 1.
In words, the total expected payoff in a DFFM equilibrium is increasing in initial favor
size(z). This should not be surprising since doing favors is efficient. Of course, increasing
z increases the cost faced by the designee, agenta, to elicit a full EM response from agent
b, provided thatb is a high type, whilea’s continuation promise remains unchanged at
u = μoūem + (1 − μo)p. Naturally, agentb would benefit. But suppose the agents do not
know ahead of time whether or not they will be designated to do the first favor, and instead
the designation will be determined by a fair coin flip at the beginning of the game. Would
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the high types wantz to be high or low now?
We are interested in this question because each agent who plays this game is either
a high type or pretends (at least passively) to be a high type, so any strategies espoused
by these agents (pre-separation) should conform to the high types’ interests when those
interests are unambiguous. For example, if the agents (claiming to be high types) decide to
match pennies to decide who is to do the first favor, and if they choose the size of the initial
favorz ∈ [z, z̄], they should both purport to favor the optimalz for high types, or else they
would reveal their type.
Lemma 2.14 (Optimal favor size in DFFM equilibria) Let (σ, μ) be a DFFM equilib-
rium profile consistent with proposition 2.13. Then an initial favor of size
zi =



μoδLpk
1−δL(1−p) if μok < 1,
any point in[z, z̄] if μok = 1,
min
{
1,
μoδHp[(1−δH)k+δHp(k−1)]
(1−δH)(1−δH(1−2p))
}
if μok > 1,
(43)
maximizes expected payoff to a high type agenti provided that the designee is chosen
randomly with even odds.
Proof. The expected payoff a high type agenti, who will be designated to do the first favor
(that is, to assume the role of agenta of proposition 2.13) with probability1/2, or to wait
for the other agent to do so (roleb) otherwise, is
uHD =
(
(1 − μo) u
HL
D + μou
HH
D
)
/2 +
(
(1 − μo) p + μov
HH
D
)
/2
=
1
2
[
(1 − μo)
(
p − p 1−δ
H
1−δH(1−p)z
)
+ μo
(
p1−δ
H+δH ūem
1−δH(1−p) − p
1−δH
1−δH(1−p)z
)]
+
1
2
[
(1 − μo) p + μo
(
p
1−δH+δHuem
1−δH(1−p) + p
(1−δH)k
1−δH(1−p)z
)]
=
1
2
p
[
1 − μo + μo
1−δH+δHuem
1−δH(1−p) + 1 − μo + μo
1−δH+δHuem
1−δH(1−p)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡κ
(44)
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+
1
2
p
[
μo
(1−δH)k
1−δH(1−p) − (1 − μo)
1−δH
1−δH(1−p) − μo
1−δH
1−δH(1−p)
]
z
= κ +
p
(
1 − δH
)
2 (1 − δH(1 − p))
[− (1 − μo) − μo + μok] z
= κ +
p(1 − δH)(μok − 1)
2 (1 − δH(1 − p))
z
∴
∂uHD
∂z
=
p(1 − δH)(μok − 1)
2 (1 − δH(1 − p))
≷ 0 ⇐⇒ μok ≷ 1.
Since total welfare of high types is either increasing or decreasing, the optimal choice of
the initial favor size is one of the endpoints of interval[z, z̄], the set of favors consistent
with DFFM equilibria of proposition 2.13. The only exception isμok = 1 ⇒
∂uHD
∂z
= 0, for
which case a favor of any size in[z, z̄] will do.
Lemma 2.14 applies to DFFM equilibria consistent with proposition 2.13. That propo-
sition implemented a full EM endgame post-separation. However, we showed in section 2.3
that high types can always move from the full EM line to the Pareto optimal HSSGL line
either immediately, or after sufficiently many periods of EM play. For DFFM equilibria
beyond proposition 2.13, in particular for equilibria that implement a HSSGL endgame,
lemma 2.14 does not apply. However, it stands to reason that since low types would have
more incentive to pool with high types, the high types would have more incentive to choose
a higher initial favor to deter the low types, and in particular, to cut down the number of pe-
riods of EM play necessary to move to the HSSGL endgame in instances where immediate
separation to HSSGL is not possible.
2.4.2 Symmetric separating (SS) equilibria
By symmetric separating equilibria we mean perfect Bayesian equilibria profiles,(σ, μ),
such that,σa defines an equivalent strategy for agenta asσb does for agentb, and(σ, μ)
implements separation with positive probability. We do not require separation with prob-
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ability one even when both agents are high types. Indeed, we will later show that SS
strategies are inherently limited in this regard when favor opportunities are correlated. Cor-
related signals are informative about the other agent’s type, which can result in increasingly
divergent beliefs between agents over time. And once beliefs diverge sufficiently, low types
cannot be deterred from pooling with high types using symmetric strategies. However, we
prove that SS equilibria that implement separation with positive probability always exist.
First, two definitions.
Definition 2.15 Suppose that(σ, μ) is a PBE profile for a favor-trading game with two-
sided incomplete information such thatσ implements separation of two high type agents
with probability(1 − ε) ∈ (0, 1). Call (σ, μ) an ε-perfect separating PBE.
Definition 2.16 (Indicator function) 1{arg} = 1 if arg is true,0 otherwise.
Consider the following example of a(1 − 2p)-perfect separating PBE. Given the op-
portunity, a high type agent does a (small) favor of sizez1 in the first period. If one of the
agents does such a favor, she becomes advantaged in the game of full equality matching
that follows provided the other agent is also a high type. If neither agent does a favor in
the first period, both agents follow the autarky strategy from thereon. A low type agent fol-
lows the autarky strategy regardless. Separation occurs with probability2p if both agents
are high types, hence the name(1 − 2p)-perfect separating PBE. This profile is described
formally below.
Lemma 2.17 (First period separation) Consider strategy profile(σ, μ) defined by (2.17)-
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(46) for i ∈ {a, b} :
σi :=



I i1 = z11{wi1=1} if ω
i = H andt = 1,
σiem (ūem, uem) starting att = 2 if ω
i = H andτ1 = (z1, 0) ,
σiem (uem, ūem) starting att = 2 if ω
i = H andτ1 = (0, z1) ,
σiaut otherwise,
(45)
μit :=



0 if ht−1 /∈ H∗t−1,
1
if ht−1 ∈ H∗t−1 and eitheri receivedz1
in first period ori did the first favor
and received full reciprocation,
μit−1
if ht−1 ∈ H∗t−1 and eitheri received a favor
opportunity this period, or no favors were done
in the first period, buti did receive a favor
opportunity that period (soμit = μo, ∀t),
μo(1−2p)
1−(1+μo)p
if ht−1 ∈ H∗t−1, no favors were done and no
opportunity received byi in first period,
μit−1(1−2p)
1−(1+μit−1)p
otherwise.
(46)
Then(σ, μ) is a (1−2p)-perfect separating PBE profile forz1 ∈ [z1, z̄1] 6= ∅, wherez1 and
z̄1 are defined by (47).
z1 =
μoδLpk
1−δL(1−p) and z̄1 = min
{
1,
μoδH((1−δH)k+δHp(k−1))
(1−δH)(1−δH(1−2p))
}
. (47)
Proof. In appendix.
The one period case gives a glimpse of how the two-sided incomplete information game
behaves. Namely a small favor is necessary to initiate some form of cooperation. The spe-
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cial characteristic of the above equilibrium is that the agents are able to go to full equality
matching if both are high types and one of the two initiates cooperation during the first
period. Note that as the fraction of high types decreases so does the amount,z1, needed
to initiate cooperation. This is because both agent types become more pessimistic asμo
decreases. The high type will be less likely to find a cooperative partner, and the low type
will be less likely to find a high type to reciprocate a small initial favor with a full favor.
Therefore, it seems likely that in an infinite horizon problem the initial favor necessary to
initiate cooperation would decrease as agents grow more pessimistic over time. The prob-
lem, however, is that both agents do not necessarily grow pessimistic at the same rate. For
example, suppose one agent, say agenta, is a low type and the other, agentb, is a high type.
Then it is possible agenta receives a string of favor opportunities at the beginning of the
game but does no favors. Agentb would grow more pessimistic by each period, whereas
agenta would not receive any information to update her beliefs. At some point the upper
bound for the initial favorz derived from a high type’s incentive compatibility constraint
would cross the lower bound derived from the low type’s incentive compatibility constraint
for certain histories such as described above with positive probability.
But would it be possible to lower the continuation promise along withzt to deter the
low types? For example, if the EM endgame is conducted at levelzt, we know from lemma
2.4 that low types would never join in while the high types could benefit from it. How-
ever, lemma 2.4 applies in the complete information environment with two high types, one
advantaged, the other disadvantaged right from the start of the game. Without preset des-
ignations it turns out that even the high type agents would require a higher continuation
promise than justem (zt) to start a partnership. In particular, for a game of full equal-
ity matching, a high type agent would be at most willing to do an initial favor of1/2 for
δH = δ∗ and never more thank
k+1
even asδH → 1. The proposition below presents the
exact bounds for the general case.
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Proposition 2.18 (Bounds with complete information)Consider a game of equality
matching at levelz2 ∈ (0, 1] between two known high type agents that follows a fa-
vor of sizez1 by either agent. The agent to do the initial favor becomes the advan-
taged agent in the subsequentem(z2) game. This game can be implemented with any
z1 ∈
(
0, pkδ
H
1+δH(p(k+1)−1)z2
]
for anyδH ∈ [δ∗, 1) .
Proof. The advantaged and disadvantaged payoffs,ūem(z) anduem(z), would be the same
as before since they are clearly not dependent on any first period payment. The expected
payoff for the undesignated agent would be
ûem(z) = p((1 − δ
H)(1 − z1) + δ
H ūem(z))
+ p((1 − δH)kz1 + δ
Huem(z)) + (1 − 2p)δ
H ûem(z).
Solving forûem(z) and substituting in for̄uem(z) anduem(z) from (71) and (69) yields
ûem(z) = p +
p(1−δH)(k−1)
1−δH(1−2p) z1 +
p2δH(k−1)
1−δH(1−2p)z2.
Per proof of lemma 2.4, we still needδH ≥ δ∗ for the incentive compatibility constraints
to hold during the second phase of the game that consists of equality matching at level
z2 ∈ (0, 1]. The question is, what level ofz1 is required to guarantee that the incentive
compatibility constraint is satisfied for the first agent with a favor opportunity to do a favor?
As usual, it is enough to consider a one-shot deviation.
ICCHfirst : (1 − δ
H)(1 − z1) + δ
H ūem(z) ≥ 1 − δ
H + δH ûem(z).
To analyzeICCHfirst, let f be a function of the left-hand side minus the right-hand side,
f ≡ (1 − δH)(1 − z1) + δ
H ūem(z) −
(
1 − δH
)
− δH ûem(z)
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= −z1 + δ
Hz1 + δ
H
(
ūem(z) − ûem(z)
)
= −z1 + δ
Hz1 + δ
H
[
p + p (1−δ
H)k+δHp(k−1)
1−δH(1−2p) z2
−
(
p + p(1−δ
H)(k−1)
1−δH(1−2p) z1 +
p2δH(k−1)
1−δH(1−2p)z2
)]
= −z1 + δ
Hz1 +
δH(1−δH)
1−δH(1−2p)p (kz2 − (k − 1) z1) .
The plot below provides a graphical example of the problemf ≥ 0, for z2 = 1, p = 1/4,
k = 5 fixed, andz1 ∈ [0, 1] and δH ∈ (δ∗, 1) as variables, whereδ∗ = 11+p(k−1) =
1
1+ 1
4
(5−1)
= 1/2.
Figure 2: Constraints without designated first mover
The region above the plane and below the curved surface represents the feasible com-
binations ofz1 andδH that are incentive compatible. Thez1 = 1 edge of the graph also
showsf < 0 (incentive compatibility is not satisfied), for allδH , in this case at least. To
generalize the intuitions represented in the graph proceed by taking the first two derivatives
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of f with respect toδH ,
df
dδH
= z1 +
[
1−δH−δH(1−δH(1−2p))
(1−δH(1−2p))2
]
p (kz2 − (k − 1) z1) , and
d2f
d (δH)2
= − 4p
(1−δH(1−2p))3
p (kz2 − (k − 1) z1) = −
4p2(kz2−(k−1)z1)
(1−δH(1−2p))3
< 0.
That is,f is strictly concave inδH and therefore has a minimum at eitherδH = δ∗ or
δH = 1. Evaluating these two limit points off is a straight-forward exercise that yields the
following results after the appropriate simplification,
lim
δH→1
f = 0, and
lim
δH→δ∗
f = −z1 + z11+p(k−1) +
1
1+p(k−1)
(
1−
1
1+p(k−1)
)
1−
1−2p
1+p(k−1)
p (kz2 − (k − 1) z1)
= pk(k−1)(z2−2z1)
k+1+p(k2−1) ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ z2 ≥ 2z1.
Therefore a half sized initial favor may always be used by high type agents to commence
an equality matching game. To find an upper bound forz1, say z̄1, we solvef = 0,
which yieldsz1 =
pkδH
1+δH(p(k+1)−1)z2. Observe that̄z1 is directly proportional toz2, and
that z̄1 < lim
δH→1
z̄1 =
k
k+1
z2 < z2. In summary, a game of equality matching at level
z2 ∈ (0, 1] between high types such that neither agent is designated to go first, but instead
the first agent with a favor opportunity is required to do a favor, is incentive compatible for
z1 ∈
(
0, pkδ
H
1+δH(p(k+1)−1)z2
]
, which proves proves proposition 2.18
If a low type is included in the game among a continuum of high types (that isμo ≈ 1),
usingz1 < z2 presents a clear problem since the original bound forδ∗ was derived using
z1 = z2. The ICC for a low type, say agentb, to follow the autarky strategy and not to pool
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with the high types whenz1 < z2 is as follows:
ICCLz1<z2 : 1 − δ
L + δLp ≥
(
1 − δL
)
(1 − z1) + δ
L
(
μbtvz2 + (1 − μo) p
)
=⇒
(
1 − δL
)
z1 ≥ δ
L (vz2 − p) ,
becauseμbt = 1 since agentb is by assumption the only low type in a continuum of high
types. The continuation payoff tob if she does the favor and if agenta is a high type is
vz2 = p
(
1 − δL + δLvz2
)
+ p
((
1 − δL
)
kz2 + δ
Lp
)
+ (1 − 2p)δLvz2
= p +
pk(1−δL)
1−δL(1−p)z2.
Substituting from above forvz2 into ICC
L
z1<z2
and simplifying yields
(
1 − δL
)
z1 ≥ δ
L
(
p+
(
1 − δL
)
pk
1−δL(1−p)z2 − p
)
⇐⇒ z1 ≥ δ
L pk
1 − δL(1 − p)
z2
⇐⇒ δL ≤
1
1 + p (k (z2/z1) − 1)
.
Observe that the bound onδL is lower thanδ∗ = 1/ (1 + p (k − 1)) for z1<z2, which
identifies an obvious problem with symmetric separating equilibria. Namely, we need to
reduce the size of the first favor or limit the time available for separation in order to achieve
separation between high types, but this will increase the incentive for low types to mimic
the high types unlessδL is sufficiently low.
Proposition 2.19 (Time constrained separation in SS equilibria)Suppose(σ, μ) is a
PBE profile in a game with two unknown types, andσ is such that fort ≤ T ∈ N ∪ {∞}
the first high type agent to receive a favor opportunity will do a favor of sizezt ∈ [zt, z̄t] ⊂
(0, 1], where[zt, z̄t] is the interval of incentive compatible first favors at timet. If agenti
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does the first favor of sizezt, (σ, μ) implements an EM strategy for high types, starting with
i advantaged, at levelm (zt), wherem : [0, 1] → [0, 1] is an increasing function. Then,
(i) ∃n̄ ∈ N such that (a)[zt, z̄t] 6= ∅ with probability1 for all t ≤ n̄, and (b)[zt, z̄t] = ∅
with positive probability for allt > n̄. (Separation between high types is always possible
with positive probability, but never with probability1 because it has to occur within a finite
time period).
(ii) In equilibrium, z̄t andm (zt) satisfy the following relationship,
m (z̄t)
z̄t
− 1 ≤
1 − δL(1 − p)
μoδLpk
≡ M ∈
(
1
μo
,∞
)
, ∀t ≤ n̄, (48)
and separation has to take place within a finite period of time, otherwise a low type may
pool with high types with positive probability.
Proof. The details are in the appendix. From lemma 2.17 we know thatn̄ ≥ 1, but we have
to show that fort large enough there exist possible histories such that a low type would be
willing to do a favor that is equal to or grater than the biggest favor a high type is willing
to do. We use a basic proof by contradiction. Suppose a separating symmetric equilibrium
exists satisfying(σ, μ) of proposition 2.19 for̄n = ∞. Since neither type can have a prof-
itable one-shot deviation for any history that occurs with positive probability, we proceed
by deriving a tight greatest lower bound forzt from the low type’s incentive compatibil-
ity constraint. To do this, we use the “worst case” scenario that givent a low type has
received favor opportunities each period so far. Consequently the low type’s beliefs have
remained unchanged atμo. This provides us with condition (48), and that is whyμo is part
of the condition. Note that the condition is defined for the upper bounds ofzt andm (zt)
instead ofzt andm (zt) themselves. That is because we know their upper bounds must be
decreasing as agents grow more pessimistic over time, whereas the actual sequence ofzt
could behave quite erratically ifσ so specified, and the incentive compatibility constraints
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allowed. We then derive a (slack) upper bound forzt from the high type’s incentive com-
patibility constraint. This bound has to hold for allzt in the range of possible equilibrium
zt, so we pick the highest one and show that condition (48) is violated when the high type
grows sufficiently pessimistic, that is fort largeenough.
Corollary 2.20 For any equilibrium profile(σ, μ) and sequence{zt}
∞
t=1 of potential first
favors consistent with proposition 2.19,
m (zt) = min
{
Mzt + z
LH
t , 1
}
(49)
is optimal, wherezLHt :=
(
1 − δL (1−p)
)∑∞
i=0
(
(1 − p)δL
)i
zt+1+i.
Proof. This result form (zt) is immediate because favors are efficient andMzt + zLHt is
the least upper bound onm (zt) conditional on sequencez ≡ {zt}
∞
t=0 as specified by(σ, μ).
The least upper bound condition is from (104) in the proof of proposition 2.19. AndzLHt is
as specified by(102).
Equation (49) may at first seem convoluted because of the inclusion ofzLHt , but that
is only the case ifz were an infinite sequence of strictly positive terms, which is ruled out
by proposition 2.19. Since the strictly positive terms inzt are finite, say ending at some
T ∈ N, thenzLHT = 0, and consequentlym(zT ) = min {MzT , 1}. We may then calculate
the rest of the least upper bounds using backward induction (in theory), although forT
large this may be intractable in closed form.
Proposition 2.21 For any equilibrium profile(σ, μ) consistent with proposition 2.19 equi-
librium separation has to occur within
T ≡ sup
{
t ∈ N
∣
∣
∣
∣
μo(1 − 2p)t−1
μo(1 − 2p)t−1 + (1 − μo)(1 − p)t−1
≥
1 − δH
δHBM
}
periods,
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whereB andM are defined by (71) and (48), respectively.
Proof. From proposition 2.19 we know that separation has to occur in finite time, call this
T periods at most. Thenzs = 0 for all s > T , which means thatSLHT = S
HL
T = S
HH
T = 0
for the periodT incentive compatibility constraints, which in turn means that we can write
condition (107) forT as
zT ≤
δH
1 − δH
μaT B m(zT )
=⇒
1 − δH
δHB
≤ μaT
m(zT )
zT
≤ μaT M.
Suppose agenta is a high type playing according toσ. Then the history must be such that
she has not received a favor opportunity until now and the other agent has done no initial
favor. In notation,(haT , HT−1) = ({0, 0, ..., 0, 1} , {0, 0, ..., 0}) ≡
(
h̃aT , H̃T−1
)
. Then
μaT
(
h̃aT , H̃T−1
)
= μaT−1 sincew
a
T = 1, andμ
a
t−1 =
μo(1−2p)T−1
μo(1−2p)
T−1+(1−μo)(1−p)T−1
by (109).
Substituting this into the above incentive compatibility constraint yields,
1 − δH
δHBM
≤
μo(1 − 2p)T−1
μo(1 − 2p)T−1 + (1 − μo) (1 − p)T−1
.
The left-hand side of the above inequality is just a constant, so we can computeT . Also
note that onceT is known we can computezT from lemma 2.17, except usingμaT instead
of μo and then work backward to calculate the otherzt. Furthermore, letg := 1−δ
H
δHBM
, then
it is straightforward to show that
∂g
∂δL
= μo(1−δ
H)k(1−δH(1−2p))
δH(1−δL(1−p))2(k(1−δH(1−p(1−1/k))) > 0,
∂g
∂δH
= −
μoδLk
(
(1−δH)2k+2(1−δH)δH(k−1)p+2(δH)
2
p(k−1)
)
(δH)2(1−δL(1−p))2(k(1−δH(1−p(1−1/k)))2
< 0,
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so g is maximized atδL = δH = δ∗. Plugging inδL = δH = 1
1+p(k−1) and simplifying
yields g|δL=δH=δ∗ = μo, so the incentive compatibility constraint is always satisfied for at
leastT = 1, which we knew already from lemma 2.17.
2.4.2.1 Importance of mutually exclusive favor opportunities: The proofs of Propo-
sition 2.19 and Proposition 2.21 relied on the mutually exclusive favor opportunities so that
one agent could grow pessimistic while the other did not. It would therefore be fair to ask
whether symmetric separation has to occur within a fixed time period simply because of the
mutually exclusive nature of the favor opportunities and whether independent favor oppor-
tunities, which are less informative, could actually lead to a better outcome. The answer,
roughly speaking, is that they would. Changing the distribution of favor opportunities from
mutually exclusive to independent would change the model drastically since we would then
have to worry about favor-trading during periods when both agents received a favor oppor-
tunity, which would have a major impact on the incentive compatibility constraints and
on the general nature of the problem at hand. However, as a thought experiment, suppose
the underlying favor opportunity distribution is kept as is, but it is assumed, contrary to
fact, thatμat = μ
b
t = μt and that this is common knowledge. Then it can be shown that
symmetric separation does not have to occur within a fixed time period.
Proposition 2.22 (Mutual exclusivity and SS equilibria) Suppose(σ, μ) is a PBE profile
in a game with two unknown types. Supposeσ is such that the first agent to receive a favor
opportunity will do a favor of sizezt ∈ (0, 1] to signal type if she is a high type while a low
type will follow the autarky strategy. And supposeσ calls for separation to be followed by
an equality matching game at some levelm (zt) ∈ (0, 1]. Furthermore, suppose agents’
beliefs areμat = μ
b
t = μt, ∀t. Then separation can be guaranteed.
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Proof. FromICCLz in the proof of proposition 2.19 we have that for the low type agents
not to mimic the high type agentszt must satisfy
zt ≥ μ
b
t
δLpk
1 − δL(1 − p)
m (zt) ,
and fromICCHz we have that for a high type agent to do the first favor,zt must satisfy
zt ≤
δH
1 − δH
(1 − μat ) S1 +
δH
1 − δH
μat (Bm (zt) − S2) , where
S1 = p
(
1−δH
) ∞∑
i=0
(
δH(1 − p)
)i
zt+1+i,
S2 = p (k − 1)
∞∑
i=0
(
δH (1 − 2p)
)i ((
1 − δH
)
zt+1+i + pδ
Hm (zt+1+i)
)
,
andB = p
(1 − δH)k + δHp (k − 1)
1 − δH(1 − 2p)
from (71)
Combining the two conditions above, rearranging and usingμat = μ
b
t = μt yields the
following condition that must be satisfied ast grow large for separation to be guaranteed:
μt
δLpk
1−δL(1−p)m (zt) ≤
δH
1−δH ((1 − μt) S1 − μtS2) +
δH
1−δH μtB m (zt) . (50)
First we need to show that(1 − μt) S1 − μtS2 ≥ 0 for t large enough. To this end, observe
that
(1 − μt) S1 − μtS2 = (1 − μt) p
(
1 − δH
)∑∞
i=0
(
δH(1 − p)
)i
zt+1+i
− μtp (k − 1)
∑∞
i=0
(
δH(1 − 2p)
)i ((
1 − δH
)
zt+1+i + pδ
Hm (zt+1+i)
)
≥ (1 − μt) p
(
1 − δH
)∑∞
i=0
(
δH(1 − p)
)i
zt+1+i
− μtp (k − 1)
(
1 − δH (1 − pM)
)∑∞
i=0
(
δH(1 − p)
)i
zt+1+i
since
(
δH(1 − p)
)i
≥
(
δH (1 − 2p)
)i
, ∀i ≥ 0,
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andm (zt+1+i) ≤ Mzt by (48)
=
(
(1 − μt) p
(
1 − δH
)
− μtp (k − 1)
(
1 − δH (1 − pM)
))
St+1,
whereSt+1 =
∑∞
i=0
(
δH(1 − p)
)i
zt+1+i
≥ 0 for t large enough∵ μt → 0 ast → ∞ while
p
(
1 − δH
)
, p (k − 1)
(
1 − δH (1 − pM)
)
> 0 are bounded.
Therefore to verify that condition (50) holds it is enough to verify that
μt
δLpk
1 − δL(1 − p)
m (zt) ≤
δH
1 − δH
μtBm (zt)
or after dividing both sides byμtm (zt) and substituting inB = p
(1−δH)k+δHp(k−1)
1−δH(1−2p) that
δLpk
1 − δL(1 − p)
≤
δH
1 − δH
p
(1 − δH)k + δHp (k − 1)
1 − δH(1 − 2p)
.
The left-hand side is clearly increasing inδL andδL < δ∗ = 1
1+p(k−1) by definition, so the
left-hand side is bounded from above by
δ∗pk
1 − δ∗(1 − p)
=
1
1+p(k−1)pk
1 − 1
1+p(k−1) (1 − p)
= 1.
As for the right-hand side, leth
(
δH
)
= δ
H
1−δH p
(1−δH)k+δHp(k−1)
1−δH(1−2p) . Thenh (δ
∗) = 1 and
dh
(
δH
)
dδH
=
(1 + (k − 1) p)2 k
p (k2 − 1)
> 0 atδH = δ∗, and
d2h
(
δH
)
d (δH)2
= p
[
k−1
(1−δH)3
+ k+1
δH(1−δH(1−2p))3
− k+1
δH(1−δH(1−2p))2
]
> 0 sincek > 1 and1 − δH (1 − 2p) ∈ (0, 1) .
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In other words,h
(
δH
)
or the right-hand side of our constraint is convex and increasing
at its minimum ofh (δ∗) = 1, which was an upper bound for the left-hand side of the
constraint. Hence condition (50) is always satisfied fort large enough, and therefore a
sequence ofzt would exist such that separation could be guaranteed if the agents believed
that their favor opportunities were independent while the game remained exactly as before
otherwise. Of course, if the favor opportunities were truly independent then the structure
of the game would change significantly because the model uses discrete time and hence we
would have to address the possibility that both agents received a favor opportunity in the
same round, which would change the incentive compatibility constraints and make it diffi-
cult to properly compare the model with mutually exclusive favor opportunities. However,
this thought exercise suggests that the impact of non-independent favor opportunities is to
make it harder to separate symmetrically.
2.4.2.2 Comparison of SS and DFFM equilibria: Next consider the welfare impli-
cations of the SS equilibria as compared to the DFFM equilibria. The appeal of the SS
equilibria is that if both agents are high types then separation is twice as fast as in the
DFFM equilibrium conditional on it occurring before the agents become too pessimistic.
In particular, ignoring a cutoff period for separation, the average times to it,T dffmsep andT
ss
sep,
can be calculated using geometric series, namely,
T dffmsep = 1p + 2(1 − p)p + 3(1 − p)
2p + ...
= p
∞∑
t=1
t(1 − p)t−1 = 1
p
(51)
and
T sssep = 1(2p) + 2(1 − 2p)(2p) + 3(1 − 2p)
2(2p) + ...
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= 2p
∑∞
t=1t(1 − 2p)
t−1 = 1
2p
. (52)
But SS equilibria do not guarantee separation and the value of the post-separation
endgame depreciates over time during the initial separation phase unlike with the DFFM
equilibria. The expected payoffs for the latter have already been examined, but for the
former the expected payoff for a high type at the start of the game would be
uHsym = (1 − μo) u
HL
sym + μou
HH
sym,
whereuHLsym andu
H
sym are the expected payoffs underσ when facing a low type and a high
type, respectively. FortunatelyuHLsym andu
HH
sym are symmetric tou
HL
−zt andu
HH
−zt from the
proof of Proposition 2.19, except thatzt start fromz1 instead ofzt+1.
uHLsym = p−S
∗
1 whereS
∗
1 = p
(
1−δH
)∑∞
i=0
(
δH(1−p)
)i
z1+i, and
uHHsym = p+S
∗
2 whereS
∗
2 = p (k−1)
∑∞
i=0
(
δH(1−2p)
)i (
(1−δH)z1+i+pδ
Hm (z1+i)
)
.
In the last step we used thatA + B = p(k − 1). Then
uHsym = (1 − μo) (p − S
∗
1) + μo (p + S
∗
2)
= p − S∗1 + μo (S
∗
1 + S
∗
2) . (53)
Next we will go over two examples, the main point of which is that depending on the
parameters either SS or DFFM equilibrium may dominate the other.
Example 2.23 (SS dominates DFFM)Consider a game with two unknown type agents.
Supposep = 0.45, δL = 0.6, δH = 0.8, k = 2, μo = 0.7. Thenδ∗ = 11+p(k−1) = 0.69 =⇒
δL < δ∗ ≤ δH .
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Consider a DFFM equilibrium first and suppose that the agents randomize evenly over
who is to be the first favor maker. Sinceμok>1, this means thatz should be maximized per
equation (43), sōz = min
{
1,
μoδHp((1−δH)k+δHp(k−1))
(1−δH)(1−δH(1−2p))
}
= 1. And plugging in the values
to uHD from equation (44) yieldsu
H
D = 0.583. Assuming the designated first favor maker
is a high type, separation will take on average2.22 rounds but it happens for sure and the
endgame will be a full EM game if both agents are high types.
Now compare these results to the SS equilibrium. From proposition 2.21 we have an
upper bound for the number of periods that separation may take
T = sup
{
t ∈ N :
μo(1 − 2p)t−1
μo(1 − 2p)t−1 + (1 − μo)(1 − p)t−1
≥
1 − δH
δHBM
}
.
Given the parameters the right-hand side of supremum function is0.3794 while μa0 =
0.7 andμa1 = 0.2979 soT = 1. It is then straightforward to verify thatz = (1, 0, 0, 0, ...)
maximizes the agents’ ex-ante payoffs. Remember that in a pure EM game with no desig-
nated first favor maker neither agent would make the first full favor by choice, however, the
difference in this example is that if the agent who receives the favor opportunity does not
do the favor, then the chance to separate is lost, so in essence she became the disadvantaged
agent as soon as she received the favor opportunity, and that is still better than an autarky
continuation payoff for the given parameters.
So in this case separation occurs with probability of0.9 conditional on both agents
being high types and will lead to an endgame of full equality matching. The incentive
compatibility constraint is satisfied and the expected payoff from (53) is
uHsym = p − p
(
1 − δH
)
+ μop
((
1 − δH
)
+ (k − 1)
(
1 − δH (1 − p)
))
= 0.599.
So in this example the SS equilibrium is clearly better than the best available DFFM
equilibrium, which makes sense since separation is.9 likely during the first period instead
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of just .45 likely, and the endgames are the same conditional on separation.
Example 2.24 (DFFM dominates SS)Consider two agents of unknown type who wish to
play a favor-trading game. Supposep = 0.1, δL = 0.9, δH = 0.91, k = 2 andμo = 0.45.
Thenδ∗ = 1
1+p(k−1) = 0.9091 =⇒ δ
L < δ∗ ≤ δH .
Consider a DFFM equilibrium first and suppose that the agents randomize over who
is to be the first favor maker. Sinceμok < 1, this means thatz should be minimized per
(43), soz = μoδ
Hpk
1−δL(1−p) = 0.4263. And plugging in the values tou
H
D from (44) yields
uHD = 0.1103, which is just above the autarky payoff ofp = 0.1. Assuming the designated
first favor maker is a high type, separation will take on average10 rounds but it happens for
sure sooner or later and the endgame will be a full EM game if both agents are high types.
Now compare these results to the SS equilibrium. From proposition 2.21 we have an
upper bound for the number of periods that separation may take
T = sup
{
t ∈ N :
μo(1 − 2p)t−1
μo(1 − 2p)t−1 + (1 − μo) (1 − p)
t−1 ≥
1 − δH
δHBM
}
.
Given the parameters the right-hand side of supremum function1−δ
H
δHBM
= 0.4232 while
μa0 = 0.45 andμ
a
1 = 0.4211 assuming no favor opportunity, and no favor was received,
so T = 1, separation has to occur within the first round of the game if at all. It is then
straightforward to verify thatz = (1/M, 0, 0, ...) = (0.4263, 0, 0, ...) per condition (48)
maximizes the agents ex-ante payoff.
So in this case separation occurs with probability of.2 conditional on both agents being
high types and will lead to an endgame of full equality matching. The incentive compati-
bility constraint is satisfied and the expected payoff from (53) is
uHsym = p − p
(
1 − δH
)
+ μop
((
1 − δH
)
+ (k − 1)
(
1 − δH (1 − p)
))
= 0.1037.
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So in this example the DFFM equilibrium is clearly better than any SS equilibrium,
which makes sense since separation is only.2 ikely in the latter case whereas in the DFFM
equilibrium it happens with probability1 sooner or later and the agents are fairly patient at
δH = 0.91.
2.5 Independent favor opportunities
In this section, unless otherwise stated, we assume favor opportunities arrive independently
across agents. In the model so far favor opportunities,wat andw
b
t , were modeled as mutually
exclusive. In particular, forp ∈ (0, 1/2) ,
P
((
wat , w
b
t
)
= (1, 0)
)
= P
((
wat , w
b
t
)
= (0, 1)
)
= p,
P
((
wat , w
b
t
)
= (0, 0)
)
= (1 − 2p)
Because the favor opportunities were correlated they were also informative about the other
agent’s type. It would be fair to ask whether or not modeling favor opportunities as mutually
exclusive was a driving force behind any of the results and what impact this had on the
equilibria. To investigate these questions suppose that each agent still receives a favor
opportunity with probabilityp ∈ (0, 1), but this time the opportunities are independent of
each other. For the rest of this section, forp ∈ (0, 1) ,
P
((
wat , w
b
t
)
= (1, 1)
)
= p2
P
((
wat , w
b
t
)
= (1, 0)
)
= P
((
wat , w
b
t
)
= (0, 1)
)
= p(1 − p)
P
((
wat , w
b
t
)
= (0, 0)
)
= (1 − p)2
Note that the total autarky payoff remains the same as before ifp is kept the same(p < 1/2).
If neither agent does favors the total average discounted value of the game is2p as before.
Similarly, the first best outcome remains unchanged at2pk if both do a favor whenever
possible. So have the results changed? The answer to this question with respect to equality
matching between two high type agents is no.
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Lemma 2.25 (EM with independent favor opportunities) In the complete information
environment,δH ≥ δ∗ is necessary and sufficient to implement any simple EM equilib-
rium that requires the disadvantaged agent to do a favor of sizex, y ∈ (0, 1], regardless of
whether favor opportunities are independent or mutually exclusive.
Proof. The proof is essentially the same as in the mutually exclusive case of lemma 2.4.
Below we go over the mathematics for the case of full equality matching(x = y = 1),
and explain why the result is the same as with mutually exclusive favor opportunities. A
complete proof is available in the appendix.
Suppose the advantaged agent’s EM payoff,ū′em, remains unchanged. Then it is imme-
diate that the disadvantaged agent’s payoff is also the same as before. If the disadvantaged
agent receives a favor opportunity (probabilityp), she does a full favor in return for a con-
tinuation promise of̄u′em. If she does not receive a favor opportunity (probability1 − p),
her continuation promise remainsu′em. The equation,u
′
em = pδ
H ū′em + (1 − p)δ
Hu′em
that definesu′em given ū
′
em is the same as its counterpart in the mutually exclusive favor
opportunities case, equation (1).
The incentive compatibility decision is between forgoing the cost of doing a (full) favor
today and receiving the autarky payoff as a continuation promise on the one hand, and doing
a full favor today in return for a continuation promise ofū′em. Whether or not the advantaged
agent has also received a favor opportunity that same period is clearly of no concern to the
disadvantaged agent’s utility trade-off decision. The autarky payoff is simplyp, as before,
and the incentive compatibility constraint has not changed, so ifū′em is the same as in the
game with mutually exclusive favor opportunities, then so is the discount factor required
for cooperation;δH ≥ δ∗.
Therefore, it is enough to show that the advantaged agent’s EM payoff remains un-
changed. Writinḡu′em in terms of the four events of the independent favor opportunity
59
distribution yields
ū′em = p
2
((
1 − δH
)
(k + 1) + δHu′em
)
+ p (1 − p)
(
1−δH + δH ū′em
)
+ (1 − p)p
((
1 − δH
)
k + δHu′em
)
+ (1 − p)2δH ū′em.
= p2
((
1 − δH
)
(k + 1) + δHu′em
)
+ p
(
1 − δH + δH ū′em
)
− p2
(
1 − δH + δH ū′em
)
+ p
((
1 − δH
)
k + δHu′em
)
− p2
((
1 − δH
)
k + δHu′em
)
+ (1 − 2p)δH ū′em + p
2δH ū′em
= p
(
1 − δH + δH ū′em
)
+ p
((
1 − δH
)
k + δHu′em
)
+ (1 − 2p)δH ū′em.
In the last step above, we canceled out thep2-terms to obtain the same equation as in the
case with mutually exclusive favor opportunities, equation (2). Therefore, it follows from
symmetry that̄u′em = ūem andu
′
em = uem, and so it follows that condition (5) is still the
correct bound forcooperation.
In subsection 2.4.2 we already discussed the problem of determining who is advantaged
and disadvantaged endogenously. With independent favor opportunities this matter is fur-
ther complicated by the possibility that both agents receive a favor opportunity in the same
period. One solution is formulate the strategy as follows: Agents areund signatedat the
start of the game. Undesignated agents are called to do a favor of sizez. If an agent does
such a favor and the other agent does not, the former becomes advantaged and the latter
disadvantaged in a game of full equality matching that follows. If both undesignated agents
do a favor of sizez, both remain undesignated and the stage game is repeated.
Lemma 2.26 (EM without initial designations) Consider a complete information envi-
ronment. Givenz ∈ (0, 1], let t∗ := inf {s ∈ N|τs = (z, 0) or (0, z)}, denote the first
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(equilibrium) favor. Let(σ, μ) be defined as follows:
σi :=



I it = z1{wit=1} if ht−1 ∈ H
∗
t−1, ω
i = H andt ≤ t∗,
σiem (uem, ūem)
from t = t∗ + 1 if ht−1 ∈ H∗t−1,
ωi = H andτt∗ = (0, z),
σiem (ūem, uem)
from t = t∗ + 1 if ht−1 ∈ H∗t−1,
ωi = H andτt∗ = (z, 0),
σiaut otherwise,
(54)
μit :=



0 if ht−1 /∈ H∗t−1,
1
else if∃n s.t. forj 6= i, Ijn =



z if n ≤ t∗
1 if n > t∗
(i.e. other agent has made the initial investment)
μit−1(1−p)
1−μit−1p
otherwise.
(55)
Then(σ, μ) is a PBE forz ≤ 1/2.
Proof. In appendix. A rough outline of the proof and some results are presented below.
Once designations are determined, the game will be exactly the same as the one an-
alyzed in lemma 2.25. In particular, payoffs and incentive compatibility constraints will
be the same, so it is enough to evaluate the incentive compatibility constraint for an un-
designated agent. Let̂uzem denote her payoff. Then we can writeû
z
em in terms of the four
possible combinations of favor opportunity events:
ûzem = p
2
[(
1 − δH
)
(1 + (k − 1) z) + δH ûzem
]
+ p(1 − p)
[(
1 − δH
)
(1 − z) + δH ūem
]
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+ (1 − p)p
[(
1 − δH
)
kz + δHuem
]
+ (1 − p)2δH ûzem.
Proof. We already know̄uem anduem from the previous lemma, so the above equation
only has one unknown, solving for which yields,
ûzem = p + C1 + C2z, where (56)
C1 ≡
δH(1−p)p2(k−1)
1−δH+2δHp(1−p) andC2 ≡
(1−δH)p(k−1)
1−δH+2δHp(1−p)
The incentive compatibility constraint is
ICCndem : p
((
1 − δH
)
(1 + (k − 1) z) + δH ûzem
)
+ (1 − p)
((
1 − δH
)
(1 − z) + δH ūem
)
≥ p
((
1 − δH
)
(1 + kz) + δHuem
)
+ (1 − p)
(
1 − δH + δH ûzem
)
.
WhenICCndem binds we can solve forδ
H . Call the solution,
δHz :=
2z





2z + p [p − 3z + k(1 − z − p(1 − 2z))+
√
(p − z)2 + k2(1 − p − z + 2pz)2 + 2k(1 − p − z)(z + p(1 − 2z))
]






(57)
Alternatively we can solve forz givenδH :
z = min
{
1,
δHp(p(1 − δH + δHp) + k(1 − p − δH(1 − 3(1 − p)p)))
(
1 − δH + δH(1 + k)p − 2δHkp2
)
(1 − δH(1 − 2p))
}
. (58)
Plugging inδH = δ∗, we obtain the boundz ≤ 1/2. Naturally this is the least upper
bound because agents with higher discount factors are willing to pay a higher cost for
future benefits. Finally, it is straightforward to verify that beliefs are consistent withσ and
Bayesian updating when applicable, so(σ, μ) is a PBE forz ≤ 1/2.
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Observe that settingz = 1/2 and implementing the strategy profile in lemma 2.26 is
equally efficient to designating one of the do the first favor in a full equality matching game.
The former strategy initially implements only half size, but with twice the likely as with
full equality matching, so the efficiency gain over autarky in both isp (k − 1). In particular,
û1/2em =
1
2
p (k + 1) = p + 1
2
p (k − 1) . (59)
However, forδH > δ∗ we can implement az > 1/2 determined by equation (58), and
thereby obtain an efficiency gain over EM with a designated disadvantaged agent from the
start. In particular, forz = 1, we need
δH ≥ δH1 :=
1
1 − 2p+p2 (k + 1)
> δ∗. (60)
Note that (60) cannot be satisfied for anyδH if p (k + 1) < 2, which roughly speaking
rules out cases in which bothp andk are high. However, when (60) is satisfied, the initial
periods of symmetric favor strategies implement the first best outcome. The next corol-
lary follows by symmetry from the proposition 2.13 (the equivalent result for the case of
mutually exclusive favor opportunities), and is presented mainly as a formality.
Corollary 2.27 Let strategy profile(σ, μ) be such that
σa :=



σaem(z) (u, ū) if ht−1∈H
∗
t−1, ω
a=H andt= inf {s∈N : was=1},
σaem (ū, u) from t=1+ inf {s∈N : w
a
s=1} if ht−1∈H
∗
t−1, ω
a=H,
σaaut otherwise,
(61)
σb :=



σbem (ū, u) from t=1+ inf {s∈N|τs= (z, 0)} if ht−1∈H
∗
t−1, ω
b=H,
σbaut otherwise,
(62)
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μat :=



0 if ht−1 /∈ H∗t−1,
1 if ht−1 ∈ H∗t−1 and∃n < t s.t. τn = (0, 1) ,
μo if ht−1 ∈ H∗t−1 and@n ≤ t s.t. τn = (z, 0) ,
μat−1(1−p)
1−μat−1p
otherwise,
(63)
μbt :=



0 if ht−1 /∈H∗t−1,
1 if ht−1∈H∗t−1 and∃n<t s.t. τn= (z, 0) ,
μbt−1(1−p)
1−μbt−1p
otherwise,
(64)
z ∈ [z, z̄] :=
[
μoδLpk
1−δL(1−p) , min
{
1,
μoδHp[(1−δH)k+δHp(k−1)]
(1−δH)(1−δH(1−2p))
}]
. (65)
Then(σ, μ) is a PBE profile.
Proof. Immediate from symmetry with proposition 2.13
Proposition 2.28 (SS equilibria and independent arrivals)Denote the time of the first
favor with t∗ := inf{s ∈ N : τs = (zs, zs), (zs, 0) or (0, zs)} whereinf{∅} ≡ ∞, and let
(σ, μ) be defined as follows fori ∈ {a, b} :
σi :=



I it = zt1{wit=1}
if ht−1 ∈ H∗t−1 andω
i = H, t<t∗
(no one has done a favor yet),
I it = 1{wit=1}
starting att = t∗ + 1 if τt∗ symmetric and
ending atn>t∗ + 1 s.t. τn−1 6= (1, 1) and
only if ht−1 ∈ H∗t−1 andω
i = H,
σiem (ūem, uem)
starting after first non-symmetricτt−1 if a did the
favor, and only ifht−1 ∈ H∗t−1 andω
i = H,
σiem (uem, ūem)
starting after first non-symmetricτt−1 if b did the
favor, and only ifht−1 ∈ H∗t−1 andω
i = H,
σiaut otherwise,
(66)
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μit :=



0 if ht−1 /∈ H∗t−1,
1
if ht−1 ∈ H∗t−1, t > t
∗ andj 6= i did the
first favor or reciprocated,
μit−1(1−p)
1−μit−1p
otherwise.
(67)
Then ifδH satisfies condition (60), there exists a sequencez = {zs}
∞
s=0 ∈ (0, 1]
∞ such
that (σ, μ) is a separating PBE profile. If both agents are high types,σ will implement
separation with probability one.
Proof. Details inappendix.
2.6 Conclusion
We have shown that using a simple EM mechanism, immediate separation can be imple-
mented in favor-trading games with one-sided incomplete information with only the min-
imal requirement thatδL < δ∗ for the low types. We also describe necessary conditions
for immediate separation into more profitable equilibria, and a workable strategy to reach
them over time if an immediate move is not possible. In the case of two-sided incomplete
information, separation can be guaranteed with probability1 if one of the agents is des-
ignated to be the first favor maker at the beginning of the game. However, in numerical
testing symmetric equilibria with no designated first favor maker tended to perform better
even though these equilibria have the unfortunate characteristic that separation has to take
place within a fixed period at the beginning of the game before the gap between potential
beliefs about each other becomes too wide. With independent favor opportunities beliefs
remain symmetric until someone does a favor, and therefore separation under symmetric
equilibria is not limited to a finite period.
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2.7 Appendix A
Proof. (Lemma 2.7: Necessary and sufficient condition for separation under one-sided
incomplete information)
Suppose we start the game with agentb as the advantaged agent, and the level of trust
is z ∈ (0, 1]; that is agenta does a favor of sizex = z if she receives a favor opportunity,
and does no further favors until the other agent, in this case agentb, reciprocates by doing
a favor of sizey = z. It follows that in terms of average discounted payoffs
uem(z) = p
((
1 − δH
)
(1 − z) + δH ūem(z)
)
+ (1 − p)δHuem(z)
= p
(1−δH)(1−z)+δH ūem(z)
1−δH(1−p) .
ūem(z) = p
((
1 − δH
)
+ δH ūem(z)
)
+ p
((
1 − δH
)
kz + δHuem(z)
)
+ (1 − 2p)δH ūem(z)
= p
(1−δH)(1+kz)+δHuem(z)
1−δH(1−p) .
The two equations above are in two unknowns,uem(z) andūem(z). Solving for these yields,
uem(z) = p + p
−(1−δH)+δHp(k−1)
1−δH(1−2p) z (68)
= p + Az whereA≡p
−(1−δH)+δHp(k−1)
1−δH(1−2p) (69)
ūem(z) = p + p
(1−δH)k+δHp(k−1)
1−δH(1−2p) z (70)
= p + Bz whereB≡p (1−δ
H)k+δHp(k−1)
1−δH(1−2p) . (71)
For z fixed, asδH ranges fromδ∗ to 1, uem(z) ranges fromp top +
1
2
p (k − 1) z andūem(z)
from p + p(k − 1)z to p + 1
2
p (k − 1) z. In particular, for anyδH ∈ [δ∗, 1),
uem(z) + ūem(z) = 2p + p(k − 1)z, or
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= p (k + 1) for z = 1. (72)
Agenta’s incentive compatibility constraint is
ICCaem(z) :
(
1 − δH
)
(1 − z) + δH ūem(z) ≥
(
1 − δH
)
+ δHuem(z)
⇐⇒ ūem(z) − uem(z) −
(1−δH)
δH
z ≥ 0,
which using equations (68) and (70) is equivalent to
p + p (1−δ
H)k+δHp(k−1)
1−δH(1−2p) z − p − p
−(1−δH)+δHp(k−1)
1−δH(1−2p) z ≥
(1−δH)
δH
z
solving forδH =⇒ 1
1+p(k−1) ≤ δ
H .
Recall thatδ∗ =
1
1 + p (k − 1)
so δ∗ ≤ δH is necessary and sufficient to implement any
simple EM strategy profile.x = y = 1 ensures the greatest gains fromcooperation.
Proof. (Lemma 2.8: HSSGL payoff to advantaged low types)
Let vLs denote agentb’s continuation payoffs periods after the game starts conditional
on b not having received a favor yet. LetvLs denote agentb’s continuation payoffs periods
after she has received a favor. And letx̄s andxs denote the favors as specified by (16) and
(17) that agenta will do following states associatedwith vLs andv
L
s , respectively. From
equation (11) we already knowthatx0 = 1 andx0 =
δH−δ∗
δH+δ∗
. Given the notation, we may
write agentb’s expected payoff as follows,
vL0 = p
((
1 − δL
)
kx0 + δ
LvL0
)
+ (1 − p)
((
1 − δL
)
p
1−p + δ
LvL1
)
= p
(
1 − δL
)
+ pδLvL0 + p
(
1 − δL
)
kx0 + (1 − p) δ
LvL1
= p
(
1 − δL
)
+ pδLvL0 + p
(
1 − δL
)
kx0
+ (1 − p)δL
(
p
(
1 − δL
)
+ pδLvL0 + p
(
1 − δL
)
kx1 + (1 − p)δ
LvL2
)
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= p
(
1 − δL
) (
1 + (1 − p)δL
)
+ pδLvL0
(
1 + (1 − p)δL
)
+ p
(
1 − δL
)
k
(
x0 + (1 − p)δ
Lx1
)
+
(
(1 − p)δL
)2
vL2
= p
(
1 − δL
) (
1 + d + d2 + ...
)
+ pδLvL0
(
1 + d + d2 + ...
)
+ p
(
1 − δL
)
k
(
x0 + dx1 + d
2x2 + ...
)
whered = (1 − p)δL
= p1−δ
L
1−d +
pδL
1−dv
L
0 + p
(
1 − δL
)
k
∞∑
t=0
dtxt. (73)
To proceed further, we need to calculatevL0 andxt.
Claim 2.8a: Let ū (t) denote the HSSGL continuation promise to an advantaged agent
t periods since the last favor in a game of complete information. Then,
ū (t) = p +
(δH)
t+1
(1−δ∗)+(1−δH)(δ∗)t+1
(δH)tδ∗(δH+δ∗)
, (74)
xt =
δH+(δ∗/δH)
t
δ∗
δH+δ∗
. (75)
Proof of claim 2.8a: By (14) and (15),
ū = u +
2(1−δH)
δH+δ∗
= p + δ
H−δ∗
δH+δ∗
1
δ∗
+
2(1−δH)
δH+δ∗
= p +
δH(1−δ∗)+(1−δH)δ∗
δ∗(δH+δ∗)
= ū (0) .
Suppose (74) holds for somes ∈ N, then by (17),
ū (s + 1) = δ∗
(
ū(s)−(1−δH)p
δH
+ u(1−δ
∗)
δ∗
)
= δ∗
(
1
δH
(
p+
(δH)
s+1
(1−δ∗)+(1−δH)(δ∗)s+1
(δH)sδ∗(δH+δ∗)
)
−p1−δ
H
δH
+
(
p+ δ
H−δ∗
δH+δ∗
1
δ∗
)
1−δ∗
δ∗
)
= δ∗
(
1
δH
−1−δ
H
δH
+1−δ
∗
δ∗
)
p+ δ
∗
δH
(δH)
s+1
(1−δ∗)+(1−δH)(δ∗)s+1
(δH)sδ∗(δH+δ∗)
+(1−δ∗) δ
H−δ∗
δH+δ∗
1
δ∗
= p +
(δH)
s+2
(1−δ∗)+(1−δH)(δ∗)s+2
(δH)s+1δ∗(δH+δ∗)
= ū (s + 1) .
68
Given that equation (74) holds fors+1 if it holds for s, and we know it holds fors = 0,
then by induction (74) must hold for alls ∈ N. Last, it is a straightforward computation to
verify that if we apply (16), the equation to compute HSSGL favors from payoffs, to (74),
the hypothetical payoff to a high type, and simplify, formula (75) results.[]
Claim 2.8b: Let u (t) denote the HSSGL continuation promise to a disadvantaged
agentt periods since the last favor in the complete information game. Then,
u (t) = p +
(δH)
t+1
(1−δ∗)−(1−δH)(δ∗)t+1
(δH)tδ∗(δH+δ∗)
(76)
xt =
δH−(δ∗/δH)
t
δ∗
δH+δ∗
(77)
Proof of claim 2.8b: By (14),u = p + δ
H−δ∗
δH+δ∗
1
δ∗
= u (0). Suppose (76) holds for some
s ∈ N, then by (17)
u (s + 1) = δ∗
(
u(s)−(1−δH)p
δH
+ u(1−δ
∗)
δ∗
)
= δ
∗
δH
(
p +
(δH)
s+1
(1−δ∗)−(1−δH)(δ∗)s+1
(δH)sδ∗(δH+δ∗)
)
− 1−δ
H
δH
p +
(
p + δ
H−δ∗
δH+δ∗
1
δ∗
)
1−δ∗
δ∗
= δ∗
(
1
δH
− 1−δ
H
δH
+ 1−δ
∗
δ∗
)
p + δ
∗
δH
(δH)
s+1
(1−δ∗)−(1−δH)(δ∗)s+1
(δH)sδ∗(δH+δ∗)
+ δ
H−δ∗
δH+δ∗
1−δ∗
δ∗
= p +
(δH)
s+2
(1−δ∗)+(1−δH)(δ∗)s+2
(δH)s+1δ∗(δH+δ∗)
.
Given that (76) holds fors + 1 if it holds for s, and we know it holds fors = 0, then by
induction (76) must hold for alls ∈ N. Last, it is a straightforward computation to verify
that if we apply (16), the equation to calculate favors from payoffs, to (76), the hypothetical
payoff to a high type, and simplify, and simplify, formula (77) results.[]
Claim 2.8c: Let d = (1 − p)δL, then
vL0 = p + pk (1 − d)
∞∑
t=0
dtxt (78)
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Proof of claim 2.8c: Proceeding as before.
vL0 = p
((
1 − δL
)
kx0 + δ
LvL0
)
+(1 − p)
((
1 − δL
)
p
1−p + δ
LvL1
)
= p
(
1 − δL
)
+ pδLvL0 + p
(
1 − δL
)
kx0 + (1 − p)δ
LvL1
= p
(
1 − δL
)
+ pδLvL0 + p
(
1 − δL
)
kx0
+ (1 − p)δL
((
1 − δL
)
p + pδLvL0 + p
(
1 − δL
)
kx1 + (1 − p)δ
LvL2
)
= p
(
1 − δL
) (
1 + (1 − p)δL
)
+ pδLvL0
(
1 + (1 − p)δL
)
+ p
(
1 − δL
)
k
(
x0 + (1 − p) δ
Lx1
)
+
(
(1 − p)δL
)2
vL2
= p
(
1 − δL
) (
1 + d + d2 + ...
)
+ pδLvL0
(
1 + d + d2 + ...
)
+ p
(
1 − δL
)
k
(
x0 + dx1 + d
2x2+...
)
whered = (1 − p)δL
=
p(1−δL)
1−d +
pδL
1−dv
L
0 + p
(
1 − δL
)
k
∑∞
t=0d
txt
= p + pk(1 − d)
∑∞
t=0d
txt
This proves (78).[]
We can now return to equation (73)for vL0 and substituting in forv
L
0 from (78)yields,
vL0 =
p(1−δL)
1−d +
pδL
1−d
(
p + pk (1 − d)
∞∑
t=0
dtxt
)
+ p
(
1 − δL
)
k
∞∑
t=0
dtxt
=
p(1−δL)
1−d +
p2δL
1−d + p
2kδL
∞∑
t=0
dtxt + p
(
1 − δL
)
k
∞∑
t=0
dtxt
= p + pk
∞∑
t=0
dt
(
pδLxt +
(
1 − δL
)
xt
)
Using (75) and (77)for xt andxt, respectively, we can write the last equationas
vL0 = p + pk
∞∑
t=0
dt
(
pδL
δH−(δ∗/δH)
t
δ∗
δH+δ∗
+
(
1 − δL
) δH+(δ∗/δH)tδ∗
δH+δ∗
)
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= p + pk
∞∑
t=0
dt
(δH)
t+1
(1−δL(1−p))+(δ∗)t+1(1−δL−δLp)
(δH)t(δH+δ∗)
= p + pk
∞∑
t=0
dt
1−δL(1−p)+αt+1(1−δL−δLp)
1+α
whereα = δ
∗
δH
= p + pk 1−δ
L(1−p)
(1+α)(1−d) + pk
α(1−δL−δLp)
(1+α)(1−αd) .
Next we substituted = (1 − p) δL andα = δ∗/δH backin,
vL0 = p + pk
1−δL(1−p)
(1+δ∗/δH)(1−(1−p)δL) + pk
(δ∗/δH)(1−δL−δLp)
(1+δ∗/δH)(1−(δ∗/δH)(1−p)δL)
= p + pk
δH(δH+δ∗−2δLδ∗)
(δH+δ∗)(δH−δLδ∗(1−p)) .
This concludes theproof.
Proof. (Simple lower bound for δ̄L)
Suppose agentb is a low type, thenb’s incentive compatibility constraint to do the first
favor is
ICCLhssgl : δ
LvL0 ≥
(
1 − δL
)
+ δLp
Substituting infor vL0 from equation (22) yields
δL
(
p + pk
δH(δH+δ∗−2δLδ∗)
(δH+δ∗)(δH−δLδ∗(1−p))
)
≥ 1 − δL + δLp (79)
The above inequality implicitly defines the exact upper bound necessary to deter low types
from pooling with high types. Call this bound̄δL. CancelδLp on both sides of inequal-
ity (79), multiply what is left on the right side by the denominator of the left side, take
everything to the left side and write the inequality as a polynomial ofδL, then
δ∗
(
−δH − δ∗ + δHp + δ∗p − 2δHpk
) (
δL
)2
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+
(
δH + δ∗
) (
δH + δ∗ − δ∗p + δHpk
)
δL − δH
(
δH + δ∗
)
≥ 0
⇐⇒ −
δ∗(δH+δ∗−δHp−δ∗p+2δHpk)
δH(δH+δ∗)
(
δL
)2
+
(δH+δ∗)(δH+δ∗−δ∗p+δHpk)
δH(δH+δ∗)
δL−1 ≥ 0
⇐⇒
≡Â
︷ ︸︸ ︷
−α(1+α(1−p)+p(2k−1))
(1+α)
(
δL
)2
+
≡B̂
︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1+α (1−p) +pk)δL−1 ≥ 0
whereα=δ∗/δH
(80)
Let Q
(
δL
)
:=
(
δL
)2
Â + δLB̂ − 1 for Â andB̂ defined above. (81)
If the inequality (80) binds, expressions (80)-(81) define a quadratic equation for the upper
bound ofδL with the following two solutions,
δ̄L =
2
B̂ ±
√
B̂2 + 4Â
(82)
whereÂ andB̂ refer to expressions from equation (80). First we need to verify thatB̂2 +
4Â>0 so that our solutions are real numbers
B̂2 + 4Â = (1 + α(1 − p) + pk) − 4α(1+α(1−p)+p(2k−1))
1+α
> 0
= 1
1+α
(1 − α − α2 + α3 + 2αp − 2α3p + 2kp − 4αkp)
+ α2kp + α2p2+α3p2 − 2αkp2−2α2kp2 + k2p2 + αk2p2) > 0
= 1
1+α
(
(1 − α)2(1 + α) + 2(1 − α) (α(1 + α)
+k(1 − α)) p + (1 + α)(k − α)2p2
)
> 0,
the above expression is positive since every term in it is clearly positive. In addition,Â <
0, B̂ > 0, so the denominator, and hence both roots defined by (82), are also real and
positive. SinceÂ < 0, we know the quadratic equationQ
(
δL
)
defined by (81) is strictly
concave with two positive, real roots. Since we are interested in the least upper bound for
δL, the appropriate solution toQ
(
δL
)
= 0, or alternatively, the left side ofICCLhssgl (the
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deviation), exceeds the right side after ifδL is greater than
δ̄L =
2
B̂ +
√
B̂2 + 4Â
. (83)
whereÂ andB̂ are defiend in expression 80.
Proof. (Corollary 2.12: From EM to HSSGL) If a low type does a full favory = 1,
then for the nextT periods it will be optimal for her to play the autarky strategy instead
of exchanging favors according to the simple EM mechanism as was shown in section 2.
Therefore we may ignore favor opportunities she receives during thoseT periods as far as
the incentive compatibility constraint is concerned because she would have received these
opportunities had she chosen not to deviate by doing a favor of sizey = 1. However, we
do have to calculate the expected amount she will receive in reciprocation from agenta.
Namely, in the first period after separation agenta will receive a favor opportunity with
probabilityp and do a full favor worthk, but she will not do any further favors during the
rest of theT periods since agentb does not reciprocate. With probability(1 − p)p agent
a will not receive a favor opportunity during period 1, but will do so in period 2, and thus
does a full favor, but no more until reciprocation for the rest of theT periods. And so forth
for the otherT periods. LetvL be her expected payoff from deviating minus the (autarky)
favor costs saved during the firstT periods,
vL =
(
1 − δL
) (
pk + δL (1 − p) p +
(
δL
)2
(1 − p)2pk + . . .
+
(
δL
)T−1
(1 − p)T−1pk
)
+
(
δL
)T
(1 − p)T vL +
(
δL
)T (
1 − (1 − p)T
)
vL,
where the
(
δL
)T
-terms are the continuation payments afterT periods pass. With probabil-
ity (1 − p)T agenta did not receive income during any of theT periods and was thus not
able to reciprocate which is why agentb remains advantaged and receives the continuation
promisevL. Otherwisea has reciprocated and is currently the advantaged agent, sob’s
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continuation promise isvL.
Note that the above equation contains a geometric series that can be written more com-
pactly, and using the fact thatvL≤vL we know
vL ≤
(
1 − δL
)
pk
∑T−1
t=0
(
δL − δLp
)t
+
(
δL
)T
(1 − p)T vL +
(
δL
)T
vL −
(
δL
)T
(1 − p)T vL
= pk
(1−δL)
(
1−(δL−δLp)T
)
1−δL(1−p) +
(
δL
)T
vL. (84)
The incentive compatibility constraint for the low type not to pool isδLvL ≤ 1 − δL +
(
δL
)T+1
p. Note that both sides of the inequality excludeT -terms after the initial favor by
agentb since they cancel each other out. Then according to condition (84) it is sufficient to
show that
δL
(1−δL)pk
(
1−(δL−δLp)
T
)
1−δL(1−p) +
(
δL
)T+1
vL ≤ 1 − δL +
(
δL
)T+1
p.
Since
(
1 −
(
δL − δLp
)T)
<1 andvL<p (k + 1) by (26) from the proof of lemma 2.10 it is
enough to show that
δL
(1−δL)pk
1−δL(1−p) +
(
δL
)T+1
p (1 + k) ≤
(
1 − δL
)
+
(
δL
)T+1
p
⇐⇒ δL (
1−δL)pk
1−δL(1−p) ≤ 1 − δ
L −
(
δL
)T+1
pk
⇐⇒ δL pk
1−δL(1−p) ≤ 1 −
(δL)
T+1
1−δL pk. (85)
To enforce the inequality we need to construct aT sufficiently high that it holds. To this
end observe that sinceδL < δ∗ there existsε > 0 such that
δL pk
1−δL(1−p) + ε = δ
∗ pk
1−δL(1−p) =
pk
(1+p(k−1))(1−δL(1−p)) .
ChooseT to be the least integer such thatpk
(
δL
)T+1
/
(
1 − δL
)
≤ ε/2. Simplifying the
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last expression, it is straightforward to show that
pk
(1+p(k−1))(1−δL(1−p)) <
pk
(1+p(k−1))(1−δ∗(1−p)) = 1,
so we have that the left-hand side of (85) is strictly than1 − ε and the right-hand side is
greater than1 − ε/2, therefore (85) holds, which implies that the incentive compatibility
constraint is satisfied and therefore the low type will not pool for this choice ofT.
Proof. (Proposition 2.13: DFFM equilibria) Consider the agent designated to do the first
favor of sizez. Let uHz andu
H
−z denote the expected payoffs, respectively, for a high type
who did and did not do the initialz favor. Similarly, for a low type letuLz andu
L
−z = p
denote the analogous payoffs. The latter payoff is equal top, he autarky payoff, since we
are considering just one shot deviations and if the low type does not deviate in the given
period by mimicking the high type then she just falls back to the specified equilibrium
autarky strategy. Then for the specified equilibrium to work the incentive compatibility
constraints for the designated high and low types, respectively, require that
ICCHD :
(
1 − δH
)
(1 − z) + δHuHz ≥ 1 − δ
H + δHuH−z (86)
ICCHD :
(
1 − δL
)
(1 − z) + δLuLz ≤ 1 − δ
L + δLp (87)
and the continuation payoffsuHz , u
H
−z andu
L
z can be expanded into the component when
facing a low type and the component when facing a high type. Namely,
uHz = (1 − μo) p + μoūem, (88)
uH−z = (1 − μo) u
HL
−z + μou
HH
−z , (89)
uLz = (1 − μo) p + μou
LH
z . (90)
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As before,̄uem denotes the equality matching payoff expected by an advantaged high type
facing another high type. So for example, if a high type does a favor of sizez this period,
then her continuation payoff is just the autarky payoffp with probability(1 − μo) since that
is the likelihood he is facing a low type that will not return any favors, and with probability
μo he is facing another high type agent so her continuation value isˉem. PayoffsuHL−z
anduH−z denote the continuation values for a high type agent who didn’t do the favor this
turn (i.e. deviated from the proposed equilibrium strategy), but will at the next available
opportunity when facing a low type agent and a high type agent, respectively, since we are
just considering one-shot deviations. Finally,uLHz denotes the expected payoff for a low
type who mimicked a high type by doing a favor of sizez; namely the expected value of
a one-time full favor from the high type agent at the next available opportunity combined
with the agent’s own favor opportunities for the rest of the game. In other words
uHL−z = p
((
1 − δH
)
(1 − z) + δHp
)
+ (1 − p)δHuHL−z
= p
(1−δH)(1−z)+δHp
1−δH(1−p) , (91)
uHH−z = p
((
1 − δH
)
(1 − z) + δH ūem
)
+ (1 − p)δHuHH−z
= p
(1−δH)(1−z)+δH ūem
1−δH(1−p) , (92)
uLHz = p
((
1 − δL
)
k + δLp
)
+ p
(
1 − δL + δLuLHz
)
+ (1 − 2p)δLuLHz
= p
(1−δL)(k+1)+δLp
1−δL(1−p) . (93)
To find the lower bound forz, substitute the expression foruLz from (90) and substitute it
into the incentive compatibility constraint for the low type given by (87), which yields
(
1 − δL
)
(1 − z) + δL
(
(1 − μo) p + μou
LH
z
)
≤ 1 − δL + δLp.
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We use (93) to replaceuLHz ,
(
1 − δL
)
(1 − z) + δL
(
(1 − μo) p + μo
(
p
(1−δL)(k+1)+δLp
1−δL(1−p)
))
≤ 1 − δL + δLp.
And solve forz and simplify to obtain the following lower bound,
z ≥ μoδ
Lpk
1−δL(1−p) ≡ z. (94)
At first it might look like the above lower bound could violate feasibility constraints fork
large enough, but condition (5),δ∗ > δL = 1
1+p(k−1) , rules this out, which will be shown
later, since ask grows large, the upper bound forδL grows proportionally small. So we
needz ≥ z to deter the low types from mimicking the high types. Next we need to solve
for the highestz a designated high type agent would be willing to do a favor in order to
signal her type and become the advantaged agent in an equality matching game if the other
agent also turns out to be a high type. To this end we need to substitute the expressions for
uHz andu
H
−z from (88) and (89), respectively, into the incentive compatibility constraint for
the high type (86) which yields
(
1 − δH
)
(1 − z) + δH ((1 − μo) p + μoūem) ≥ 1 − δ
H + δH
(
(1 − μo) u
HL
−z + μou
HH
−z
)
Next substitute in expressions foruHL−z andu
HH
−z from (91) and (92), respectively,
(
1 − δH
)
(1 − z) + δH ((1 − μo) p + μoūem) ≥ 1 − δ
H
+ δH
(
(1 − μo) p
(1−δH)(1−z)+δHp
1−δH(1−p) + μop
(1−δH)(1−z)+δH ūem
1−δH(1−p)
)
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And also substitute in for̄uem from (4) to get
(
1 − δH
)
(1 − z) + δH
(
(1 − μo) p + μo
p(1−δH(1−p))(1+k)
1−δH(1−2p)
)
≥ 1 − δH
+ δH

(1 − μo) p
(1−δH)(1−z)+δHp
1−δH(1−p) + μop
(1−δH)(1−z)+δH
p(1−δH (1−p))(1+k)
1−δH (1−2p)
1−δH(1−p)


Finally solve for thez and simplify, which results in
z ≤ min
{
1,
μoδHp((1−δH)k+δHp(k−1))
(1−δH)(1−δH(1−2p))
}
≡ z̄. (95)
The last step is to verify that̄z ≥ z. To this end, we show thatz from (94) is increasing in
δL :
∂z
∂δL
= μopk
(1−δL(1−p))2
> 0
=⇒ z ≤ z|δL=δ∗ =
μoδ
Lpk
1 − δL (1 − p)
∣
∣
∣
∣
δL=
1
1+p(k−1)
= μo.
So it is enough to verify that̄z ≥ μo and incidentally this also proved thatz ≤ 1.To show
that z̄ ≥ μo proceed as before:
∂z̄
∂δH
= μop
(1−δH)
2
k+2δHp(1−δH(1−p))(k−1)
(1−δH)2(1−δH(1−2p))2
> 0
=⇒ z̄ ≥ z̄|δL=δ∗ = μoδ
Hp
(1−δH)k+δHp(k−1)
(1−δH)(1−δH(1−2p))
∣
∣
∣
∣
δL= 1
1+p(k−1)
= μo.
In other words,̄z ≥ z, so this equilibrium is incentive compatible for both types for any
pre-agreedz ∈ [z, z̄] as specified by equations (94) and (95).
Proof. (Lemma 2.17: First period separating equilibria) First, observe that the belief
system simply states each agent begins the game assuming that the other is a high type with
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probabilityμo, and if the other agent makes an observable deviation from the equilibrium
path (ht−1 /∈H∗t−1), she is believed to be a low type. If there has been no public deviation and
the other agent has either done a favor of sizez1 in the first period, or size1 as reciprocation
in some other period (ht−1 ∈ H∗t−1 and∃n ≤ t s.t. τ1 =
(
Ij1 , 0
)
or
(
0, Ij1
)
for j = a or
b, respectively), she is believed to be a high type. Note thatIj1 > 0 must bez1 in the first
period) or subsequently1 otherwise it would be off-equilibrium path. Next if the agent
receives a favor opportunity this period or did so in the first period without doing a favor
(ht−1 ∈ H∗t−1 and {w
i
t = 1 or w
i
1 6= τ1 = 0}), the other agent cannot do a favor or will
not do a favor perσ so beliefs about her remain as they were last period. In the latter
case, they would remainμo forever. Another possibility is that the agent received no favor
opportunity and no favor during the first period
(
ht−1 ∈ H∗t−1 andw
i
1 = τ1 = 0
)
so both
agents revert to autarky and there will be no more informative signals on the equilibrium
path. Therefore, her belief about the other agent will just be updated once fromμo to
μo(1−2p)
1−(1+μo)p
forever. The last possibility (”otherwise”) is that the agent did an initial favor and
is now waiting for reciprocation, and each period she does not receive either reciprocation
or a favor opportunity, her previous belief about the other agent is updated according to
Bayes’ rule. It is easy to see that this belief system is consistent with strategy profileσ
provided that the low types do not attempt to pool with the high types, and that the high
types do not choose the autarky strategy because their favor could be wasted on a low type.
Therefore, it is sufficient to check thatz1 is high enough so that a low type has no incentive
to mimic a high type, and that a high type would not be better off choosing the autarky
strategy. LetuLz denote the expected continuation payoff for a low type, say agentb, who
does a favor of sizez1.
E
(
uLz |ω
a = H
)
≡ u = p
((
1 − δL
)
+ δLu
)
+ p
((
1 − δL
)
k + δLp
)
+ (1 − 2p)δLu
= p
(1−δL)(1+k)+δLp
1−δL(1−p) .
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Using the above equation, it follows that
uLz = P (ω
a = L) p + P (ωa = H) E
(
uLz |ω
a = H
)
= (1 − μo) p + μoE
(
uLz |ω
a = H
)
= (1 − μo) p + μop
(1−δL)(1+k)+δLp
1−δL(1−p) . (96)
The incentive compatibility constraint for a low type who has received a favor opportunity
in the first period not to mimic the high type is
ICCLz :
(
1 − δL
)
(1 − z1) + δ
LuLz ≤
(
1 − δL
)
+ δLp
⇐⇒ uLz − p ≤
(
1 − δL
)
z1/δ
L
⇐⇒ (1 − μo) p + μop
(1−δL)(1+k)+δLp
1−δL(1−p) − p ≤
1−δL
δL
z1 by (96)
=⇒ z1 ≥
μoδLpk
1−δL(1−p) ≡ z1 (97)
Observe thatz1 = μoδ
Lpk/
(
1 − δL(1 − p)
)
< μoδ
∗pk/ (1 − δ∗(1 − p)) = μo < 1. Next
consider a high type, say agenta, who receives a favor opportunity in period 1. LetuHz
denote the expected continuation payoff to a high type who does a favor of sizez1. Then
uHz = (1 − μo) p + μoūem = (1 − μo) p + μo
p(1−δH(1−p))(1+k)
1−δH(1−2p) using (4)
The incentive compatibility constraint for the high type who received a favor opportunity
in the first period to do a favor of sizez1 is,
ICCHz :
(
1 − δH
)
(1 − z1) + δ
HuHz ≥
(
1 − δH
)
+ δHp
⇐⇒ (1 − μo) p + μo
p(1−δH(1−p))(1+k)
1−δH(1−2p) − p ≥
1−δH
δH
z1
=⇒ z1 ≤
μoδH((1−δH)k+δHp(k−1))
(1−δH)(1−δH(1−2p))
80
∴ let z̄em1 ≡ min
{
1,
μoδH((1−δH)k+δHp(k−1))
(1−δH)(1−δH(1−2p))
}
(98)
To finish the proof it is necessary to show that[z1, z̄1] 6= ∅. Recall thatz1 < μo, so if
z̄1 = 1, then it is immediate that[z1, z̄1] 6= ∅. Therefore suppose thatz̄1 < 1, then it is
enough to show that̄z1 − z1 > 0. To this end
z̄1 − z1 =
μoδH((1−δH)k+δHp(k−1))
(1−δH)(1−δH(1−2p)) −
μoδLpk
1−δL(1−p)
=
δH((1−δH)k+δHp(k−1))
(1−δH)(1−δH(1−2p)) −
δLpk
1−δL(1−p)
The expression above shows that the existence of a separating equilibrium in this game does
not depend onμo, the fraction of high types. Still supposinḡz1 < 1, taking the derivative
of z̄1 with respect toδH in equation (98) and rearranging yields
dz̄1
dδH
= μop
(1−δH)
2
k+2δHp(k−1)(1−δH(1−p))
(1−δH)2(1−δH(1−2p))2
From the above expression it is easy to see thatdz̄1/dδH > 0 sincek − 1 > 0. Therefore
z̄1 is minimized atδH = δ∗ = 1/ (1 + p (k − 1)). Substituting1/ (1 + p (k − 1)) for δH in
the expression for̄z1 and simplifying yields̄z1 = μo. Therefore[z1, z̄1] 6= ∅. (Again recall
thatz1 < μo).
Proof. (Proposition 2.19: Separation between high types time restricted by mutually
exclusive favor opportunity distribution) Suppose to the contrary of proposition 2.19 that
for each period there exists[zt, z̄t] 6= ∅, zt > 0 of potential first favors, and an equilibrium
strategy profile(σ, μ), such that if an agent does a favor of sizezt in periodt, and that is
the first favor in the game, then the other agent believes she is facing a high type with prob-
ability one. Furthermore, suppose(σ, μ) subsequently implements an EM game between
high types at levelm (zt), for some functionm : [0, 1] → [0, 1], and that the initial favor
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maker (presumed high type) is the first advantaged agent in the EM game. And suppose
(σ, μ) specifies the autarky strategy for low types.
To prove that(σ, μ) or any equivalent profile cannot be an equilibrium, suppose, without
loss of generality, that agentb, is a low type. Then ifb deviates from the autarky strategy,
and does a favor of sizezt, she would receive a continuation payoff ofp if she is facing
another low type, andvLHzt if she is facing a high type, where
vLHzt = p
((
1 − δL
)
(1 + k m (zt)) + δ
Lp
)
+ (1 − p)δLvLHzt
= p
(1−δL)(1+k m(zt))+δLp
1−δL(1−p) = p +
p(1−δL)k
1−δL(1−p)m (zt) , (99)
so her expected continuation payoff would be
vLzt =
(
1 − μbt
)
p + μbtv
LH
zt
=
(
1 − μbt
)
p + μbtp + μ
b
t
p(1−δL)k
1−δL(1−p)m (zt)
= p + μbt
p(1−δL)k
1−δL(1−p)m (zt) (100)
And if agentb does not do the favor, her continuation payoff isp if agenta is a low type,
andvLH−zt if a is a high type, where
vLH−zt = p
(
1 − δL + δLvLH−zt+1
)
+ p
((
1 − δL
)
kzt+1 + δ
Lp
)
+ (1 − 2p)δLvLH−zt+1
= p
(
1 − (1 − p)δL
)
+ p
(
1 − δL
)
k
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡b
zt+1 + (1 − p)δ
L
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡a
vLH−zt+1
= p (1 − a) + bzt+1 + a
(
p (1 − a) + bzt+2 + a
(
vLH−zt+2
))
,
iteratively expanding eachvLH. and collecting like terms
produces the following geometric sums
= p (1 − a)
(
1 + a + a2 + ...
)
+ b
(
zt+1 + azt+2 + a
2zt+3 + ...
)
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= p + b
∑∞
i=0a
izt+1+i = p + p
(
1 − δL
)
kSLH ,
whereSLH =
∑∞
i=0
(
(1 − p)δL
)i
zt+1+i.
Then it follows that
vL−zt =
(
1 − μbt
)
p + μbt
[
p + p
(
1 − δL
)
kSLH
]
= p + μbtp
(
1 − δL
)
kSLH (101)
In order for agentb not to pool with high types we needzt large enough that her incentive
compatibility constraint to follow the autarky strategy instead of deviating is satisfied for
all t.
ICCLz :
(
1 − δL
)
(1 − zt) + δ
LvLzt ≤
(
1 − δL
)
+ δLvL−zt
⇐⇒ zt ≥ δ
L
1−δL
(
vLzt − v
L
−zt
)
Substituting in forvLzt andv
L
−zt from (100) and(101) yields,
zt ≥ δ
L
(1−δL)
(
p + μbt
p(1−δL)k
1−δL(1−p)m (zt) − p − μ
b
tp
(
1 − δL
)
kSLH
)
= μbt
δLp(1−δL)k
1−δL
(
m(zt)
1−δL(1−p) − S
LH
)
= μbtδ
Lpk
(
m(zt)
1−δL(1−p) − S
LH
)
,
=
μbtδ
Lpk
1−δL(1−p)
(
m (zt) − z
LH
t
)
, wherezLHt ∈ (0, z̄t+1) is s.t.
∑∞
i=0
(
(1 − p)δL
)i
zt+1+i =
∑∞
i=0
(
(1 − p)δL
)i
zLHt =
zLHt
1−δL(1−p) . (102)
The incentive compatibility constraint needs to hold for everyt and every possible
history, so consider the history that maximizes the right-hand side,hbt = {1, 1, ..., 1}, and
a public history of no favors assuming agentb follows the autarky strategy as specified
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by σ for low types. Thenμbt = μo and the right-hand side of the low type’s incentive
compatibility constraint satisfies
μbtδ
Lpk
1−δL(1−p)
(
m (zt) − z
LH
t
)
≤ μoδ
Lpk
1−δL(1−p)
(
m (zt) − z
LH
t
)
=
m (zt) − zLHt
M
by def’n ofM from (48).
Thenzt must satisfy
zt ≥
m (zt) − zLHt
M
, ∀t, (103)
or else there exists a set of histories, that occur with strictly positive probability, such that a
low type would could profit by mimicking a high type. Conversely, if (103) holds, the low
types will never pool with high types, and given a sequencez ≡ {zt}
∞
t=1, condition (103)
represents the greatest lower bound on the individual terms of the sequencez. Rearranging
we obtain condition
m (zt) ≤ Mzt + z
LH
t , ∀t, (104)
for the least upper bound onm (zt) conditional on sequencez specified by(σ, μ). And
independent ofz,
m (zt) < Mzt + z̄t+1 sincez
LH
t ∈ (0, z̄t+1)
=⇒ m (zt) < Mzt + 1, ∀zt andm (z̄t) < (M + 1) z̄t (105)
sincez̄t is decreasing int. Furthermore, ifz is a decreasing sequence, (104) implies that
m (zt) ≤ Mzt + zt
=⇒
m (zt)
zt
≤ M + 1. (106)
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Observe that the above condition rules out functions of the formm (zt) = c ∈ (0, 1]
(constant bounds), for example. Given a sequence ofzt, let t∗ = inf
{
t ∈ N : zt∗ ≤ cM+1
}
and supposehbt∗ = {1, 1, ..., 1}, thenμ
b
t∗ = μo so the low type’s incentive compatibility
constraint to follow the autarky strategy would be violated. In this example, the violation
would occur with probability greater thanpt
∗
. Also, note that ∗ 6= ∞ sincezt → 0 as
t → ∞ because a high type grows more pessimistic each period that goes by without an
initial favor, and therefore the largest favor she is willing to do to separate must also be
decreasing.4 If m (zt) is chosen appropriately, for examplem (zt) = min {(M + 1) zt, 1},
then low types would have no incentive to mimic high types even if they knew they were
facing one with certainty. However, we still need to consider the incentive compatibility
constraints for the high type, say, without loss of generality, for agenta:
ICCHz :
(
1 − δH
)
(1 − zt) + δ
HuHzt ≥
(
1 − δH
)
+ δHuH−zt ,
whereuHzt andu
H
−zt are the expected continuation payoffs for a high type if she does a favor
of sizezt and if she does no favor, respectively. Then these payoffs can be broken down
into two separate components, the payoffs when facing a high and a low type, respectively,
uHzt = (1 − μ
a
t ) u
HL
zt + μ
a
t u
HH
zt , and
uH−zt = (1 − μ
a
t ) u
HL
−zt + μ
a
t u
HH
−zt .
ClearlyuHLzt = p, the autarky payoff, sinceσ dictates that agenta, who did the first favor, do
no more favors until reciprocation is received, and that agentb, a low type in this instance,
do no favors. Ifb is a high type,a’s expected payoff isuHHzt = ūem(m(zt)) = p + B m (zt)
per (71). To compute the components ofuH−zt recall that we are considering just one-shot
4The initial favors under(σ, μ) that are incentive compatible for a high type could be weakly decreasing
at first (sequence of full favors), but must become strictly decreasing once the high type grows sufficiently
pessimistic that her incentive compatibility constraint binds.
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deviations, so next period agenta is assumed to do a favor of sizet+1 if she receives a
favor opportunity, or she could receive a favor of sizezt+1 from agentb if b is a high type,
and so forth. Namely,
uHL−zt = p
((
1 − δH
)
(1 − zt+1) + δ
Hp
)
+ (1 − p) δHuHL−zt+1
= p
(
1 − (1 − p) δH
)
− p
(
1 − δH
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡b
zt+1 + (1 − p) δ
H
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡a
uHL−zt+1
= p (1 − a) − bzt+1 + a
(
p (1 − a) − bzt+2 + a
(
uHL−zt+2
))
,
iteratively expanding eachvHL. and collecting like
terms produces the following geometric sums
= p (1 − a)
(
1 + a + a2 + ...
)
− b
(
zt+1 + azt+2 + a
2zt+3 + ...
)
= p1−a
1−a − b
∑∞
i=0a
izt+1+i = p − p
(
1 − δH
)
SHL,
whereSHL =
∑∞
i=0
(
(1 − p)δH
)i
zt+1+i.
Performing a similar calculation foruHH−zt yields
uHH−zt = p
((
1 − δH
)
(1 − zt+1) + δ
H ūem(m(zt+1))
)
+ p
((
1 − δH
)
kzt+1 + δ
Huem(m(zt+1))
)
+ (1 − 2p)δHuHH−zt+1
= p
(
1 − δH
)
+ pδH
(
ūem(m(zt+1)) + uem(m(zt+1))
)
+ p
(
1 − δH
)
(k − 1) zt+1 + (1 − 2p) δ
HuHH−zt+1
= p
(
1 − δH
)
+ pδH (2p + p (k − 1) m (zt+1))
+ p
(
1 − δH
)
(k − 1) zt+1 + (1 − 2p) δ
HuHH−zt+1 by (72)
= p
(
1 − δH(1 − 2p)
)
+ p (k − 1)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡b
(
pδHm (zt+1) +
(
1 − δH
)
zt+1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡n(zt+1)
+ (1 − 2p)δH
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡a
uHH−zt+1
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= p (1 − a) + bn (zt+1)
+ a
(
p (1 − a) + b n (zt+2) + a u
H
−zt+2
)
. Iteratively expanding eachuH. and
collecting like terms produces the following geometric sums
= a
(
1 + a + a2 + ...
)
+ b
(
n (zt+1) + a n (zt+2) + a
2n (zt+3) + ...
)
= p1−a
1−a + b
∑∞
i=0a
in (zt+1+i) = p + p (k − 1) S
HH , where
SHH =
∑∞
i=0
(
(1 − 2p)δH
)i
n (zt+1+i)
=
∑∞
i=0
(
(1 − 2p)δH
)i (
pδHm (zt+1+i) +
(
1 − δH
)
zt+1+i
)
Putting the pieces together, we have
uHzt = (1 − μ
a
t ) p + μ
a
t (p + Bm (zt)) , and
uH−zt = (1 − μ
a
t )
(
p − p
(
1 − δH
)
SHL
)
+ μat
(
p + p (k − 1) SHH
)
.
Now rearrangingICCHz and plugging in the above values foru
H
zt andu
H
−zt we have
zt ≤ δ
H
1−δH
(
uHzt − u
H
−zt
)
= δ
H
1−δH (1 − μ
a
t )
(
p −
(
p − p
(
1 − δH
)
SHL
))
+ δ
H
1−δH μ
a
t
(
p + B m (zt) −
(
p + p (k − 1) SHH
))
= (1 − μat ) p δ
HSHL + μat
δH
1−δH
(
B m (zt) − p (k − 1) S
HH
)
. (107)
Becausēzt is decreasing,
pδHSHL = pδH
∑∞
i=0
(
(1 − p)δH
)i
zt+1+i ≤ pδ
H
∑∞
i=0
(
(1 − p)δH
)i
z̄t =
pδH
1−δH(1−p) z̄t.
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And becauseSHH > 0,
zt ≤ (1 − μ
a
t )
pδH
1−δH(1−p) z̄t + μ
a
t
δHB
1−δH m (zt) ≤ (1 − μ
a
t )
pδH
1−δH(1−p) z̄t + μ
a
t
δHB
1−δH m (z̄t) .
The last inequality must hold for allt and all zt ∈ [zt, z̄t], otherwise we would have a
contradiction to our initial supposition, and the proof would be over. So letzt = z̄t, then
the following must hold
z̄t ≤ (1 − μ
a
t )
pδH
1−δH(1−p) z̄t + μ
a
t
δHB
1−δH m (z̄t)
< cz̄t + μ
a
t d m (zt) for c ≡
δHp
1−δH(1−p) , d ≡
δHB
1−δH
=⇒ 1−c
d
< μat
m(zt)
zt
≤ μat M by (48). (108)
It is easy to verify that1−c
d
> 0. Namely from (71),
d = δ
H
1−δH B =
δH
1−δH p
(1−δH)k+δHp(k−1)
1−δH(1−2p) > 0 andδ
H < 1
=⇒ δHp < 1 − δH(1 − p) =⇒ c = δ
Hp
1−δH(1−p) < 1
∴ 1−c
d
> 0.
Furthermore,1−c
d
andM are fixed whileμat → 0 in probability ast → ∞ unless separation
takes place, so we know that with some positive probability condition (108) will be violated
producing a contradiction to our supposition that(σ, μ) was a PBE. To compute the exact
time we need the following lemma.
Lemma 2.19a:Let s denote the number of periods agenti has received neither a favor
opportunity, nor a favor from the other agent, then
μis =
μo (1−2p)
s
μo (1−2p)
s + (1−μo) (1−p)
s . (109)
88
Proof of lemma 2.19a:Fors = 1, we know that
μi1 =
μo(1 − 2p)
1 − (1 + μo) p
=
μo(1 − 2p)1
μo(1 − 2p)1 + (1 − μo) (1 − p)1
Suppose (109) for somes ∈ N, then
μis+1 =
μis(1−2p)
1−(1+μis)p
= μ
i
s(1−2p)
1−p−pμis
per (2.7 (iv))
=
μo(1−2p)
s
μo(1−2p)s+(1−μo)(1−p)s
(1−2p)
1−p−p μo(1−2p)
s
μo(1−2p)s+(1−μo)(1−p)s
= μo(1−2p)
s+1
(1−p)(μo(1−2p)s+(1−μo)(1−p)s)−pμo(1−2p)s
= μo(1−2p)
s+1
(1−2p)μo(1−2p)s+(1−p)(1−μo)(1−p)s
= μo(1−2p)
s+1
μo(1−2p)s+1+(1−μo)(1−p)s+1
So if (109) holds for somes ∈ N, it holds fors + 1. We know it holds fors = 1, so by in-
duction it must hold for alls ∈ N. Let t∗ := inf
{
t ∈ N : μo(1−2p)
t−1
μo(1−2p)t−1+(1−μo)(1−p)t−1
< 1−a
bM
}
and supposehat∗ = {0, ..., 0, 1} andHt∗ = {0, ..., 0}, thenμ
a
t∗ =
μo(1−2p)
t∗−1
μo(1−2p)t
∗−1+(1−μo)(1−p)t
∗−1
< 1−a
bM
by (109) and by definition oft∗ so that the incentive compatibility constraint for the
high type is violated by periodt∗ if she does not receive any favor opportunities or fa-
vors before then. Hence separation has to occur withint∗ − 1 or fewer periods or it will
never take place. The belief function follows from Bayesian updating and must have this
form given a history of no favor opportunities until now and no favors in order forμ to
be consistent withσ. Thus separation cannot be guaranteed with probability1 n any SS
equilibria.
Proof. (Lemma 2.25: EM with independent favor opportunities)Suppose we start the
game with agentb as the advantaged agent, and the level of trust isz ∈ (0, 1], that is agent
a does a favor of sizex = z if she receives a favor opportunity, and then does no further
favors until the other agent, in this case agentb, reciprocates by doing a favor of sizey = z.
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It follows that in terms of average discounted payoffs
uem(z) = p
((
1 − δH
)
(1 − z) + δH ūem(z)
)
+ (1 − p)δHuem(z)
= p(
1−δH)(1−z)+δH ūem(z)
1−δH(1−p)
ūem(z) = p
2
((
1 − δH
)
(kz + 1) + δHuem(z)
)
+ p(1 − p)
((
1 − δH
)
(1 − z) + δH ūem(z)
)
+ (1 − p)p
((
1 − δH
)
kz + δHuem(z)
)
+ (1 − p)2δH ūem(z)
= p2
((
1 − δH
)
(kz + 1) + δHuem(z)
)
+ p
((
1 − δH
)
(1 − z) + δH ūem(z)
)
− p2
((
1 − δH
)
(1 − z) + δH ūem(z)
)
+ p
((
1 − δH
)
kz + δHuem(z)
)
− p2
((
1 − δH
)
kz + δHuem(z)
)
+ (1 − 2p)δH ūem(z) + p
2δH ūem(z)
= p
((
1 − δH
)
(1 − z) + δH ūem(z)
)
+ p
((
1 − δH
)
kz + δHuem(z)
)
+ (1 − 2p)δH ūem(z)
= p
(1−δH)(1+kz)+δHuem(z)
1−δH(1−p) .
Equations foruem(z) and ūem(z) are identical to their counterparts from the mutually ex-
clusive favor opportunities case (see proof of lemma 2.1), and the incentive compatibility
constraint is also the same, so by symmetry:
uem(z) = p + Az whereA ≡ p
δHp(k−1)−(1−δH)
1−δH(1−2p) ,
ūem(z) = p + Bz whereB ≡ p
δHp(k−1)+(1−δH)k
1−δH(1−2p)
andδH ≥ δ∗ = 1
1+p(k−1) is necessary and sufficient to implement any simple EM strategy
profile, and settingx, y = 1 ensures the greatest gains fromcooperation.
Proof. (Lemma 2.26: EM without initial designations) Once agent designations are
determined, the game will be exactly as before in 2.25. In particular, the payoffs and
incentive compatibility constraints are the same as before. Therefore we can focus on the
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initial stage of the game before designations are determined. Letûzem denote the expected
payoff for an agent with no designation. Then,
ûzem = p
2
((
1 − δH
)
(1 + (k − 1) z) + δH ûzem
)
+ p(1 − p)
((
1 − δH
)
(1 − z) + δH ūem
)
+ (1 − p)
(
p
((
1 − δH
)
kz + δHuem
)
+ (1 − p)δH ûzem
)
=
(1−δH)p(1−z+kz)+δH(p−p2)(uem+ūem)
1−δH+2δHp−2δHp2
= (1−δ
H)p(1−z+kz)+δH(p−p2)p(k−1)
1−δH+2δHp−2δHp2
= p + δ
H(1−p)p2(k−1)
1−δH+2δHp(1−p)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡C1
+ (1−δ
H)p(k−1)
1−δH+2δHp(1−p)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡C2
z. (110)
The incentive compatibility constraint for an undesignated agent to do a favor of sizez i
ICCndem : p
((
1 − δH
)
(1 + (k − 1) z) + δH ûzem
)
+ (1 − p)
((
1 − δH
)
(1 − z) + δH ūem
)
≥ p
((
1 − δH
)
(1 + kz) + δHuem
)
+ (1 − p)
((
1 − δH
)
+ δH ûzem
)
⇐⇒ p
((
1 − δH
)
(−z) + δH (ûzem − uem)
)
+ (1 − p)
((
1 − δH
)
(−z) + δH (ūem − û
z
em)
)
≥ 0
⇐⇒ pδH (ûzem − uem) + (1 − p) δ
H (ūem − û
z
em) −
(
1 − δH
)
z ≥ 0
⇐⇒ pδH (ûzem − uem) + (1 − p) δ
H (ūem − û
z
em) −
(
1 − δH
)
z ≥ 0
substituting in for̂uzem, uem andūem from (110), (69) and (71) yields
pδH (p + C1 + C2z − p − A) + (1 − p)δ
H (p + B − p − C1 − C2z) −
(
1 − δH
)
z ≥ 0
⇐⇒ pδH (C1 + C2z − A) + (1 − p)δ
H (B − C1 − C2z) −
(
1 − δH
)
z ≥ 0
Solving for δH from the above constraint is complicated, but we can we solve forz and
show thatz ≤ 1/2, is required whenδH = δ∗. In particular, solving forz from the previous
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inequality yields
z ≤
δHp(p(1−δH(1−p))+k(1−δH−p+3δHp−3δHp2))
(1−δH(1−2p))(1−δH(1−(1+k)p+2kp2)) ≤ 1/2 for δ
H = δ∗.
It follows immediately that the upper bound onz is increasing withδH since the more
patient agents are the higher cost they will pay for tomorrow’s continuationpr mise.
Proof. (Proposition 2.28: SS equilibria with independent favor opportunities)The
incentive compatibility constraint for a high type to do a favor of sizezt in period t if
Ht−1 = {0, 0, ..., 0} is provided below.
ICCHiss:
(
1 − δH
)
(1 − zt) + (1 − μt) δ
Hp
+ μt
(
p
((
1 − δH
)
kzt + δ
H ûem
)
+ (1 − p)δH ūem
)
≥ 1 − δH + (1 − μt) δ
H ûHL−zt
+ μt
(
p
((
1 − δH
)
kzt + δ
Huem
)
+ (1 − p)δH ûH−zt
)
=⇒ δ
H
1−δH (μtp (ûem − uem)
+ μt(1 − p)
(
ūem − û
HH
−zt
)
+ (1 − μt)
(
p − ûHL−zt
))
≥ zt, (111)
whereμit = μt for both agents regardless of type since neither one has done a favor yet
and private favor opportunities are uninformative about the type of the other agent since
favor opportunities are independent. PayoffsûHH−zt andû
HL
−zt denote the continuation values
implemented by(σ, μ) for a high type agent who did not do or receive a favor in periodt
facing a high type and a low type, respectively. As for the low type, the following incentive
compatibility constraint has to be satisfied for her not to mimic a high type.
ICCLiss :
(
1 − δL
)
(1 − zt)
+ μt
(
p
((
1 − δL
)
kzt + δ
LūLem
)
+ (1 − p)δLūLem
)
+ (1 − μt) δ
Lp
92
≤
(
1 − δL
)
+ μt
(
p
((
1 − δL
)
kzt + δ
Lp
)
+ (1 − p)δLûLH−zt
)
+ (1 − μt) δ
Lp
=⇒ δ
L
1−δL μt
(
p
(
ūLem − p
)
+ (1 − p)
(
ūLem − û
LH
−zt
))
≤ zt, (112)
whereūLem denotes the expected payoff to an advantaged low type facing a high type in an
EM game of full trust, and̂uLH−zt denotes the continuation payoff a low type if she is facing
a high type in periodt. That is, her autarky payoff and one time small favor as soon as the
high type receives a favor opportunity. Per inequalities (111) and (112), it is necessary to
prove that
μtδH
1−δH
(
p (ûem − uem) + (1 − p)
(
ūem − û
HH
−zt
))
+ (1−μt)δ
H
1−δH
(
p − ûHL−zt
)
≥ μtδ
L
1−δL
(
p
(
ūLem − p
)
+ (1 − p)
(
ūLem − û
LH
−zt
))
, ∀t (113)
and forzt ∈ (0, 1].First, we need to solve for̂uHH−zt , û
HL
−zt , ū
L
em andû
LH
−zt .
ūLem = p
(
1 − δL
)
+ p
((
1 − δL
)
1
2
k + δLp
)
+ (1 − p)δLūLem
= p + (1−δ
L)pk
1−δL(1−p) . (114)
Repeating the calculation for̂uLH−zt :
ûLH−zt = p
(
1 − δL
)
+ p
((
1 − δL
)
kzt+1 + δ
Lp
)
+ δL (1 − p) ûLH−zt+1
= p
(
1 − δL (1 − p)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡a1
+ p
(
1 − δL
)
k
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡a2
zt+1 + δ
L(1 − p)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡dL
ûLH−zt+1
= a1 + a2zt+1 + dL
(
a1 + a2zt+2 + dLû
LH
−zt+2
)
= a1
(
1 + dL + d
2
L + ...
)
+ a2
(
zt+1 + dLzt+2 + d
2
Lzt+3 + ...
)
= a1
1−dL
+ a2
∞∑
i=0
diLzt+1+i =
p(1−δL(1−p))
1−δL(1−p) + a2
∞∑
i=0
diLzt+1+i
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= p +
(
1 − δL
)
SiLH for SiLH ≡ pk
∞∑
i=0
(
δL(1 − p)
)i
zt+1+i. (115)
The math remains the same forûHL−zt :
ûHL−zt = p
((
1 − δH
)
(1 − zt+1) + δ
Hp
)
+ δH(1 − p)ûHL−zt+1
= p
(
1 − δH (1 − p)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡b1
− p
(
1 − δH
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡b2
zt+1 + δ
H(1 − p)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡dhl
ûHL−zt+1
= b1 − b2zt+1 + dhl
(
b1 − b2zt+2 + dhlu
HL
−zt+2
)
+ b1
(
1 + dhl + d
2
hl + ...
)
− b2
(
zt+1 + dhlzt+2 + d
2
hlzt+3 + ...
)
= b1
1−dhl
− b2
∞∑
i=0
dihlzt+1+i =
p(1−δH(1−p))
1−δH(1−p) − b2
∞∑
i=0
dihlzt+1+i
= p −
(
1 − δH
)
SiHL for SiHL ≡ p
∞∑
i=0
(
δH(1 − p)
)i
zt+1+i. (116)
And finally for ûHH−zt :
ûHH−zt = p
2
((
1 − δH
)
(1 + (k − 1) zt+1) + δ
H ûem
)
+ p(1 − p)
((
1 − δH
)
(1 − zt+1) + δ
H ūem
)
+ (1 − p)p
((
1 − δH
)
kzt+1 + δ
Huem
)
+ (1 − p)2δH ûHH−zt
= p2
((
1 − δH
)
+ δH ûem
)
+ p(1 − p)
((
1 − δH
)
+ δH (ūem + uem)
)
+ p2
(
1 − δH
)
(k − 1) zt+1 + p (1 − p)
(
1 − δH
)
(k − 1) zt+1 + (1 − p)
2 δH ûHH−zt
= p
(
1 − δH
)
+ pδH (ūem + uem) + p
2δH (ûem − (ūem + uem))
+ p
(
1 − δH
)
(k − 1) zt+1 + (1 − p)
2 δH ûHH−zt .
Recall from (71) that̄uem + uem = p (k + 1), so
ûHH−zt = p
(
1 − δH
)
+ pδHp (k + 1) + p2δH(ûem − p (k + 1))
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+ (1 − δH)p(k − 1)zt+1 + (1 − p)
2δH ûHH−zt
= p
(
1 − δH
)
+ p2δH ((k + 1) (1 − p) + ûem)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡c1
+ (1 − δH)p(k − 1)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡c2
zt+1 + δ
H(1 − p)2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡dhh
ûH−zt
= c1 + c2zt+1 + dhh
(
c1 + c2zt+2 + dhhu
HL
−zt+2
)
= c1
(
1 + dhh + d
2
hh + ...
)
+ c2
(
zt+1 + dhh zt+2 + d
2
hhzt+3 + ...
)
= c1
1−dhh
+ c2
∑∞
i=0d
i
hhzt+1+i = p +
(
1 − δH
)
α + (1 − δH)SiHH (117)
for SiHH ≡ p(k − 1)
∞∑
i=0
(
δH(1 − p)2
)i
zt+1+i, and
α ≡
c1
1−dhh
−p
(1−δH) =
δH(k−1)p2(1−δH(1−p(2−(3−p)p)))
(1−δH)(1−δH(1−p)2)(1−δH(1−2(1−p)p))
We are now ready to return back to inequality (113) that needs to hold for the result to hold.
Take all the terms to the left side and call the resultant function,Q.
Q := μtδ
H
1−δH
(
p (ûem − uem) + (1 − p)
(
ūem − û
HH
−zt
))
+ (1−μt)δ
H
1−δH
(
p − ûHL−zt
)
− μtδ
L
1−δL p
(
ūLem − p
)
− μtδ
L
1−δL (1 − p)
(
ūLem − û
LH
−zt
)
.
Substituting in for payoffs from (69), (71), (117), (116), (114), (115) yields
Q = μtδ
Hp
p(k(1−δH(1−p)2)−δHp2)
(1−δH(1−2p))(1−δH(1−2(1−p)p))
+ μtδ
H p(1−p)
2
(
2(k−1)
1−δH(1−p)2 +
k+1
1−δH+2δHp −
k−1
1−δH(1−2(1−p)p)
)
− μtδ
Hp(1 − p)(k − 1)
∑∞
i=0
(
δH(1 − p)2
)i
zt+1+i
+ (1 − μt) δ
Hp
∑∞
i=0
(
δH(1 − p)
)i
zt+1+i −
μtδLpk
1−δL(1−p)
+ μtδ
Lpk(1 − p)
∑∞
i=0
(
δL(1 − p)
)i
zt+1+i.
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Observe that for converging series there existszω =
∑
diωzi∑
diω
andzi decreasing, thend1 ≤
d2 =⇒ z1 ≥ z2 so we can writeQ as,
Q =
μtδHp2(k(1−δH(1−p)2)−δHp2)
(1−δH(1−2p))(1−δH(1−2(1−p)p))
+ μtδ
Hp(1−p)
2
(
2(k−1)
1−δH(1−p)2 +
k+1
1−δH+2δHp −
k−1
1−δH(1−2(1−p)p)
)
− μtδ
Lpk
1−δL(1−p) +
μtδLpk(1−p)
1−δL(1−p) zL −
μtδHp(1−p)(k−1)
1−δH(1−p)2 z̄H +
(1−μt)δHp
1−δH(1−p)zH
where
zL =
∑∞
i=0(δL(1−p))
i
zt+1+i
∑∞
i=0(δ
L(1−p))i
=
(
1 − δL(1 − p)
)∑∞
i=0
(
δL(1 − p)
)i
zt+1+i ∈ (0, zt) (118)
z̄H =
(
1 − δH(1 − p)2
)∑∞
i=0
(
δH(1 − p)2
)i
zt+1+i ∈ (0, zt) (119)
zH =
(
1 − δH(1 − p)
)∑∞
i=0
(
δH(1 − p)
)i
zt+1+i ∈ (0, zt) (120)
observe that̄zH > zH and0 < zL, zH , z̄H ≤ 1.
Next we show thatQ is decreasing inδL and increasing inδH .
∂Q
∂δL
= −μt
pk(1−(1−p)zL)
(1−δL(1−p))2 < 0 sincezL ∈ (0, 1) .
Since we want to prove thatQ ≥ 0 for all values ofδL ∈ (0, δ∗), andQ is decreasing inδL,
it is enough to prove thatQ ≥ 0 for δL = δ∗. Next we show thatQ is increasing inδH .
∂Q
∂δH
=
1
2
p
(
−μt
(k−1)(1−2p)
(1−δH+2δHp−2δHp2)2
+ μt
(k+1)
(1−δH(1−2p))2
+ μt
2(k−1)(1−p)(1−z̄H)
(1−δH(1−p)2)2
+ (1 − μt) 2(1−δH(1−p))2 zH
)
=
1
2
pμt
>0 per claim 2.7
(
︷ ︸︸ ︷
k+1
(1−δH(1−2p))2 −
(k−1)(1−2p)
(1−δH(1−2p+2p2))2
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+ μt
2(k−1)(1−p)(1−z̄H)
(1−δH(1−p)2)2
+ (1 − μt) 2(1−δH(1−p))2 zH) > 0. (121)
SinceQ is increasing inδH , it is enough to prove thatQ ≥ 0 for δH = δH1 . To that end, let
Q∗ = Q s.t. δL = δ∗ andδH = δH1 =
1
1−2p+p2(k+1) . Then
Q∗ =
μt(1 − p)(k − 1)
pk
(1 − z̄H) +
1 − μt
p(k + 1) − 1
zH + μt(1 − p)zL > 0.
Recall that condition (60) implies thatp(k + 1) ≥ 2, so the second term ofQ∗ is positive
and bounded, and thēzH , zH , zL ∈ (0, 1), soQ
∗ > 0 ⇒ Q > 0 for all δL∈ (0, δ∗) and
δH ∈ [δH1 , 1).Furthermore, the constraint is slack, so it follows that we could find equilibria
for lower δH . Last, letQL denote the part ofQ that representsICCLiss That is,
QL =
μtδ
Lpk
1 − δL(1 − p)
−
μtδ
Lpk(1 − p)
1 − δL(1 − p)
zL.
Since ∂Q
∂δL
< 0 =⇒ ∂Q
L
∂δL
> 0, so QL is increasing inδL as is to be expected. Since
δL ∈ (0, δ∗), it follows that
QL ∈
(
QL
∣
∣
δL=0
, QL
∣
∣
δL=δ∗
)
= (0, μt(1 − (1 − p)z
∗
L))
=
(
0, μt
(
1 − (1 − p) (1 − δ∗(1 − p))
∑∞
i=0 (δ
∗(1 − p))i zt+1+i
))
by (118)
=
(
0, μt − μt
(1−p)pk
1+p(k−1)
∑∞
i=0
(
1−p
1+p(k−1)
)i
zt+1+i
)
by (5)
=
(
0, μt − μtpk
∑∞
i=0
(1−p)i+1
(1+(k−1)p)i+1
zt+1+i
)
=
(
0, μt
(
1 − p + p2
)
z̃L
)
for z̃L ∈ (0, zt) ⊆ (0, 1]
⊂
(
0, μt
(
1 − p + p2
))
.
That is, the lower bound forzt is well-defined. Next, letQH denote the part ofQ that
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representsICCHiss.
QH =
μtδHp2(k(1−δH(1−p)2)−δHp2)
(1−δH(1−2p))(1−δH(1−2(1−p)p)) −
μtδHp(1−p)(k−1)
1−δH(1−p)2 z̄H +
(1−μt)δHp
1−δH(1−p)zH
+ μtδ
Hp(1−p)
2
(
2(k−1)
1−δH(1−p)2 +
k+1
1−δH+2δHp −
k−1
1−δH(1−2(1−p)p)
)
.
Since ∂Q
∂δH
> 0 =⇒ ∂Q
H
∂δH
> 0, soQH is increasing inδH as is to be expected. Since
δH ∈
(
δH1 , 1
)
, it follows that
QH ∈
(
QH
∣
∣
δH=δH1
, QH
∣
∣
δH=1
)
=
(
μt
k−1+p
pk
− μt
(k−1)(1−p)
pk
z̄H +
(1−μt)
p(k+1)−1zH ,
μt
(
k
2
+ (k−1)p
2
4(1−p)(2−p)
)
− μt
(k−1)(1−p)
2−p z̄H + (1 − μt)zH
)
.
The simplifications forz’s can be found at the end,
QH ∈
(
μt
k−1+p
pk
+
≡(∗)
︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1−μt)
p(k+1)−1zH − μt
(k−1)(1−p)
pk
z̄H ,
(1 − μt)zH − μt
(k−1)(1−p)
2−p z̄H︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡(∗∗)
+ μt
4k+3kp2−6kp−p2
4(p−1)(p−2)
)
. (122)
Then there exists̃zh1, z̃h2 ∈ (0, zt) such that
QH ∈
(
μt
k−1+p
pk
+
(
1
p(k+1)−1 + μt
k(1−2p)−(1−p)(1+p(k2−1))
pk(p(k+1)−1)
)
z̃h1,
μt
(
k
2
+ (k−1)p
2
4(1−p)(2−p)
)
+
(
1 − μt(k(1−p)+1)
2−p
)
z̃h2
)
.
That is, the upper bound forzt is well-defined.
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Proof. (Inequality 121):
k+1
(1−δH(1−2p))2 >
(k−1)(1−2p)
(1−δH(1−2p+2p2))2
⇐⇒ (
1−δH(1−2p+2p2))
2
(1−δH(1−2p))2 >
(k−1)(1−2p)
k+1
⇐⇒ 1−δ
H(1−2p)−2δHp2
1−δH(1−2p) >
√
(k−1)(1−2p)
k+1
⇐⇒ 1 − 2δ
Hp2
1−δH(1−2p) >
√
(k−1)(1−2p)
k+1
(123)
The left-hand side of (123) is minimized atδH = 1, so it is enough to verify that
1 − p >
√
(k−1)(1−2p)
k+1
⇐= (k + 1) (1 − p)2 − (k − 1)(1 − 2p) > 0
⇐⇒ p2k − 4p + p2 + 2 > 0
⇐= p2k − 4p + p2 + 2 ≥ 2p2 − 4p + 2 = 2 (p − 1)2 > 0.
Therefore, the inequality used in step (121) of the proof of proposition 2.28holds.
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Chapter 3
3 Favor-trading with Concave Utility FunctionsFavor-trading it oncave Utility Functions
3.1 Introduction
To date the prominent models of favor-trading assume agents have linear preferences and
favors are intrinsically of greater benefit than cost. In this chapter informal favor-trading
is considered to be a form of insurance. We assume agents have concave utility functions
and favors derive their value from risk sharing. With sufficiently concave utility functions,
agents can beneficially trade favors at some level for any discount factors. This is in contrast
to the linear case in which the incentive compatibility of the favors traded is independent
of the size of the favors because agents are essentially risk-neutral with respect to favors.
Furthermore, if utility functions are linear and agents’ discount factors are just large enough
to satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint for equality matching, the best the agents
can do is to equality match full favors. If the same agents have concave utility functions, we
show that the equivalent equality matching equilibria are dominated by equilibria involving
a smaller than full first favor, followed by a small second favor if reciprocation has not
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been received by the time the agent receives the second consecutive favor opportunity.
Consequently, the assumption of linear preferences drives some of the results in prominent
favor-trading models.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. We first introduce the relevant literature
at the end of this section. Section 3.2 introduces the model. Section 3.3 describes equal-
ity matching with concave utility functions and generalizes equality matching to multiple
states. In section 3.3.1 we construct two parametric models to numerically analyze multi-
state equilibria. The first model simulates a large sample of games, derives payoff functions
from the simulations, and uses them to solve for the optimal strategy. The second model
solves directly the system of simultaneous payoff equations associated with an equality
matching game and uses the results to find the optimal strategy. Section 3.3.2 presents the
results of the numerical tests and a number of conjectures based on them. We describe
certain unexpected outcomes in multi-state equality matching including favors above the
efficient stage game levels (beyond full-sharing) and optimal multi-state equality matching
favor sequences that are not decreasing. We also argue against the efficiency of infinite
state equality matching strategies. Section 3.4 repeats the analysis for strategies we call
pseudo-highest symmetric self-generating line equilibria that emulate analogously named
strategies from the linear favor-trading literature. Section 3.5 discusses preliminary work in
strategies involving favor-depreciation and other remaining issues. Section 3.6 concludes
chapter 3. An appendix and reference sections follow.
3.1.1 Relevant literature
The major contributions to the favor-trading literature by Möbius [12], Hauser and Hopen-
hayn [8], and Abdulkadirŏglu and Bagwell [1] (AB for short), are all linear models in
terms of agents’ preferences with intrinsically efficient favors. Summaries of these models
101
are available in section 2.2.3. The model we introduce next retains the fundamental infor-
mation structure of these models; that is, all information is complete but not always public,
but we endogenize the value of favors by assigning agents concave utility functions so that
favors may be used to share risk. Furthermore, we assume the absolute cost of doing a favor
is equal to the absolute benefit generated. In other words, favors have no intrinsic value in
our model. As in chapter 2, we take a simplified version of the favor-trading model by AB
[1] as our benchmark for comparisons.
Outside of the favor-trading literature, our model overlaps with the insurance litera-
ture. In particular, Kocherlakota [9] investigates the “Implications of Efficient Risk Sharing
without Commitment” as we do, but he uses a macroeconomic model whereas we restrict
attention to a two agent game. To our knowledge, this setup has not been covered by any
major works in economics or closely related fields.
3.2 The Model
Since concave functions include linear functions and strictly concave functions can be ar-
bitrarily close to linear functions, we restrict attention to a subclass of concave functions
we callα-concave. These functions are “sufficiently concave” for meaningful analysis of
the differences concavity can make in favor-trading models. However, we do not claim that
concavity alone is sufficient for meaning differences. On the contrary, we believe that the
results of linear models could generally be replicated with arbitrary proximity with strictly
concave utility functions that are arbitrarily close to their linear counter-parts. However,
our goal is to investigate the difference sufficient concavitycan make relative to linear
models. To that end we defineα-concave functions below. The domain and range have
each been normalized to the unit interval for simplicity. Unless otherwise stated, any future
references to concave utility functions implyα-concave utility functions.
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Definition 3.1 Suppose functionu : [0, 1] → [0, 1] is such thatu (x) = xα for α ∈ (0, 1) .
Then we callu anα-concave function.
Consider two identical agents,a andb. Each agent has utility functionu(x) = xα for
someα ∈ (0, 1). The agents play an infinitely repeated stage game with the following
structure: At the beginning of each period nature allocates an opportunity, normalized to
size1, either to agenta or b (but not both), each with probabilityp ∈ (0, 1/2), or to neither
with probability1 − 2p. Opportunities are private information. An agent who receives an
opportunity may either use it privately and receive a flow payoff ofu (1) = 1 or share some
or all of it. The amount shared is denoted byx andy for agentsa andb, respectively. If
agenta receives an opportunity and shares amountx of it, the flow payoffs to(a, b) are
((1 − x)α , xα). Similarly, if agentb does the sharing, payoffs are(yα, (1 − y)α). Because
side payments are not allowed, and reciprocation cannot be explicitly conditioned on future
opportunities since they are not publicly observable, shared opportunities are called favors.
Favors, including their size, are public information. The stage game is repeated in each
subsequent period.
To see how favor-trading works consider the following game calledequality matching
(EM). In EM of levelz ∈ (0, 1/2], one agent is calledadvantaged, the otherdisadvantaged.
The disadvantaged agent is said to owe the advantaged agent a favor of sizez. If th disad-
vantaged agent does a favor of sizez, she becomes advantaged and the other disadvantaged.
If she does no favor, she remains disadvantaged. Favors of size other thanz are ot part of
equilibrium play and can be deterred by Nash reversion. Whenz = 1/2 (full sharing), the
game is calledfull equality matching.
Consider a game of full equality matching between two agents. Suppose agenta is dis-
advantaged,b advantaged. Let(uem, ūem) denote the average discounted payoffs expected
by agents(a, b), or more generally by disadvantaged and advantaged agents, respectively.
Let σem (uem, ūem) =
(
σaem (uem, ūem) , σ
b
em (uem, ūem)
)
denote the EM strategy profile
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that implements the payoff pair(uem, ūem). Underσem the payoffs are
uem = p ((1 − δ)u(1 − 1/2) + δūem) + (1 − p)δuem
= p ((1 − δ)(1/2)α + δūem) + (1 − p)δuem, (124)
ūem = p ((1 − δ)u(1) + δūem) + p ((1 − δ)u(1/2) + δuem) + (1 − 2p)δūem
= p (1 − δ + δūem) + p ((1 − δ)(1/2)
α + δuem) + (1 − 2p)δūem. (125)
The first equation consists of two events: (i) with probabilityp agenta receives an
opportunity, does a full favor(x = 1/2) and becomes the advantaged agent; that is, agent
a receives flow payoff(1/2)α and continuation promisēuem, (ii) with probability (1 − p)
agenta receives no opportunity, so her flow payoff is zero and her continuation promise
remainsuem along with her disadvantaged status. The equation for payoffūem consists
of three events that occur with probabilitiesp, p and 1 − 2p, respectively: (i) agentb
receives an opportunity, does no favor and receives a flow payoff of1 and her continuation
promise remains̄uem as she is still advantaged, (ii) agenta receives an opportunity, shares
it (x = 1/2) so agentb receives a flow payoff of(1/2)α but her continuation payoff drops
to uem because she now owes agenta the next favor, and (iii) neither agent receives a favor
opportunity so agentb’s flow payoff is zero and her continuation payoff remainsūem.
The two previous equations contain two unknowns,uem andūem, with solutions:
uem =
p (1 − δ+δp (2 + 2α))
2α (1 − δ(1 − 2p))
, (126)
ūem =
p ((1 − δ) (1 + 2α) + δp (2 + 2α))
2α (1 − δ(1 − 2p))
. (127)
For the EM strategy profile to be aNash equilibrium (NE)in each stage game, neither
agent can have a profitable deviation available to her. It is trivial that the advantaged agent
has no profitable deviation as she just waits for reciprocation, but does no favors. Public
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(observable) off-equilibrium path deviations, such as the advantaged agent doing a favor
or one of the agents doing the wrong size favor, can easily be deterred by the threat of
autarky (no more favors). Therefore, we only need to check that a one-shot deviation for
the disadvantaged agent consisting of doing no favor despite having the opportunity to do
so followed byσem play as usual is not profitable. Agenta’s discount factor has to be high
enough that theincentive compatibility constraint (ICC)below is satisfied.
ICCaem : (1 − δ)
1
2α
+ δūem ≥ 1 − δ + δuem
⇐⇒ ūem − uem ≥
1−δ
δ
(
1 − 1
2α
)
.
Using equations (126) and (127) we may writeICCaem as
p((1−δ)(1+2α)+δp(2+2α))
2α(1−δ(1−2p)) −
p(1−δ+δp(2+2α))
2α(1−δ(1−2p)) ≥
1−δ
δ
(
1 − 1
2α
)
⇐⇒ δp
1−δ(1−2p) ≥ 1 −
1
2α
⇐⇒ δ ≥ 2
α−1
2α−1+p(2−2α) ≡ δα (128)
Figure 3 showsδα asp andα vary between(0, 1/2) and(0, 1), respectively.
Figure 3:δα(p, α) for full EM with u(x) = xα
We start with equality matching because that is the easiest and most basic way to im-
plement cooperation in the linear model, in particular, in AB [1]. Before proving several
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differences, we summarize the notation, and introduce the information structure and the
equilibrium concept to be used.
3.2.1 Summary of notation and structure
The summary that follows is meant for reference, but we also need it in the next subsection
to formally define several equilibrium concepts. Payoffs are in average discounted values.
Model parameters:
i ∈ {a, b} : Agents.
δ ∈ (0, 1) : Discount factor.
p ∈ (0, 1/2) : Probability that agenti ∈ {a, b} receives a favor opportunity.
α ∈ (0, 1) Preference convexity parameter.
Actions:
x, y ∈ [0, 1] : Size of favor by agentsa, b, respectively.
Payoffs:
(u, v) : Current payoffs to agents(a, b).
(uo, vo) : Continuation payoffs to(a, b) when no one does a favor.
(ui, vi) : Continuation payoffs to(a, b) wheni ∈ {a, b} does a favor.
Table 2: Summary of notation with concave utility functions
3.2.1.1 Information structure: Let t = 1, 2, . . . denote the time index. If agenti re-
ceives at-period favor opportunity,wit = 1 and0 otherwise. Agenti privately observes
W it = {w
i
z}
t
z=1. Let τt = (x, y) denote favors(x, y) ∈ (0, 1]
2 agentsa and b, respec-
tively, do in periodt. If neither agent does a favor, then letτt = 0. Both agents observe
Tt = {τz}
t
z=1. Private history of agenti and public history up to and including periodt are
denoted byhit = W
i
t ∈ H
i
t andHt = Tt ∈ Ht, respectively. A strategy for agenti, denoted
by σi, consists of a favor decision,I it , for each period based oni’s private history up to
periodt, and public history up to periodt − 1. More formally,I it : H
i
t×Ht−1 → [0, 1] s.t.
I it (∙, ∙) = 0 whenw
i
t = 0.
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3.2.2 Strategies and equilibrium concepts
For our solution concept we will usepublic perfect equilibrium(PPE) following Fuden-
berg, Levine and Maskin [5]. A strategy for agenti ∈ {a, b} is public if it depends only
on her current period private information and the public history. In the favor-trading game
under study, private information consists of whether or not the agent received a favor op-
portunity, and public information consists of (public) favors done up to and including the
last period. A PPE is a profile of public strategies that form a Nash equilibrium for each pe-
riod and the corresponding public history. Since the payoff pair(uem, ūem) is enforceable
(implementable), it follows by symmetry that(ūem, uem) is also enforceable, and therefore
any utility pair on the line connecting(uem, ūem) and(ūem, uem) is enforceable with the
use of a public randomization device. Off-equilibrium path moves can be deterred by the
threat of Nash reversion (autarky). This brings us to the following two definitions.
Definition 3.2 Letσiaut be such thatI
i
t = 0, ∀t.
Definition 3.3 LetH∗t be the set of all public on-equilibrium path histories up to and in-
cluding periodt.
For example, if two agents are playing a full EM game and agenta is the initial disad-
vantaged agent, any history such that agentb did the first favor, one of the agents did two
consecutive favors or a partial favor, would not be inH∗t . However, histories that include
only private deviations, that is, a disadvantaged agent does not do a favor when she has the
opportunity, would still be inH∗t . Next we define EM formally.
Definition 3.4 Givenz ∈ (0, 1], σiem(z) is such thatI
i
t = z if agent i is disadvantaged,
wit = 1 andht−1 ∈ H
∗
t−1, otherwiseI
i
t = 0. Letσ
i
em(1) ≡ σ
i
em.
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3.2.3 Basic properties of concave favor-trading games
The lemmas in this section state for the record that the model always has at least the autarky
equilibrium and that the first-best outcome is not enforceable.
Claim 3.5 In a favor-trading game with preferencesu (x) = xα, equilibria always exist.
Proof. Immediate. Autarky is always anequilibrium.
Claim 3.6 First-best outcome is not enforceable in equilibrium.
Proof. To achieve the first-best outcome both agents have to share every favor opportunity
equally, that is regardless of whether the other agent has reciprocated. But then each agent
has a profitable deviation to not do a favor, which the other agent could not observe as favor
opportunities are privateinformation.
3.3 Multi-state equality matching (n-EM)
In this section we generalize equality matching to multiple states.
Lemma 3.7 (EM is always possible)Givenδ and α, there existsz ∈ (0, 1/2] such that
EM at levelz is implementable as a PPE.
Proof. In appendix.
The proof for this lemma follows immediately from the utility function’s formu (x) =
xα. Marginal utility cost of doing an infinitesimal favor goes to a bounded constant:
u′(1 − z) =
−α
z1−α
→ −α asz → 0,
while the marginal benefit to the recipient goes to infinity:
u′(z) =
α
z1−α
→ ∞ asz → 0.
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That is, we can make the cost of doing a favor relative to the benefit arbitrarily small by
choosing a small enough size for the favor. This is in contrast to the linear case in which
the cost-to-benefit ratio is alwaysk ∈ (1,∞) and consequently discount factors need to
exceed a certain threshold for EM to be implementable.
In EM games with linear preferences, full equality matching also represents the most
efficient incentive compatible form of favor-trading (on symmetric self-generating lines) in
the special case ofδ = δ∗. The equivalent form of EM with concave preferences consists
of matching half-sized favors as opposed to full-sized ones because maximal efficiency is
achieved by sharing the opportunity equally due toα-concave utility functions. Such an
EM game is shown in Figure 4 (left). We refer to it as a 2-state EM game because agents
alternate between the two states:a advantaged,b disadvantaged,(A,D), andb advantaged,
a disadvantaged,(D,A). Similarly, we refer to an EM game with 3-states as a 3-state EM
game, such as the one shown in Figure 4 (right). State(∅, ∅) refers to a neutral, or even
state.
2-state full EM game
(A,D)
(D,A)
1-p
1-p
p px = 1
2
y = 1
2
(A,D): Agenta advantaged, agentb disadvantaged
(D,A): Agenta disadvantaged, agentb advantaged
(∅,∅): Neutral state
3-state EM game
(A,D)
(D,A)
(∅,∅)
p
p
p
p
1-p
1-p
1-2p1-2p
x1 =
1
2
− ε
x2 = ε y1 =
1
2
− ε
y2 = ε
Figure 4: 2-state and 3-state EM automata
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Next we show that 3-state EM strategies dominate 2-state EM strategies whenδ = δ∗.
To make the demonstration more concrete, we offer a parametric example of 2-state vs.
3-state EM strategies using valuesα = 0.6 andp = 0.3. The threshold discount factor,δα,
is determined by substituting these values into equation (128):
δα ≡
2α − 1
2α − 1 + p (2 − 2α)
= 0.7802. (129)
We then substitute our values forα, p andδ = δα into equations (126) and (127) to find our
benchmark payoffs:
uem =
p (1 − δ+δp (2 + 2α))
2α (1 − δ(1 − 2p))
= 0.3, (130)
ūem =
p ((1 − δ) (1 + 2α) + δp (2 + 2α))
2α (1 − δ(1 − 2p))
= 0.39585, (131)
uem + ūem = 0.69585. (132)
To find the equivalent values for a 3-state EM strategy we need to solve the following
system of 3 payoff equations in 3 unknown payoffs,
ū = p ((1 − δ) + δū) + p
(
(1 − δ)
(
1
2
− ε
)α
+ δuo
)
+ (1 − 2p) δū,
uo = p ((1 − δ) (1 − ε)α + δū) + p ((1 − δ) εα + δu) + (1 − 2p)δuo,
u = p
(
(1 − δ)
(
1
2
+ ε
)α
+ δuo
)
+ (1 − p) δu.
To simplify the arithmetic, we first replace the utility function terms as follows:
A ≡ εα, B ≡
(
1
2
− ε
)α
, C ≡
(
1
2
+ ε
)α
, D ≡ (1 − ε)α (133)
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For mnemonic reasons, we choseA < B < C < D for ε small. In terms ofA, B, C and
D, the 3-state EM payoffs are
ū = p ((1 − δ) + δū) + p ((1 − δ) B + δuo) + (1 − 2p) δū,
uo = p ((1 − δ) D + δū) + p ((1 − δ) A + δu) + (1 − 2p)δuo,
u = p ((1 − δ) C + δuo) + (1 − p)δu.
Solving and simplifying:
ū = p
1+B+((3+A+3B+D)p−2(1+B))δ+(1+B−(3+A+3B+D)p+(1+A+B+C+D)p2)δ2
(1−(1−p)δ)(1−(1−3p)δ) ,
uo = pA+D+(−A−D+(1+A+B+C+D)p)δ
1−(1−3p)δ ,
u = p
C+((A+3C+D)p−2C)δ+(C−(A+3C+D)p+(1+A+B+C+D)p2)δ2
(1−(1−p)δ)(1−(1−3p)δ) .
For later use, the payoff differences between adjacent states are
ū − uo = p (1 − δ) (1−A+B−D−(1−A+B−D+(−2+A−2B+C+D)p)δ)
(1−(1−p)δ)(1−(1−3p)δ) ,
uo − u = p (1 − δ) (A−C+D+(−A+C−D+(1+A+B−2C+D)p)δ)
(1−(1−p)δ)(1−(1−3p)δ) , (134)
ū − uo
uo − u
= 1−A+B−D−(1−A+B−D+(−2+A−2B+C+D)p)δ
A−C+D−(A−C+D−(1+A+B−2C+D)p)δ ,
= (1−δ(1−p))(1−A+B−D)+pδ(1+B−C)
(1−δ(1−p))(A−C+D)+pδ(1+B−C) . (135)
With three states, we have two incentive compatibility constraints. To move from the disad-
vantaged state to the neutral state requires a favor of size1/2−ε in return for a continuation
promise ofuo:
ICC1 : (1 − δ) C + δu
o ≥ 1 − δ + δu
=⇒
δ
1 − δ
≥
1 − C
uo − u
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=⇒ δ∗ =
1 − C
1 − C + uo − u
. (136)
To move from the neutral state to the advantaged state requires a favor of sizeε in r turn
for a continuation promise of̄u :
ICC2 : (1 − δ)D + δū ≥ 1 − δ + δu
o
=⇒
δ
1 − δ
≥
1 − D
ū − uo
=⇒ δ∗ =
1 − D
1 − D + ū − u∗
. (137)
Below we show that ifICC2 holds, thenICC1 holds, and therefore it is enough to only
verify ICC2.
Claim 3.8 ICC2 ≥ 0 =⇒ ICC1 ≥ 0.
Proof (by contradiction). Suppose to the contrary thatICC2 ≥ 0 but ICC1 < 0. Then
∃ε, δ > 0 such that δ
1−δ ≥
1−D
ū−uo and
δ
1−δ <
1−C
uo−u .
=⇒ δ ≥ 1−D
1−D+ū−uo andδ <
1−C
1−C+uo−u
=⇒ 1−D
1−D+ū−uo <
1−C
1−C+uo−u
=⇒ (1 − C) (1 − D) + (1 − D) (uo − u) < (1 − C) (1 − D) + (1 − C) (ū − uo)
=⇒ uo − u − D (uo − u) < ū − uo − C (ū − uo)
=⇒ C (ū − uo) − D (uo − u) < ū − 2uo + u
=⇒ D (ū − 2uo + u) < ū − 2uo + u
=⇒ D > 1 sinceū − 2uo + u < 0 by strict concavity ofu(∙). The last inequality
contradicts the definition ofD ≡ (1 − ε)α < 1.
Returning to our example, it is sufficient per claim 3.8 to find anε > 0 such thatICC2
binds. Substituting inα = 0.6, p = 0.3 andδ = δα = 0.7802 from the 2-state problem
into our 3-state payoff functions and solvingICC2 = 0 for ε yields ε = 0.2176. Using
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these valuesA ≡ εα = 0.4005, B ≡
(
1
2
− ε
)α
= 0.4683, C ≡
(
1
2
+ ε
)α
= 0.8195,
D ≡ (1 − ε)α = 0.8631 anduo − u= 0.498(3.821−δ)(1−δ)
(10−δ)(1.429−δ) . We can now solve forδ1 from
ICC1 : δ1 ≥ 1−C1−C+uo − u .
Substituting in values forA,B,C andD =⇒ δ1 ≥
1−(0.5+ε)α
1−(0.5+ε)α+
0.498(3.820−δ1)(1−δ1)
(10−δ1)(1.429−δ1)
.
Substituting in values fora, ε and solving forδ1 =⇒ δ1 ≥ 1−0.819
1−0.819+
0.498(2δ21−2.402δ1+1.903)
δ21−11.43δ1+14.29
=⇒ δ1 ≥ 0.7452.
That is, if we fixδ = δ∗ from the two state problem, and increaseε until ICC2 binds,
thenICC1 will be slack for thoseε andδ. In particular, we needδ ≥ 0.7802 to satisfy
ICC2 in the example above, whereasICC1 holds forδ ≥ 0.7452. The payoffs for our
example are as follows:̄u = 0.39941 > 0.39585 = ūem, uo = 0.36084 andu = 0.30515 >
0.3 = uem, whereuem andūem, from (131) and (130), respectively, are the corresponding
payoffs with the 2-state EM strategy. Observe that the total value of the game is higher with
the 3-states. Furthermore the total payoff in the 3-state game is higher when the agents are
in the middle state:uem + ūem = 0.69585 < u + ū = 0.70456 < 2u
o = 0.72168.
The example demonstrates a general contrast between favor-trading games with linear and
concave utility functions.
We are now ready to generalize equality matching for multiple states. Note that (138)
below also implies reversion to autarky if either agent deviates from the equilibrium path
(ht−1 /∈H∗t−1).
Definition 3.9 Suppose that fori ∈ {a, b}, s ∈ S ≡ {1, 2, ..., n} and t ∈ N, strategy
profileσ is such that
ys ≡ xn+1−s ∈ (0, 1) andI
i
s :=



xs if s 6=n,wat = 1, ht−1 ∈ H
∗
t−1,
xn+1−s if s 6=1, wbt = 1, ht−1 ∈ H
∗
t−1,
0 otherwise,
(138)
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st+1 :=st + 1{τt=(xst ,0)} − 1{τt=(0,yst)}. (139)
Then we callσ ann-state EM strategy profileand denote it byσemn .
Definition 3.10 (Special case ofσemn) Suppose that fori ∈ {a, b}, s ∈ Z and t ∈ N,
strategy profileσ is such that
y−s ≡ xs ∈ (0, 1) andI
i
s :=



xs if w
a
t = 1, ht−1 ∈ H
∗
t−1,
ys if w
b
t = 1, ht−1 ∈ H
∗
t−1,
0 otherwise,
(140)
s0 ≡ 0, st+1 := st + 1{τt=(xst ,0)} − 1{τt=(0,yst)}. (141)
Then we callσ an∞-state EM strategy profileand denote it byσem∞.
For the subsequent definitions and lemmas, we refer to random variables with uppercase
letters, realizations of random variables with lowercase letters, and probability distributions
with calligraphic (or script uppercase) letters.U refers to the uniform distribution.P refers
to the distribution of favor opportunities.ρs,t ≡ ρ(s, t) is the transition probability from
states to t. If a stationary distribution exists,πs ≡ π(s) denote the associated probabilities.5
Definition 3.11 Given ann-state strategy profileσ, let πs(σ) denote the stationary proba-
bility for states = 1, 2, ..., n, respectively, consistent withσ. If the game has no stationary
distribution consistent withσ, let π(σ) ≡ ∅. For convenience, letπs(σ) ≡ πs ≡ π(s) when
no ambiguity exists aboutσ.
Definition 3.12 Given ann-state strategy profileσ, let s0 ∈ S ≡ {1, 2, ..., n} denote the
starting state, then
us(σ) := E0 [u(σ) : s
0 = s] , s = 1, 2, ..., n,
5A stationary probability may also be thought of as the fraction of time spent asymptotically in a given
state, or the number of visits to states in a game witht periods ast → ∞.
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defines the expected average discounted payoff to agentin states, and
u(σ) = E [(1 − δ)
∑∞
t=0 δ
t ((1 − X t)α + (Y t)α)],
represents the overall expected average discounted payoff to agent, whereX t andY t are
random variables of periodt favors by agentsa and b, respectively. Letvs and v be the
equivalent payoffs to agentb. If π 6= ∅, P (s0 = s) = πs, or undefined, andσ is symmetric
(ys ≡ xn+1−s for s ∈ N or ys ≡ x−s for s ∈ Z), we claim without proof that for finite
n∗-EM equilibria
u(σ) ≡ u(x) = 1−δ
2
∑n
s=1 πs ((1 − xs)
α + (ys)
α),
and we define the value ofσ to beT (σ) := u + v ≡ 2u(x).
We now return to finish our 2-state vs. 3-state EM comparison for the general case of
δ > δ∗ or for itsα-concave equivalent;δ > δα.
Lemma 3.13 (3-state EM strategy)For δ > δα there exists a 3-state EM equilibrium
profile, call it σ′em3 , that has strictly higher value than any 2-state EM profile. That is,
T
(
σ′em3
)
> T (σem2), ∀α, p, σem2 .
Proof. δα is defined as the discount factor at which full equality matching becomes incen-
tive compatible in a 2-state EM game (definition 128). Therefore the onlyσem2 strategy
profile we need to consider consists of full favors by the disadvantaged agent and no favors
by the advantaged agent. Call this profileσ∗em2 .
T
(
σ∗em2
)
= uem (δα) + ūem (δα) = p (1 + (1 − x)
α + yα) = p (1 + 21−α).
For 3-state EM,
T
(
σ′em3
)
= 2 (π1u1 + π2u2 + π3u3), whereπ = (π1, π2, π3) .
π denotes the stationary probabilities. Letm be a matrix of transition probabilities between
states induced by a 3-state EM strategy, thenπ is determined by
mᵀπ = π andπ1 + π2 + π3 = 1 wherem =
[ 1−p p 0
p 1−2p p
0 p 1−p
]
=⇒ π =
(
1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
)
.
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It is enough to prove the claim forδ = δα since forδ > δα we can use the “δ = δα”-solution
because it is incentive compatible forδ ≥ δα. The ICC forσ′em3 are:
(1 − δα) (1 − x1)
α + δαu2 ≥ 1 − δ + δαu1, (142)
(1 − δα) (1 − x2)
α + δαu3 ≥ 1 − δ + δαu2. (143)
Suppose for our candidate solution we pickx1 andx2 such the ICC (142) and (143)
bind. Treating the inequality signs in (142) and (143) as equalities and solving yields
x2 = (1 − 2x1) /2. The arithmetic required for the last step and for an expression for
T
(
σ′em3
)
is in the appendix. We just need one point so letx1 = 1/3 =⇒ x2 = 1/6. Then
T (σ′em3) =
2
3
p
(
1 +
(
1 − 1
3
)α
+
(
1
3
)α
+
(
1 − 1
6
)α
+
(
1
6
)α)
= 2
3
p
(
1 +
(
2
3
)α
+
(
5
6
)α
+
(
1
3
)α
+
(
1
6
)α)
.
A comparison ofT
(
σ∗em2
)
to T
(
σ′em3
)
shown in figure 5 concludes theproof.
Figure 5:T (σ′em3) in red,T (σ
∗
em2) in blue, andp =
1
2
by normalization
To finish this section we show that the uniform stationary distribution we found in the
3-state EM example holds in general for multi-state EM, except for infinite state strategies.
For the latter we show that now stationary distribution exists. Finally, we define locally and
116
globally efficient multi-state equilibria.
Lemma 3.14 πs (σemn) = 1/n, s = 1, 2, ..., n.
Proof. The proof is in the appendix. The proof is a generalized version of the transforma-
tion matrix calculation we did in the proof of lemma 3.13 to compute the fractions of time
agents spent in each state in a3-state EM game.
Lemma 3.15 π (σem∞) = ∅.
Proof. By (141) of definition 3.10 the stochastic process associated withσem∞ is a simple
random walk onZ1 with transition probabilitiesρ (s, s + 1) = ρ(s, s−1) = p andρ(s, s) =
1−2p. We say thatρ is irreducible since any state∈ Z is reached with positive probability
from any states ∈ Z in a finite number of steps. Furthermore, eachs ∈ Z is visited
infinitely often so eachs is recurrent, but there are infinitely many states so the fraction
of total visits tos has measure0. That is,s is null recurrent and therefore no stationary
distribution exists overs ∈ Z consistent withσem∞ . A proof of the last statement can be
found in Durrett [3] (p. 307, but the details are beyond the scope of thispaper).
Definition 3.16 Supposeσemñ is anñ-state EM strategy profile such that neither agent has
a profitable deviation. Then we callσemñ an ñ-state EM equilibrium(ñ-EM equilibrium).
If T (σemñ) ≥ T
(
σ′emñ
)
, for all ñ-EM equilibria, σ′emñ , we callσemñ a locally efficient
ñ-state EM equilibrium, and denote it byσ∗emñ . If T (σemñ) ≥ T (σemn) for all n ∈ N and
σemn , we callσemñ a globally efficientmulti-state equality matching equilibrium (n∗-EM
or globally efficientñ-EM equilibrium), and denote it byσ∗emn .
3.3.1 Globally efficient n-EM equilibria (n∗-EM): Numerical methods
Imposing concavity on the linear favor-trading model substantially complicates the equi-
librium analysis. At this point we are unable to solve the model further in closed-form and
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therefore in this section we turn to numerical techniques to characterizen∗-EM equilibria.
Subsection 3.3.1.1 introduces our numerical analysis approach and provides an overview
of the parametric models we have constructed to carry out the analysis. Details of the
two models follow in subsections 3.3.1.2 and 3.3.1.4, respectively. We characterizen∗-
EM equilibria properties in section 3.3.2 based on the results of our numerical analysis.
However, our solution methods themselves may be of greater interest to some readers than
the actual solutions in so far as these techniques may be used to solve other applied game
theory problems.
3.3.1.1 Summary of parametric models: Conjectures in later sections are based on
results from two types of parametric computer models; games withsimulated payoffs (SP)
and games withcomputed payoffs (CP). The computer code for each model is Mathematica
7 based, and consists of a favor solver engine and a favor solver frame. Given numerical
values ofα, δ, p andn (number of states), the favor solver engine finds a representation for
payoffs,u =
∑n
s=1 πsus, and incentive compatibility constraints,ICCs, in terms ofx, then
solves the constrained nonlinear optimization problem:6
max
x=0
u(x)
subj. toICCs(x)≥0, ∀s∈S.
(144)
The favor solver frame is essentially a series of loops built around the engine code that
feeds the engine a set of user-specified values forα, δ andp, and incrementsn until u stops
increasing. The frame also records the results for the optimaln, denoted byn∗, for each
triplet (α, δ, p) and constructs user-specified tables and plots out of these results.
The difference between the simulated payoffs model and the computed payoffs model
6In EM optimization problemsx ≡ {x1, ..., xn−1} in (144) becausexn = 0 by definition of n-EM and
therefore drops out ofu(x) andICCs(x). For other strategies (withxn > 0), x in (144) should be treated as
x ≡ {x1, ..., xn}.
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is the part of the engine code that findsus(x). The SP-model’s engine generates a large
set of random favor opportunity sequences, computes the path of the game (sequence of
states) consistent with strategy profileσemn for each favor opportunity sequence and for
each possible starting state, computed the discounted sums agenta’s flow payoffs along
each path, and takes the averages per starting states to determineus(x), ∀s. The CP-
model’s engine findsus(x) directly by solving the set ofn simultaneous payoff equations
that characterizeσemn .
Both models use Mathematica’s built-in optimization algorithms to solve problem (144)
and the CP-model uses Mathematica’s built-in numerical solver to solve the sets of simulta-
neous payoff equations. The Mathematica code for each model is available in the appendix.
3.3.1.2 Simulated payoffs (SP) model: The SP-model consists of the following steps:
1. Choose simulation and parameter values:The user specifies the number ofgames
per state(I) and rounds per gameto simulate(J), and either point values or ranges for
model parametersα (concavity),δ (discount factor), andp (probability of favor opportu-
nity).
2. Simulate data: The model generates a matrix of random favor opportunitiesW ≡
[wi,j ]I×J with elementswi,j ∼ P {a, b, ∅}.
3. Process data to estimate payoff functions:We need to mapW to payoffs consistent
with σemn(α, δ, p). To this end, the model defines operators
%(s, w) :=s + 1{w=a,s 6=n} − 1{w=b,s 6=1}, (145)
υ(s, w)(x, y) :=1{w=a}(1 − xs)
α + 1{w=b}(ys)
α
⇐⇒ υ(s, w)(x) :=1{w=a}(1 − xs)
α + 1{w=b}(xn+1−s)
α by def’n 3.9 (146)
si,j = %(si,j−1, wi,j) iteratively determines the path of gamei consistent withσemn given
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a starting statesi,0 ∈ S. υ maps each state along gamei’s path to a flow payoff function
(of x). We want to findus(x) for states so we apply the following functionals toW given
starting statesi,0
si,0 × [wi,j ]I×J 7→ si,0 × [% (si,j−1, wi,j)]I×J ≡ [si,j−1]I×J , (147)
[si,j−1]I×J × [wi,j ]I×J 7→ [υ (si,j−1, wi,j) (x)]I×J ≡
[
υ (x)i,j−1
]
I×J
(s). (148)
In words,[υ(x)i,j−1]I×J (s) is anI×J matrix of flow payoffs in terms ofx initiated from
statesi,0 = s, ∀i. To find total payoffs the model computes discounted sums along the rows
of [υ(x)i,j−1]I×J . We multiply the result by(1 − δ) to convert total payoffs into average
discounted payoffs:
(1 − δ)
([
υ (x)i,j−1
]
I×J
(s) ∙
[
δj−1
]
J×1
)
= [ũs(x)i]I×1 , (149)
whereũs(x)i = (1 − δ)
∑J
j=1δ
j−1υ(x)i,j−1.
We use tilde to differentiate estimated payoffs from the true payoffs. However forJ = ∞,
ũs(x) =
1
I
∑I
i=1ũs(x)i →p
us(x) asI → ∞ (150)
by law of large number.̃us(x) contains a small truncation error,εsi,J = δ
Jusi,J (x), for each
gamei becauseJ < ∞. We could usẽus(x) = 11−δJ
1
I
∑I
i=1 ũs0,j=s(x)i to compensate, but
at the moment the SP-model does not implement any correction scheme for the truncation
error. Instead we choseJ sufficiently large that errors factored byδJ are insignificant.
The model produces̃us(x) for all s ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} using the sameW . Therefore the
simulation generatesnI payoff samples in total, and the overall value of theσemn is esti-
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mated as
ũ(x) + ṽ(x) = 2ũ(x) by symmetry, and
ũ(x) =
∑n
s=1πsũs(x) by def’n 3.12
=
1
n
∑n
s=1ũs(x) by def’n 3.14. (151)
4. Optimization: Our goal is to find the optimal number of states,n∗ and efficient
multi-state EM favorsx∗ ≡ {x∗1, x
∗
2, ..., x
∗
n∗} for the specified values ofα, δ, p and a set of
random favor opportunitiesW . To do so the model performs following steps:
a. Incrementn by 1 or start withn = 2 if this is the first round.
b. Apply operators% andυ defined by (145) and (146) toW and transformations
(147)-(149) to the results to find̃us (x) for s = 1, 2, ..., n as defined in (150).
c. To findx1, ..., xn−1 (xn = 0 by definition ofσemn), numerically solve the following
formulation of nonlinear optimization problem (144):
max
x1,...,xn−1>0
1
n
∑n
s=1ũs (x1, ..., xn−1)
subj. toxn=0 and(1−δ)((1−xs)
α−1)+δ(ũs+1(x)−ũs(x))≥0, s=1,...,n−1.
(152)
d. Let ũ(n) andx̃(n) denote the solutions to (152). Record these values as well as
the corresponding̃us(n), ∀s, and other desired data.
e. If n = 2 or ũ(n−1) < ũ(n), repeat from step a. Elsen∗ = n−1 andx∗ = x(n−1).
We defer the technical details concerning Mathematica’s optimization algorithms and
their scope to subsection 3.3.1.4 and the appendix.
5. Output: A single point solution is not of particular importance to us, so we run the
SP-model on a set of points(α, δ, p) ∈ (0, 1)2 × (0, 1/2) that cover the parameter space.
The output is retrieved in tables and plots that describe the general behavior ofn∗-EM
equilibria. For example, figure 6 depicts globally efficientx∗s for s = 1, 2, ..., n
∗ − 1 as a
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functions ofp. The exact code for this demonstration is available in the appendix.
Figure 6:
Simulated payoffs:n∗-EM(p) equilibria
Algorithm: Interior point
Points: α = 0.5, δ = 0.8, p = 0.05, 0.1, ..., 0.45
3.3.1.3 SP-model versus CP-model:The CP-model is more efficient (faster) and more
accurate but requires the extra step of solvingn simultaneous payoff equations. When that
is not possible, the SP-model can fill in the gap. We used the SP-model mainly to double
check our results, but we present it here to offer another tool for the continuing research
into favor trading equilibria and for other similar problems.
3.3.1.4 Computed payoffs (CP) model: The CP-model has similar steps to the SP-
model:
1. Choose parameter values:The user specifies point values or ranges for model
parametersα (concavity),δ (discount factor), andp (probability of favor opportunity).
2. Setup simultaneous payoff equation problem:Givenn, we can describeus (σemn)
with following set of simultaneous equations:
u1 = p ((1 − δ)(1 − x1)
α + δu2) + (1 − p)δu1,
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un = p(1 − δ + δun) + p ((1 − δ)(yn)
α + δun−1) + (1 − 2p)δun,
us = p ((1 − δ)(1 − xs)
α + δus+1) + p ((1 − δ)(ys)
α + δus−1)
+ (1 − 2p)δus for s = 2, ..., n − 1.
Substitutingys = xn+1−s per definition 3.9 and simplifying
us :=



p (1−δ)(1−x1)
α+δu2
1−(1−p)δ , s=1,
p
(1−δ)((1−xs)α+xαn+1−s)+δ(us−1+us+1)
1−(1−2p)δ , s=2,...,n-1,
p
(1−δ)(1+xα1 )+δun−1
1−(1−p)δ , s=n.
(153)
3. Solve payoff equations to find payoff functions:Given parametric values forα, δ
andp, and the number of statesn, Mathematica can numerically solve (153). Letũs(x),
s = 1, ..., n, denote the solution.
4-5. Optimization and output: Same as in the SP-model, exceptũs(x), s = 1, ..., n,
in 4(b) comes from solving (153) instead of simulation based estimates ofus(x).
Technical details:We used Mathematica’sNSolvecommand to solve the payoff equa-
tions in the CP-model and theNMaximizeand FindMaximum commands for optimization.
FindMaximumlooks for a local optimum with an interior point algorithm whileNMax-
imize uses Differential Evolutionor Nelder-Meadsimplex algorithm to solve for global
optima. Simulated AnnealingandRandom Searchalgorithms were also available, but the
other methods performed better.FindMaximumwas significantly faster and more robust in
many cases than the global methods, so we used it to investigate particular aspects of the
global equilibria uncovered by the NMaximize. A description of each global algorithm is
available in the appendix courtesy of Wolfram Research [21].
Limitations: Limiting factors to arbitrarily high numerical accuracy are time and com-
puting power. In practice this means that characterizing asymptotic behavior of the model
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is not possible or reliable using numerical techniques. Closed-form solutions would of
course be preferable.
3.3.2 Numerical analysis ofn∗-EM equilibria
In this section we present a number of conjectures derived from numerical testing using the
models from section 3.3.1. To support these conjectures we refer to a number of figures
and tables interpolated from sets of parametric solutions. The rest of the section illustrates
n∗-EM equilibrium behavior asp, δ andα are varied in turn.
3.3.2.1 Results and resulting conjectures: The following conjectures concern glob-
ally efficient multi-state EM equilibria. That is, n-EM equilibria that are optimal across the
number of states(n) and favors(x1, x2, ..., xn−1). In our conjectures we sometimes use
the expression “for all” (in quotes) in the context of numerical results to refer to an entire
parameter range that we covered at close increments rather than at every actual point. For
example, if a numerical result was interpolated from solutions forp = 0.01, 0.02, ..., 0.49,
we may refer to it as a result “for all”p.
Conjecture 3.17 Let n∗(α, δ, p) be the number of states associated withσ∗emn givenα, δ
andp. Then the finite difference functions (discrete derivatives) forα, δ andp, respectively,
are (i) Δα|Δn∗=1,Δδ=Δp=0 < 0 and increasing inn
∗ (decreasing in absolute value),
(ii) Δδ|Δn∗=1,Δα=Δp=0 > 0 and decreasing in
∗ (smallerδ-steps per unitΔn∗),
(iii) Δp|Δn∗=1,Δα=Δδ=0 > 0 and approximately constant.
Support for conjecture. The conjectured relationships were observed in all our numerical
tests. Please refer to figures 11, 13, and 15 for plots ofn∗ (p) , n∗ (δ) andn∗ (α), respec-
tively. Figure 7 shows the globally efficient number of states,n∗, as a function ofδ andp.7
7Each grid point in figure 7 corresponds to a Mathematica solution for given values ofδ andp. We
used Mathematica’s interior point algorithm to find the optimal favors,x∗1, ..., x
∗
n, for eachn = 2, 3, ... until
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We suggest further numerical tests to verify these relationships for a wider set of parameter
values, and we believe that further analysis of the system of n-EM payoff equations may
provide a closed-formsolution.
Figure 7: Globally efficient n-EM equilibria:n∗(δ, p) whereα = 0.5
Conjecture 3.18 Let x∗ = {x∗1, x
∗
2, ..., x
∗
n∗} =
{
y∗n∗ , y
∗
n∗−1, ..., y
∗
1
}
be the set of favors as-
sociated withσ∗emn . Defines as the first state withx
∗
s smaller than its successorx
∗
s+1 where
s = n∗ if none are smaller. That is,(α, δ, p) := inf
{
s ∈ S : x∗s < x
∗
s+1 where x
∗
n∗+1 ≡ 1
}
.
Then givenδ, p ∃α ∈ (0, 1) such thats < n∗ for α < α, otherwises = n∗.
Support for conjecture. The relationship was observed in all our numerical tests. Sub-
section 3.3.2.2 covers the conjecture 3.18 “for all”p with δ fixed whenα ≥ α (see figure
8). Subsection 3.3.2.3 does the same “for all”δ with p fixed (see figure 12). Subsection
3.3.2.4 illustrates the behavior ofx∗ asα varies from values belowα to values above it
u (x∗1, ..., x
∗
n) stopped increasing.n
∗ was chosen as then for which u (x∗1, ..., x
∗
n) peaked. The grid points
consist ofα = 0.5, δ = 0.4, 0.41, ..., 0.95 andp = 0.01, 0.02, ..., 0.49.
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(see figure 14) and supports our conjecture that such anα exists. Figure 16 illustrates in-
equalitys < n∗ in more detail. It would be natural to expect, or at least we expected, the
optimal favor sequence to be decreasing so this came as a surprise. At the moment we do
not attempt to explain this anomaly, but we do confirm it by solving the same model with
the additional restriction that favors have to be decreasing. The resulting equilibria favors
ẋ = {ẋ1, ẋ2, ..., ẋn} are dominated by the originalx∗ solution;u(x∗) > u(ẋ). Subsection
3.3.2.5 offers a numerical analysis with figures and tables of case withα < α. In particular,
figures 17 and 18 illustrate the case “for all”p and “for all” δ, respectively, withα fixed
belowα.
Claim 3.19 Considerx∗ discussed in conjecture 3.18. Forn∗ > 2 n∗-EM equilibria may
include (i) favors that are above the socially optimal stage game level of 1/2 (full sharing),
and (ii) favor sequences that are non-decreasing.
Proof. Both findings surprised us which is why we state them above in a claim. We offer
the proofs in the form of numerical examples. Please refer to table 3 for results of ann∗-EM
equilibrium solution forα = 0.5, δ = 0.9 andp = 0.3, 0.31, ..., 0.49. Observe that all of the
solutions includex∗1 > 1/2 andx
∗
2 > 1/2, and toward the higherp-values,x
∗
3 > 1/2. We
ran the exact same parametric model was with the same values, except with an additional
restriction ofxs ≤ 1/2 (instead ofxs ≤ 1). The results are in table 4. Both tables display
expected payoff to agenta in the first column under headingu. (Recall thatT = u+v = 2u,
by symmetry). A comparison of the two tables shows that the unrestrictedn∗-EM strategies
generate slightly higher payoffs. Examples of non-decreasing favor sequences are available
in subsection 3.3.2.5
Conjecture 3.20 For n∗ ands discussed in conjectures 3.17 and 3.18,s (n∗) has approxi-
mately the same relationship top, δ andα asn∗ has top, δ andα, respectively.
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Support for conjecture. Whens (n∗) = n∗, the result is trivially true. Therefore we only
need to consider case (iii) of conjecture 3.18, that is, whens < n∗. Figures 16, 17 and 18 in
subsection 3.3.2.5 show the behavior ofs whenα < α. Recall thatx∗n∗ = 0 by definition of
an n-EM strategy. Therefore the outer edge in the figure that forms a geometric ridge in the
plots, represents second to last favor by agenta. The referenced plots show this ridge for
x∗n∗−1 (α), xn∗−1 (p) andx
∗
n∗−1 (δ), respectively. Along each ridge runs a “concave canal”
that is formed by the set of smallest nonzero favorsx∗s(n∗) (α), x
∗
s(n∗) (p) andx
∗
s(n∗) (δ),
respectively. It is apparent from the plots thatx∗s(n∗) varies in tandem withx
∗
n∗−1 favors in
terms of position, and hence it follows thatΔs
Δα
≈Δn
∗
Δα
, Δs
Δp
≈Δn
∗
Δp
and Δs
Δδ
≈Δn
∗
Δδ
.
3.3.2.2 Efficient favors asp varies: Figure 8 was interpolated from a set of globally
optimal EM favor sequences(x∗) for α = 0.5, δ = 0.85 fixed, whilep was varied from
p = 0.03, 0.07, ..., 0.47. The plot shows the globally efficient size of favors(x) across states
(s) as the probability of favor opportunities varies from0 to 0.5. Because the number of
states is a discrete variable and favors are optimized across states, this causes the magnitude
of each favor to increase asp increases until it becomes optimal to add another state. At
this point the size of the favors in the older states tends to fall slightly. The favor levels then
climb to and above their previous levels until it becomes optimal to add yet another state,
and so forth. This gives the favor surface a jagged outline along thep-axis. The surface
would appear even more jagged had we used a larger number of points forp ∈ (0, 1/2).
Along thes-axis favors are decreasing for the givenα, however, later we show that this is
not necessarily the case forα sufficiently low. The plot also demonstrates lemma 3.7 in
that for any value ofp, at least some level of equality matching dominates autarky when
utility functions areα-concave.
The corresponding numbers for figure 8 are shown in figure 9 and can found in more detail
in the appendix in tables 6 and 7, respectively.
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Figure 8:
n∗-EM favor sequence: x∗1(p), x
∗
2(p), ..., x
∗
n∗(p)
Algorithm: Differential evolution
Points: α = 0.5, δ = 0.85, p = 0.03, 0.07, ..., 0.47
Figure 9: Figure 8 data: Multi-state EMx∗s(p)
The slack in incentive compatibility constraints associated with figure 8 are available
in table (figure) 10. The ICC are virtually all tight suggesting the solution may represent a
second best strategy profile in at least some situation or for some parameter values.
Figure 11 depicts hown∗ changes withp. The step function was interpolated from a
set of solutions forα = 0.5, δ = 0.9 andp = 0.005, 0.01, ..., 0.495. The other function
is a generic linear approximation. The figure illustrates that steps inare approximately
constant.
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Figure 10: ICC for figure 8: Multi-state EMx∗s(p)
Figure 11:n∗(p) for n-EM equilibria
3.3.2.3 Efficient favors asδ varies: Figure 12 was interpolated from the multi-state
EM solution sequences (favors) for points(α, δ, p) = (0.6, 0.37, 0.4), (0.6, 0.41, 0.4),...,
(0.6, 0.93, 0.4). The regions forδ < 0.37 and δ > 0.93 were excluded from the plots
because they would have made the plots visually less informative.8 x∗s (δ) displays many
of the same characteristics as the corresponding plot forx∗s (p) (figure 8);x
∗
s (δ) are jagged
along theδ-axis because number of states is a discrete variable, and forδ fixed, x∗s (δ)
decreases alongs for the givenα, or for α high enough which we show later. A closer
inspection of the plots and the data shows that the dependence of∗ andx∗s, s = 1, ..., n
∗
8Solutions forδ < 0.37 each consist of one tiny nonzero favor(x∗1 < 0.1) and subsequently would only
have added flat space into our plots. The number of nonzero favors increase exponentially in asδ → 1 o
including the tail end would have dominated the rest of the plot, and obscured other details.
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onp is (direct) linear, and (direct) convex onδ for α sufficiently high.
Figure 12:
n∗-EM behavior w.r.t. δ: x∗1(δ), x
∗
2(δ), ..., x
∗
n∗(δ)
Algorithm: Nelder-Mead simplex
Points: α = 0.6, p = 0.4, δ = 0.37, 0.41, ..., 0.93
The data points for figure 12 are available in the appendix in table 8. The corresponding
payoffs and incentive compatibility constraints are also available (table 9). As before the
incentive compatibility constraints are all tight within round off error. Figure 13 depicts
how n∗ changes withδ. The step function was interpolated from a set of solutions for
α = 0.5, p = 0.3 andδ = 0.1, 0.11, ..., 0.9. The other function is a generic approximation.
The figure illustrates that steps inδ are decreasing.
3.3.2.4 Efficient favors asα varies: Figure 14 was interpolated from a set of favor
sequencesx∗ = {x∗1, x
∗
2, ..., x
∗
n∗} obtained by optimizingσ
∗
emn (x
∗) for δ = 0.8 andp =
0.4 fixed, whileα was varied fromα = 0.2, 0.24, ..., 0.8. Both thedifferential evolution
andNelder-Meadalgorithms converged to the same set of global solutions, but performed
poorly for smallerα. Later on we use ani terior pointalgorithm to find (local)x∗ solutions
consistent withσ∗emn whenα < 0.2 (high concavity case). However figure 14 already
supports conjecture 3.18, which states that forα high enoughx∗ (α) is decreasing, but for
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Figure 13:n∗(δ) for n-EM equilibria
α sufficiently low,x∗ (α) fails to remain decreasing toward the end of the sequence. As
with x∗(p) in p andx∗s (δ) in δ, figure 14 shows thatx
∗ (α) is jagged inα because the
number of states,s, is treated as a continues variable (for visual effect) even thoughs ∈ N
is discrete.
Figure 14:
n∗-EM favor sequence: x∗1(α), x
∗
2(α), ..., x
∗
n∗(α)
Algorithm: Differential evolution
Points: δ = 0.8, p = 0.4, α = 0.2, 0.24, ..., 0.8
The Mathematica code used to compute the data points and to plot figure 14 is avail-
able in the appendix. The data points and associated payoffs and incentive compatibility
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constraints may also be found there in tables 10 and 11. The ICC are all close to zero.
Figure 15 depicts hown∗ changes withα. The step function was interpolated from a set of
solutions forδ = 0.7, p = 0.3 andα = 0.1, 0.11, ..., 0.9. The other function is a generic
approximation. The figure illustrates that steps inα are increasing.
Figure 15:n∗(α) for n-EM equilibria
3.3.2.5 Analysis of specialn∗-EM cases(α < α): For smallα we used Mathemat-
ica’s interior point algorithm that solves for local optima, but in our case local optima
are also global optima. The interior point algorithm is more stable and can handle more
variables (longer favor sequences) than Mathematica’s global algorithms. Therefore it lets
us solveσ∗emn (x
∗) for smallerα and gives us a closer look at the behavior ofx∗ (α) se-
quences in lowα cases. Figure 16 depicts globally efficientx∗ (α) sequences forα < α
that were interpolated fromn∗-EM solutions forα = 0.08, 0.09, 0.10, ..., 0.35 (the re-
sults forα = 0.2, 0.3 are consistent with the results obtained by differential evolution and
Nelder-Mead algorithms). Then∗-EM solution data is available in table 12 in the appendix.
Of course the sudden jump in favor sizes toward the very end of the globally efficient
series of favors shown in figure 16 could be an error of some sort, perhaps a short-coming
in the numerical algorithms employed by Mathematica? However, it seems exceedingly
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Figure 16:
n∗-EM behavior for α < α: x∗1(α), x
∗
2(α), ..., x
∗
n∗(α)
Algorithm: Interior point
Points: δ = 0.85, p = 0.4, α = 0.08, 0.09, ..., 0.35
unlikely that three different algorithms (Differential evolution, Nelder-Mead, and interior
point) would all produce identical errors. But just to be sure we reran the experiment
show in figure 16 with one exception; favors were constrained by0 ≤ xs ≤ xs−1, ∀s
wherex0 ≡ 0, instead of the standard feasibility constraint0 ≤ xs ≤ 1, ∀s. The results
are available in table 13 and figure 27 in the appendix. The plot looks identical to its
counterpart with unconstrained favor sizes except for the jump in favor values at the end
of favor sequences. The payoffs corresponding to the constrained favor sequences were
smaller by about0.02% on average, but more importantly thexs ≤ xs−1 constraints bound
wherexs > xs−1 previously instead of converging to completely different fixed points.
Figure 17 shows then∗ andx∗ (p) associated with a globally efficient∗-EM equilib-
rium as a function ofp ∈ (0, 1/2) whenα < α. The plot was interpolated from parametric
solutions forα = 0.2, δ = 0.85 andp = 0.01, 0.02, ..., 0.49. The corresponding numbers
are available in the appendix in table 14. The key take-away from the figure is that while an
increase in the probability of favor opportunities(p) increases the number of favors that are
optimal as before, it does not eliminate or change the “canal” of minimal nonzero favors
defined bys in conjecture 3.18 that appears in the interior of the optimal favor sequence,
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that is,s < n∗. Furthermore,s (p) appears to be directly proportional ton∗(p).
Figure 17:
n∗-EM behavior for α < α : x∗1(p), x
∗
2(p), ..., x
∗
n∗(p)
Algorithm: Interior point
Points: α = 0.2, δ = 0.85, p = 0.01, 0.02, ..., 0.49
Figure 18 shows the same figure with respect to changingδ. The plot was interpolated
from parametric solutions forα = 0.3, p = 0.3 andδ = 0.6, 0.61, ..., 0.96, and the cor-
responding numbers are available in the appendix in table 15. As before, the “canal” of
minimal nonzero favors defined bys remains in the interior of the optimal favor sequence;
s < n∗ ands (δ) appears to be directly proportional ton∗ (δ).
3.3.2.6 Partial results and resulting speculation: The conjectures in this subsections
are more speculative than the earlier conjectures in this section.
For finite dimensional EM strategies we defined the value of a strategy profile as the
sum of average discounted state payoffs for both agents weighted by the stationary proba-
bilities of each state (definition 3.12). If the starting state is random, this value is also equal
to the strategy profile’s dynamically defined value. For infinite dimensional EM strategy
profiles this is not the case as∞-EM strategies have no stationary distribution (lemma
3.15). Therefore the value ofσem∞ has to be computed dynamically and the only sensible
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Figure 18:
n∗-EM behavior for α < α : x∗1(δ), x
∗
2(δ), ..., x
∗
n∗(δ)
Algorithm: Interior point
Points: α = 0.3, p = 0.4, δ = 0.6, 0.61, ..., 0.96
starting is state 0. This makes comparisons with finiteσemn trickier, but our preliminary
results suggest that∞-EM strategies cannot be incentive compatible. If an∞-EM equilib-
rium exists, it would be dominated by a truncated (finite) version of that∞-EM strategy
profile. The core intuition is that in EM equilibria the value of the game is the average
value of all the states, favors are efficient (up to full sharing) so the bigger the favors, the
greater the value of the game. But favors generally have to decrease to provide agents with
an incentive to keep doing them. This in turn means that in a game with infinite states there
would also be infinitely many low favor (low value) states. Truncating the game at some
point ensures that the game is played in high value territory except for two boundary states
that nonetheless map the game back into the higher favors region. Eliminating a boundary
state may provide a higher return for that point in the game, but it would extend the game
into states with lower values until adding another state would be inefficient.
Conjecture 3.21 σem∞ are never globally efficient and may not even exist.
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We define the expected (average discounted) value in an iterative fashion then expand.
T (σem∞) := 2 (1 − δ) v0, wherevs := p
(1−xs)
α+(ys)
α+δ(vs−1+vs+1)
1−(1−2p)δ , s ∈ Z (154)
To make the expansion easier, letp̂ ≡ p
1−(1−2p)δ , δ̂ ≡
δ
1−(1−2p)δ , x̂s ≡ (1 − xs)
α +(y−s)
α ≡
(1−xs)
α + (x−s)
α, and in these termsvs := p̂x̂s + δ̂ (vs−1 + vs+1) for s ∈ Z. Expanding
v0 iteratively:
v0 = p̂x̂0 + δ̂ (v−1 + v+1)
= p̂x̂0 + δ̂
(
p̂x̂−1 + δ̂ (v−2 + v0)
)
+ δ̂
(
p̂x̂1 + δ̂ (v0 + v2)
)
= p̂x̂0 + p̂δ̂x̂−1 + p̂δ̂x̂1 + δ̂
2 (v−2 + 2v0 + v2)
= p̂x̂0 + p̂δ̂x̂−1 + p̂δ̂x̂1 + δ̂
2
(
p̂x̂−2 + δ̂ (v−3 + v−1)
)
+ 2δ̂2
(
p̂x̂0+δ̂ (v−1 + v+1)
)
+ δ̂2
(
p̂x̂2 + δ̂ (v1 + v3)
)
= p̂x̂0
(
1 + 2δ̂2
)
+ p̂δ̂x̂−1 + p̂δ̂x̂1 + p̂δ̂
2x̂−2 + p̂δ̂
2x̂2 + δ̂
3 (v−3+3v−1+3v+1 + v3)
= ...
To further condense the expansion, letx̌0 := x̂0, x̌j := x̂j + x̂−j for t ∈ N. Then
v0 = p̂
(
1 + 2δ̂2
)
x̌0 + p̂δ̂x̌1 + p̂δ̂
2x̌2 + δ̂
3 (v−3+3v−1+3v+1 + v3)
= p̂
(
1 + 2δ̂2 + 6δ̂4 + 20δ̂6 + ...
)
x̌0 + p̂
(
δ̂ + 3δ̂3 + 10δ̂5 + 35δ̂7 + ...
)
x̌1
+ p̂
(
δ̂2 + 4δ̂4 + 15δ̂6 + 56δ̂8 + ...
)
x̌2 + p̂
(
δ̂3 + 5δ̂5 + 21δ̂7 + 84δ̂9 + ...
)
x̌3 + ...
The x̌j coefficients, say̌Cj, consist of discounted sums of binomials. Taking their limits
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shows thatČj have2F1 Hypergeometric9 form
Čj =
∞∑
i=0
p̂
(
2i + j
i + j
)
δ̂2i+j = p̂δ̂j2F1
(
1+j
2
,2+j
2
; 1 + j; 4δ̂
2
)
=⇒ Č0 =
p̂√
1−4δ̂2
, Č1 = p̂
1−
√
1−4δ̂2
2δ̂
√
1−4δ̂2
, Č2 = p̂
1−2δ̂2−
√
1−4δ̂2
2δ̂2
√
1−4δ̂2
, ...
∴ T (σem∞) = 2 (1 − δ) p̂
∞∑
j=0
2F1
(
1+j
2
,2+j
2
; 1 + j; 4δ̂
2
)
x̌j
= 2(1−δ)p
1−(1−2p)δ
1
√
1 − 4δ
2
(1−(1−2p)δ)2
(1 − x0)
α + (x0)
α
+ 4(1−δ)p
1−(1−2p)δ
∞∑
j=1
2F1
(
1+j
2
,2+j
2
; 1 + j; 4δ
2
(1−(1−2p)δ)2
)
((1 − xj)
α + (x−j)
α)
The hypergeometric function is well-suited for numerical and analytical work but we leave
further analysis ofT (σem∞) for the future.
Speculation supporting conjecture 3.21.Suppose an∞-EM equilibrium exists. We as-
sume the values of the associated favors would have to be decreasing for both theoretical
and empirical reasons. In theory we expect favors to decrease to provide agents with an
incentive to keep doing them (do a big favor today in return for the promise of bigger
reciprocal favors tomorrow). Empirically (numerical testing) we found that favors were
decreasing, except in special cases that involved a jump toward the end of the favor se-
quence. If the sequence is infinite it has no end (to state the obvious), so there would be
no reason to expect any jump either. Furthermore, our numerical algorithm worked by op-
timizing the value of the game forn states, comparing the value to then − 1 state value,
and adding another state and repeating if then state value was higher than then − 1 state
value. The solutions were of course finite, but moreover they were well-behaved in terms
of the optimal number of states (see figure 7), and show almost surely that the number of
states does not diverge to infinity within the interior of the parameter space. That said,
9“The” Hypergeometric function is defined as2F1(a, b; c; z) =
∑∞
k=0(a)k(b)k/(c)k z
k
/
k!
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numerical analysis is not well-suited for analysis of asymptotic behavior we so cannot rule
out anomalous behavior asα → 1, δ → 1 or p → 1/2.
Conjecture 3.22 The globally efficientn∗-EM equilibrium exists and is unique up to a
measure zero in parameter space. That is, there may be pairs of points (zero measure) in
the parameter space for which then∗ andn∗ + 1 state values of the game are equal.
Speculation supporting conjecture 3.22.Our numerical tests always produced unique
n∗-EM outcomes, however, the parameters live on continuous intervals while the optimal
number of states is discrete. Letñ be the efficient number of states for a triplet of val-
ues
(
α̃, δ̃, p̃
)
. Suppose we decreaseα, or increaseδ or p continuously while the globally
efficient multi-state solution is updated untiln∗ = ñ turns ton∗ = ñ + 1. At that point
T
(
σ∗emñ
)
= T
(
σ∗emñ+1
)
, so by definition 3.16 both are globally efficient multi-state equi-
libria. For any integer pair(n, n + 1) with n ≥ 2, we should be able to create three dis-
tinct pairs of such non-unique EM equilibria (one pair for each parameter), but they would
have measure zero mass. It might be possible to use a similar technique to create lines or
planes of n-EM intersections by increasing one parameter while lowering another subject to
T (σ∗emn) = T
(
σ∗emn+1
)
, however there is no reason to suspect thatT (σ∗emn) would remain
constant.
3.4 Pseudo-highest symmetric self-generating line (pseudo-HSSGL)
equilibria
In this section we discuss an analog of AB’s [1] highest symmetric self-generating line
(HSSGL) equilibrium concept for favor-trading with concave utility functions. Our version
of HSSGL calledpseudo-HSSGLinvolves finite number of states, whereas AB used infi-
nite states, but in the interior both have the same automata representation (see figure 19).
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Figure 19: Automata for 6-state pseudo-HSSGL strategy
Another difference between AB’s HSSGL and ourpseudo-HSSGLis that we do not limit
our analysis onto lines (symmetric or otherwise). We call a pseudo-HSSGL strategy with
n states ann-state pseudo-HSSGL (n-HSSGL)strategy, and denote it withσhssgln .
3.4.1 Globally efficient n-HSSGL equilibria (n∗-HSSGL)
We use the same approach as withn∗-EM strategies to numerically optimize problem (144).
As before, it is enough to solve the optimization problem for agenta because we impose
symmetry on it by replacingvs andys with u−s andx−s, respectively, where the state space
is S ≡ {−n, ...,−1, 1, ..., n}. The objective is simplyu(x) = u−1(x)+u1(x)
2
because the
HSSGL game starts from either state 1 (agentb fully advantaged) or state -1 (agenta fully
advantaged). Individual payoffs are described by equation (155) and incentive compatibil-
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ity constraints by equation (156).
us :=



p ((1 − δ)(1 − x−n)
α + δu−1)
+p ((1 − δ)(y−n)
α + δu1) + (1 − 2p)δu−n
s=-n
p ((1 − δ)(1 − xs)
α + δu−1)
+p ((1 − δ)(ys)
α + δu1) + (1 − 2p)δus−1
s=1-n,...,-1,
p ((1 − δ)(1 − xs)
α + δu−1)
+p ((1 − δ)(ys)
α + δu1) + (1 − 2p)δus+1
s=1,...,n-1,
p ((1 − δ)(1 − xn)
α + δu−1)
+p ((1 − δ)(yn)
α + δu1) + (1 − 2p)δun
s=n.
(155)
ICCs(x) :=



u−1 − u−n − 1−δδ (1 − (1 − x−n)
α) s=-n,
u−1 − us−1 − 1−δδ (1 − (1 − xs)
α) s=1-n,...,-1,
u−1 − us+1 − 1−δδ (1 − (1 − xs)
α) s=1,...,n-1,
u−1 − un − 1−δδ (1 − (1 − xn)
α) s=n.
(156)
The problem is computationally harder than optimizing n-EM strategies, so we used the
CP-model with interior point algorithm and applied it to well-behaved regions of the pa-
rameter space.
3.4.2 Numerical analysis ofn∗-HSSGL equilibria
For low values ofp, our computedn∗-HSSGL results are approximately consistent with
AB’s original HSSGL equilibria. That is, the size of the “small” favor owed (interest
payment) by the advantaged agent grows as periods of no favors pass, while the “large”
favor owed by the disadvantaged agent decreases. However, for largerp th optimaln∗-
HSSGL strategy appears to converge to four states: large favors in the inner states, and
small favors in the outer states.
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Figure 20:
n∗-HSSGL favors as p varies: View 1
Points: α = 0.3, δ = 0.9, p = 0.14, 0.16, ..., 0.46
Figure 21:
n∗-HSSGL favors as p varies: View 2
Points: α = 0.3, δ = 0.9, p = 0.14, 0.16, ..., 0.46
For the parameter values used to construct figures 20 and 21, then∗-HSSGL equilibria
produce higher payoffs thann∗-EM equilibria forp = 0.42, 0.44, 0.46 and lower payoffs
otherwise. If we lowerδ by 0.1, n∗-HSSGL dominatesn∗-EM for all p in our sample. If we
lowerα by 0.1 n∗-HSSGL dominatesn∗-EM for p = 0.14, 0.16 andp ≥ 0.34. However, in
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each case then∗-HSSGL dominance increases asp increases, and is insignificant (within
margin of error) for lowp values.
Figures 28-31 in the appendix illustraten∗-HSSGL equilibrium behavior asδ andα
vary per our CP-model and the (local) interior point algorithm. However, even these nu-
merical solutions were difficult to find in terms of error free parameter space coverage and
starting points for the interior point algorithm.
For theδ variation analysis we usedδ = 0.65, 0.67,...,0.95 while α = p = 0.3. All n∗-
HSSGL equilibria involved 8 or fewer states without strong patterns. However, we also ran
the same optimization exercise using∗-EM strategies, and it turned out thatT (σ∗emn) >
T
(
σ∗hssgln
)
for δ < 0.8 andn∗-HSSGL in turn outperformedn∗-EM increasingly forδ >
0.8.
To investigaten∗-HSSGL responsiveness to changes in concavity, we usedα = 0.1,
0.12, ..., 0.74 while δ = 0.9 andp = 0.3. As the game became more linear (α approached
1) the optimaln∗-HSSGL solution included a greater number of states and began to re-
semble AB’s HSSGL strategy. This suggests that pure-form symmetric line equilibria are
optimal in the linear model (for some parameter values), but not in the concave model.
In comparison ton∗-EM, n∗-HSSGL produced higher payoffs for lowα values and lower
payoffs for highα.
3.5 Equilibria with favor-depreciation (FD equilibria)
Consider a strategy that involves a small probabilityq ∈ [0, 1/2] that if the disadvantaged
agent does not do a favor in the boundary state, the game moves inwards by one state. The
idea is to chooseq high enough that the agents would do a small favor at the boundary
state to avoid the chance of punishment in the form of having to do a positive (bigger)
favor next period. We call this mechanismfavor-depreciation.It is our initial attempt to
design equilibria similar to HSSGL equilibria by AB [1] for a multi-state environment, or
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equilibria in continuous time by Hauser and Hopenhayn [8] for a discrete time environment.
In numerical testing, globally efficient (to use the EM definition 3.16)equilibria with
favor-depreciation (FD equilibria)were only marginally better than correspondingn∗-EM
equilibria. When the maximum number of states was bound exogenously, FD equilibria
performed somewhat better against their locally efficient n-EM counterparts. Figures 22
and 23 show the results of FD equilibria bounded by a maximum of 4 states withα = 0.1,
δ = 0.5 and p = 0.07, 0.11, ..., 0.47. The corresponding results for locally efficient n-
EM equilibria are in figures 24 and 25. Column%(FD − EM) in figure 25 shows the
percentage difference between an example set of 4-state FD and EM equilibria payoffs.
This was consistent with our expectation since favor-depreciation strategies remove some
of the inefficiency involved with boundary states, however we were not expecting as much
of a difference for low values ofp when the constraint on the number of states is not even
binding. The payoff difference starts at5.4% for p = 0.07 and steadily increases to9% as
the probability of favor opportunities is increased top = 0.47. Perhaps the lack of a greater
difference is due to a fundamental inefficiency in FD strategies; the (fully) disadvantaged
agent is punished with probabilityq even when she does not do a favor simply because she
did not receive a favor opportunity. In our numerical tests, estimates of optimalq were very
small for smallp (around0.01) but grew larger (to0.066) asp increased. The largerp is,
the higher the number of efficient states is, and hence the greater the effect of the bound on
states.
3.5.1 Remaining questions
Other potential equilibria to investigate include a EM-HSSGL hybrids and equilibria in-
volving punishment phases. For example, if no one does a favor, a strategy profile could
specify that neither agent do a favor next period either as punishment. The infinite dimen-
sional EM strategies also require more work as we did not have time to apply the expression
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Figure 22:
4-state FD equilibria: x∗1(p), x
∗
2(p), ..., x
∗
n∗(p)
Algorithm: Interior point
Points: α = 0.1, δ = 0.5, p = 0.07, 0.11, ..., 0.47
Figure 23: 4-state FD equilibria: Data for figure 22
for T (σem∞) that we derived. For finite dimensional strategies, we believe we could gen-
erate a full set of data in all dimensions, fit an approximating curve to it, and use the result
for comparative statistics and other analysis. It may be possible to analyze the system of
simultaneous n-EM payoff equations implicitly, for example, by the use of perturbation
analysis.
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Figure 24:
4-EM equilibria: x∗1(p), x
∗
2(p), ..., x
∗
n∗(p)
Algorithm: Interior point
Points: α = 0.1, δ = 0.5, p = 0.07, 0.11, ..., 0.47
Figure 25: 4-EM equilibria: Data for figure 24
3.6 Conclusion
By choosing a concave utility function that is arbitrarily close to a linear utility line, we can
obtain equilibria and outcomes that are arbitrarily close to the linear case of favor-trading.
Therefore we focused on the family ofα-concave functions to emphasize the impact that
sufficient concavity can have on favor-trading games. In particular, favor-trading becomes
possible for allδ at some level and multi-state strategies become more valuable. For ex-
ample, when discount factors are just high enough to equality match full favors doing so
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maximizes expected utility in the linear case within a large class of incentive compatible
equilibria, whereas in the concave case we can do better by lowering the favor size and
using the generated slack in the incentive compatibility constraints to enforce a second
smaller consecutive favor.
In the rest of the paper, we generalized AB’s [1] equality matching to multiple states
or alternatively, we generalized M̈obius’ “chips mechanism” to divisible chips. We defined
multi-state equality matching for equilibria that were locally efficient for a given number
of states, and then for equilibria that were globally efficient across any number of states.
We also defined infinite state equality matching strategies, but argued that they either were
not incentive compatible or that they would be dominated by finite state equality matching
equilibria. We constructed two parametric models to numerically analyze globally efficient
multi-state equilibria. The first model simulates a large sample of games, derives pay-
off functions from the simulations, and finds the number and size of favors that would be
optimal for the constructed payoff functions. The second model solves the system of si-
multaneous payoff equations associated with an equality matching game directly, and uses
the results to find the optimal favor sequence given a general strategy profile such as multi-
state equality matching or pseudo-highest symmetric self-generating line strategies. We
used these models to compute sets of solutions that spanned the parameter space and then
interpolated general equilibria characteristics from those results. We further constructed a
version of AB’s highest symmetric self-generating lines equilibria that followed the same
automata except in the border states and was not restricted to lines or infinite number of
states. And we also extended the multi-state equality matching model to a class of equi-
libria that involve favor-depreciation and that dominate globally efficient multi-state equi-
libria. All strategies were analyzed using our parametric models, but not in as much depth
as multi-state equality matching strategies. Further research is needed to find closed-form
solutions to these various strategy profiles and to investigate hybrid and other strategies for
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favor-trading with concave utility functions.
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3.7 Appendix B
3.7.1 Proofs
Proof. (Lemma 3.7: EM equilibrium always exists)
Consider a simple (2-state) EM strategy profileσem consisting of favorsx = y = ε,
and payoffsuε andūε for the disadvantaged and advantaged agents, respectively. We use
a direct proof to show that given anyα, δ andp, there exists anε small enough that the
incentive compatibility constraint for simple EM is satisfied.
The payoffs are
uε = p ((1 − δ)(1 − ε)
α + δūε) + (1 − p)δuε
= p
(1 − δ) (1 − ε)α + δūε
1 − δ(1 − p)
ūε = p ((1 − δ) + δūε) + p ((1 − δ)ε
α + δuε) + (1 − 2p)δūε
= p
(1 − δ) (1 + εα) + δuε
1 − δ(1 − p)
To obtain explicit equations foruε and ūε the solve the two equations above in two
unknowns,
uε = p
(1 − δ)(1 − ε)α + pδ (1 + (1 − ε)α + εα)
1 − (1 − 2p)δ
ūε = p
(1 − δ) (1 + εα) + pδ (1 + (1 − ε)α + εα)
1 − (1 − 2p)δ
=⇒ ūε − uε =
p(1 − δ) (1 − (1 − ε)α + εα)
1 − (1 − 2p)δ
(157)
The incentive compatibility constraint is
(1 − δ) (1 − ε)α + δūε ≥ 1 − δ + δuε
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=⇒ δ ≥
1 − (1 − ε)α
1 − (1 − ε)α + ūε−uε
We substitute for̄uε − uε from equation 157,
δ ≥
1 − (1 − ε)α
1 − (1 − ε)α + p(1−δ)(1−(1−ε)
α+εα)
1−(1−2p)δ
and solve forδ (here we skip several steps of straightforward simplification),
δ ≥
1
1 − p + p ε
α
1−(1−ε)α
→ 0 asε → 0. (158)
becauseα ∈ (0, 1) andp ∈ (0, 1/2) are fixed andlimε→0 ε
α
1−(1−ε)α = ∞. And sinceu (ε) =
εα is continuous forα > 0 andε > 0, we can always find anε sufficiently small that
inequality 158 issatisfied.
Proof. (Lemma 3.13:δ > δα =⇒ ∃σ′em3 such thatT
(
σ′em3
)
> T (σem2))
We first have to solve system of 3-state EM payoff equations whenδ = δα :
u3 = p ((1 − δα) + δαu3) + p ((1 − δα) y
α
1 + δαu2) + (1 − 2p)δαu3,
u2 = p ((1 − δα) (1 − x2)
α + δαu3) + p ((1 − δα) y
α
2 + δαu1) + (1 − 2p)δαu2,
u1 = p ((1 − δα) (1 − x1)
α + δαu2) + (1 − p)δαu1.
Recall thatδα = 2
α−1
2α−1+p(2−2α) and by definition of multi-state EM strategiesy1 = x2
andy2 = x1 :
u3 = p
((
1 − 2
α−1
2α−1+p(2−2α)
)
+ 2
α−1
2α−1+p(2−2α)u3
)
+ p
((
1 − 2
α−1
2α−1+p(2−2α)
)
xα2 +
2α−1
2α−1+p(2−2α)u2
)
+ (1 − 2p) 2
α−1
2α−1+p(2−2α)u3,
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u2 = p
((
1 − 2
α−1
2α−1+p(2−2α)
)
(1 − x2)
α + 2
α−1
2α−1+p(2−2α)u3
)
+ p
((
1 − 2
α−1
2α−1+p(2−2α)
)
xα1 +
2α−1
2α−1+p(2−2α)u1
)
+ (1 − 2p) 2
α−1
2α−1+p(2−2α)u2,
u1 = p
((
1 − 2
α−1
2α−1+p(2−2α)
)
(1 − x1)
α + 2
α−1
2α−1+p(2−2α)u2
)
+ (1 − p) 2
α−1
2α−1+p(2−2α)u1.
Solving
u3 = p
−1+32α−4α+(4−4x1)
α+(1−x1)
α−21+α(1−x1)
α−(1−32α+4α)xα1 +(2−2x2)
α−(1−x2)
α+(2α−1)xα2
21+α−1 ,
u2 = p
−1+2α+(2−2x1)
α−(1−x1)
α+(2α−1)xα1 +(1−x2)
α+xα2
21+α−1 ,
u1 = p
1−21+α+4α−(4−4x1)
α+3(2−2x1)
α−(1−x1)
α+(2α−1)2xα1 +(2−2x2)
α−(1−x2)
α+(2α−1)xα2
21+α−1 .
And taking the differences and the sum average, and simplifying
u3 − u2 = p (2 − 2
α)
2α−(2−2x1)
α+(1−x1)
α+2αxα1 −(1−x2)
α−xα2
21+α−1
u2 − u1 = p (2 − 2
α)
2α−1−(2−2x1)
α+(2α−1)xα1 +(1−x2)
α+xα2
21+α−1
T (σ′em3) =
2
3
(u3 + u2 + u1)
= 2
3
p (1 + (1 − x1)
α + xα1 + (1 − x2)
α + xα2 )
The incentive compatibility constraints forσ′em3 are
(1 − δα) (1 − x1)
α + δα u2 ≥ 1 − δα + δα u1
=⇒ δα
1−δα
(u2 − u1) ≥ 1 − (1 − x1)
α
(1 − δα) (1 − x2)
α + δα u3 ≥ 1 − δ + δα u2
=⇒ δα
1−δα
(u3 − u2) ≥ 1 − (1 − x2)
α
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Suppose the ICC inequalities bind. Substituteδα
1−δα
= 1
p
2α−1
2−2α and the values foru3 − u2
andu2 − u1 into the ICC and simplify
(2α−1)(2α−(2−2x1)α+(1−x1)α+2αxα1 −(1−x2)
α−xα2 )
21+α−1 = 1 − (1 − x1)
α
(2α−1)(2α−(2−2x1)α+(1−x1)α+2αxα1 −(1−x2)
α−xα2 )
21+α−1 = 1 − (1 − x2)
α
Solving yieldsx2 = (1 − 2x1) /2.
Proof. (Lemma 3.14:πs (σemn) = 1/n, s = 1, 2, ..., n)
Let π∗ = (π∗1, π
∗
2, . . . , π
∗
n), whereπ
∗
1 + π
∗
2 + . . . + π
∗
n = 1, denote the fraction of time
spent in the corresponding states, and letm denote the transformation matrix of agents
between states if they followσemn . In equilibrium,π∗ has to satisfy the following equations,
m′π∗ = π∗ andπ∗1 + π
∗
2 + . . . + π
∗
n = 1,
writing out them-matrix andπ∗-vectors,



















1 − p p 0 ∙ ∙ ∙ 0
p 1 − 2p p 0
...
0 p 1 − 2p p
... 0 p 1 − 2p
... 0 p 0
...
. . . p
0 ∙ ∙ ∙ 0 p 1 − p




























π∗1
π∗2
...
π∗n









=









π∗1
π∗2
...
π∗n









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multiplying out the terms,
(1 − p)π∗1 + pπ
∗
2
pπ∗1 + (1 − 2p)π
∗
2 + pπ
∗
3
pπ∗2 + (1 − 2p)π
∗
3 + pπ
∗
4
...
pπ∗n−2 + (1 − 2p)π
∗
n−1 + pπ
∗
n
pπ∗n−1 + (1 − p)π
∗
n
= π∗1
= π∗2
= π∗3
...
= π∗n−1
= π∗n
Solving such thatπ∗1 + π
∗
2 + . . . + π
∗
n = 1 =⇒ π
∗ =
(
1
n
, 1
n
, . . . , 1
n
)
.
3.7.2 Mathematica code
The following Mathematica code offers a compact example of using simulated payoffs
(section 3.3.1.2) withα = 0.5, δ = 0.8 andp = 0.05, 0.1, ..., .45. The code constructs
payoff functions from the simulated data and solves then∗-EM optimization problem for
those payoff functions and the associated triplet of parameter values(α, δ, p) . The solution
set is used to interpolate 3D-plot of the optimal favor sequences for the parameter space
that was covered (see figure 6).
(* Clear old variables and set new values *)
Clear[”Global‘*”]; α=.5;δ=.8;II=100;J=10000;
tr1:=p;tr1a=”p”;tr2:=α;tr2a=”α”;tr3:=δ;tr3a=”δ”;Col=1;
v0=1/20;v1=9/20;vInc=1/20;
For[p=v0,p≤v1,p+=vInc,
PrintTemporary[ToString[tr1a]<>”=” <>ToString[N[tr1]]];
Clear[avU,xSeq,ICCa];n=1;u[0]=p;
While[n<3||avU[n-1]<avU[n],n++;
Clear[x];x[0]=1;x[n+1]=0;x[n]=0;
(* generate data *)
W=RandomChoice[{p,p,1-2p}→{1,-1,0},{J,II}];
Do[S[k]=Drop[FoldList[Max[1,Min[n,Plus[#1,#2]]]&,k,#]&/@W,None,-1],
{k,1,n}];
(* derive payoffs and define objective *)
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Do[u[k]=(1-δ)Mean[(Map[(1-x[#]) α̂&,S[k](W/.-1→0),{2}]+Map[x[n+1-#] α̂&,
-S[k](W/.{1→0}),{2}]).Array[δˆ(#-1)&,II]], {k,1,n}];
objective=Sum[u[k],{k,1,n}]/n;
(* define incentive and feasibility constraints *)
ICCa[n]=Table[0≤(1-δ)((1-x[k])ˆα-1)+δ (u[k+1]-u[k]),{k,1,n-1}];
constraints=And@@Join[Table[0≤x[k]≤1,{k,1,n-1}],ICCa[n]];
(* choose starting points and solve for optimal favors *)
variables=Table[{x[t],Min[2*p,.55]* δ*tˆ(-α)},{t,1,n-1}];
{avU[n],xSeq[n]}=FindMaximum[{objective,constraints},variables]
];
nMax=Ordering[Array[avU,n-1,2],-1][[1]]+1;
Col=Max[Col,Count[xSeq[nMax][[All,2]], ]];
optimalX0[tr1]=Join[xSeq[nMax][[All,2]],Table[0,{i,30}]]
];
gg={Black,24,”Helvetica”};
data=Flatten[Table[{vv,nn,optimalX0[vv][[nn]]},{vv,v0,v1,vInc},{nn,1,Col}],1];
ListPlot3D[data,AxesLabel→{Text[Style[ToString[tr1a],gg]],Text[Style[”s”,gg]],
Text[Style[”x”,gg]]},ColorFunction→(ColorData[”LakeColors”][#3*5/3]&)]
Our second example applies the computed payoffs model (section 3.3.1.4) and the dif-
ferential evolution algorithm to find globally efficient equilibrium favors and associated
payoffs forα = 0.2, .24, ..., .8 while δ = .8 andp = .4. The results are available in figure
14 and table 10.
(* Clear old variables and set new values *)
Clear[”Global‘*”]; δ=4/5;p=2/5;Col=1;
tr1:=α;tr1a=”α”;tr2:=δ;tr2a=”δ”;tr3:=p;tr3a=”p”;
(* Define set of system of payoff equations and the ICC *)
equ[n ]:=Join[Table[
u[s]==(p (δ u[s-1]+δ u[1+s]+(1-δ)(x[1+n-s]α+(1-x[s])α)))/(1-(1-2 p)δ),
{s,2,n-1}],{u[1]==(p (δ u[2]+(1-δ) (1-x[1])α))/(1-(1-p)δ),
u[n]==(p (δ u[n-1]+(1-δ) (1+x[1]α)))/(1-(1-p)δ)}];
ICCa[n ]:=Table[0≤δ (u[s+1]-u[s])-(1-δ)(1-(1-x[s])α),{s,1,n-1}];
v0=1/5;v1=4/5;vInc=1/25;
For[α=v0, α≤v1, α+=vInc,
Clear[avU,xSeq];n=1;PrintTemporary[ToString[tr1a]<>”=” <>ToString[N[tr1]]];
While[n<3||avU[n-1]<avU[n],n++;PrintTemporary[”n=”<>ToString[n]];
Clear[x];x[0]=1;x[n+1]=0;x[n]=0;
(* Solve system of payoff equations *)
uSolv=NSolve[equ[n],Table[u[s],{s,1,n}]][[1]];
objective=1/n*Sum[u[t],{t,1,n}]/.uSolv;
constraints=And@@Join[Table[0≤x[k]≤1,{k,1,n-1}],ICCa[n]]/.uSolv;
(* solve for optimal favors *)
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variables=Table[x[t],{t,1,n-1}];
{avU[n],xSeq[n]}=NMaximize[{objective,constraints},variables,
{Method→”DifferentialEvolution”,MaxIterations→500}]
];
nMax=Ordering[Array[avU,n-1,2],-1][[1]]+1;
Col=Max[Col,Count[xSeq[nMax][[All,2]], ]];pay[tr1]=avU[nMax];
optimalX[tr1]=xSeq[nMax][[All,2]];
optimalX0[tr1]=Join[xSeq[nMax][[All,2]],Table[0,{i,30}]]
];
gg={Black,24,”Helvetica”};
data=Flatten[Table[{vv,nn,optimalX0[vv][[nn]]},{vv,v0,v1,vInc},{nn,1,Col}],1];
Labeled[TableForm[Table[Prepend[optimalX[vv],pay[vv]],{vv,v0,v1,vInc}],
TableHeadings→{Table[ToString[tr1a]<>” = ” <>ToString[N[vv]],{vv,v0,v1,vInc}],
Prepend[Table[Subscript[x,t],{t,1,Col}],”u”] }],”n∗-EM equilibria: ”<>ToString[tr2a]
<>”=” <>ToString[N[tr2]]<>”,” <>ToString[tr3a]<>”=” <>ToString[N[tr3]],Top,
Frame→True,LabelStyle→Bold]
ListPlot3D[data,AxesLabel→{Text[Style[ToString[tr1a],gg]],Text[Style[”s”,gg]],
Text[Style[”x”,gg]]},ColorFunction→(ColorData[”LakeColors”][#3*5/3]&)]
Our final Mathematica code example was used to generate figures 24 and 25 depicting
4-state FD equilibria. The included code is longer than previous examples only because it
includes most of the auxiliary subroutines we use while testing the code. These subroutines
provide the user with an option to use either a global or local optimization algorithm, print
out intermediate results so that we can see which part of the code or loop is running and to
gather debugging information if necessary.
(* Clear old variables and set new values *)
Clear[”Global‘*”];start = SessionTime[];global=0;Col=1;
α=.1;δ=.5;sMax=4;tr1:=p;tr1a=”p”;tr2:=α;tr2a=”α”;tr3:=δ;tr3a=”δ”;
(* Define favor functions and ICC *)
equ[n ]:=Join[Table[
u[s]==(p(δ u[s-1]+δ u[s+1]+(1-δ) (x[1+n-s]α+(1-x[s])α)))/(1-(1-2 p)δ),{s,2,n-1}],
{u[1]==(p(δ u[2]+(1-δ)((1-x[1])α+( x[n])α)))/(1-(1-p)δ),
u[n]==(δ(p-(1-2 p) x[0])u[n-1]+p(1-δ)((x[1])α+(1-x[n])α))/(1-δ(1-p)+(1-2 p)δ x[0])}];
ICCa[n ]:=Append[Table[0≤δ (u[s+1]-u[s])-(1-δ)(1-(1-x[s])α),
{s,1,n-1}],0≤(1-δ)((1-x[n])α-1)+δ*x[0](u[n]-u[n-1])];
v0=7/100;v1=47/100;vInc=4/100;
(* sMax optional limit to number of states *)
For[p=v0,p≤v1,p+=vInc,
Clear[avU,xSeq];n=1;u[0]=p;
While[navU[n]),n++;
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Clear[x];x[n+1]=0;uSolv=NSolve[equ[n],Table[u[s],{s,1,n}]][[1]];
(* Define obj, cons and vars - need to choose starting pts carefully *)
objective=1/n*Sum[u[t],{t,1,n}]/.uSolv;
constraints=And@@Join[Table[0≤x[t]≤1,{t,0,n}],ICCa[n]]/.uSolv;
variables=Prepend[Table[{x[t],Min[2*p,.55]*(sMax+1-n)/sMax},
{t,1,n}],{x[0],0.01}];varOnly=Table[x[t],{t,0,n}];
If[global==0,{avU[n],xSeq[n]}=FindMaximum[{objective,constraints},
variables,MaxIterations→20000],
{avU[n],xSeq[n]}=NMaximize[{objective,constraints},varOnly,
{Method→”DifferentialEvolution”,MaxIterations→500}]];
current = SessionTime[]-start;PrintTemporary[”n = ”<>ToString[n]<>” and ”
<>ToString[tr1a]<>” = ” <>ToString[N[tr1]]<>” and time = ”
<>ToString[current]<>” Payoff = ”<>ToString[avU[n]]]
];
nMax=Ordering[Array[avU,n-1,2],-1][[1]]+1;
Col=Max[Col,Count[xSeq[nMax][[All,2]], ]-1];
pay[tr1]=avU[nMax];optimalX[tr1]=xSeq[nMax][[All,2]];
optimalX0[tr1]=Join[xSeq[nMax][[All,2]],Table[0,{i,sMax}]]
];
gg={Black,24,”Helvetica”};
data=Flatten[Table[{vv,nn-1,optimalX0[vv][[nn]]},{vv,v0,v1,vInc},{nn,2,Col+1}],1];
Labeled[TableForm[Table[Prepend[optimalX[vv],pay[vv]],{vv,v0,v1,vInc}],
TableHeadings→{Table[ToString[tr1a]<>” = ” <>ToString[N[vv]],
{vv,v0,v1,vInc}],Prepend[Prepend[Table[Subscript[x,t],
{t,1,Col}],”q”],”u”] }],ToString[sMax]<>”-state FD equilibria: ”
<>ToString[tr2a]<>” = ” <>ToString[tr2]<>”, ” <>ToString[tr3a]<>” = ”
<>ToString[N[tr3]],Top,Frame→True,LabelStyle→Bold]
ListPlot3D[data,AxesLabel→{Text[Style[ToString[tr1a],gg]],Text[Style[”s”,gg]],
Text[Style[”x”,gg]]},ColorFunction→(ColorData[”LakeColors”][#3*5/3]&)]
3.7.3 Numerical algorithms for constrained global optimization
Source: Wolfram Research [21]:
Nelder-Mead
The Nelder-Mead method is a direct search method. For a function of n variables,
the algorithm maintains a set ofn+1 points forming the vertices of a polytope in n-
dimensional space. This method is often termed the ”simplex” method, which should
not be confused with the well-known simplex method for linear programming.
At each iteration,n+1 pointsx1, x2, ..., xn+1 form a polytope. The points are
ordered so thatf(x1) ≤ f(x2) ≤ ... ≤ f(xn+1). A new point is then generated to
replace the worst pointxn+1.
Let c be the centroid of the polytope consisting of the bestn points,c =
∑n
i=1 xi.
A trial point xt is generated by reflecting the worst point through the centroid,xt =
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c + α(c − xn+1), whereα > 0 is a parameter.
If the new pointxt is neither a new worst point nor a new best point,f(x1) ≤
f(xt) ≤ f(xn), xt replacesxn+1.
If the new pointxt is better than the best point,f(xt) < f(x1), the reflection is
very successful and can be carried out further toxe = c + β(xt − r), whereβ > 1 is
a parameter to expand the polytope. If the expansion is successful,f(xe) < f(xt), xe
replacesxn+1; otherwise the expansion failed, andxt replacesxn+1.
If the new pointxt is worse than the second worst point,f(xt) ≥ f(xn), the
polytope is assumed to be too large and needs to be contracted. A new trial point is
defined as
xc =
{
c + γ (xn+1 − c), if f (xt) ≥ f (xt+1),
c + γ (xt − c), if f (xt) < f (xt+1),
where0 < γ < 1 is a parameter. If (xc) < min (f(xn+1), f(xt)), the contraction is
successful, andxc replacesxn+1. Otherwise a further contraction is carried out.
The process is assumed to have converged if the difference between the best func-
tion values in the new and old polytope, as well as the distance between the new best
point and the old best point, are less than the tolerances provided byAccuracyGoal
andPrecisionGoal .
Strictly speaking, Nelder-Mead is not a true global optimization algorithm; how-
ever, in practice it tends to work reasonably well for problems that do not have many
local minima.
Differential Evolution
Differential evolution is a simple stochastic function minimizer.
The algorithm maintains a population ofm points,{x1, x2, ..., xj , ..., xm}, where
typically m  n, with n being the number of variables.
During each iteration of the algorithm, a new population ofm points is generated.
Thejth new point is generated by picking three random points,xu, xv andxw, from
the old population, and formingxs = xw +s(xu−xv), where s is a real scaling factor.
Then a new pointxnew is constructed fromxj andxs by taking theith coordinate
from xs with probabilityρ and otherwise taking the coordinate fromxj . If f(xnew) <
f(xj), thenxnew replacesxj in the population. The probabilityρ is controlled by the
"CrossProbability" option.
The process is assumed to have converged if the difference between the best func-
tion values in the new and old populations, as well as the distance between the new best
point and the old best point, are less than the tolerances provided byAccuracyGoal
andPrecisionGoal .
The differential evolution method is computationally expensive, but is relatively
robust and tends to work well for problems that have more local minima.
Simulated Annealing
Simulated annealing is a simple stochastic function minimizer. It is motivated from
the physical process of annealing, where a metal object is heated to a high temperature
and allowed to cool slowly. The process allows the atomic structure of the metal to
settle to a lower energy state, thus becoming a tougher metal. Using optimization
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terminology, annealing allows the structure to escape from a local minimum, and to
explore and settle on a better, hopefully global, minimum.
At each iteration, a new point,xnew, is generated in the neighborhood of the cur-
rent point,x. The radius of the neighborhood decreases with each iteration. The best
point found so far,xbest, is also tracked.
If f(xnew) ≤ f(xbest), xnew replacesxbest andx. Otherwise,xnew replacesx with
a probabilityeb(i,Δf,f0). Hereb is the function defined byBoltzmannExponent , i
is the current iteration,Δf is the change in the objective function value, andf0 is the
value of the objective function from the previous iteration. The default function forb
is −Δf log(i+1)10 .
Like theRandomSearch method,SimulatedAnnealing uses multiple start-
ing points, and finds an optimum starting from each of them.
The default number of starting points, given by the optionSearchPoints , is
min(2d, 50), where d is the number of variables.
For each starting point, this is repeated until the maximum number of iterations
is reached, the method converges to a point, or the method stays at the same point
consecutively for the number of iterations given byLevelIterations .
Random Search
The random search algorithm works by generating a population of random start-
ing points and uses a local optimization method from each of the starting points to
converge to a local minimum. The best local minimum is chosen to be the solution.
The possible local search methods are Automatic and “I teriorPoint ”. The
default method is Automatic, which uses FindMinimum with unconstrained methods
applied to a system with penalty terms added for the constraints. When Method is set
to “InteriorPoint ”, a nonlinear interior-point method is used.
The default number of starting points, given by the option SearchPoints, is
min (10d, 100), where d is the number of variables.
Convergence forRandomSearch is determined by convergence of the local method
for each starting point.
RandomSearch is fast, but does not scale very well with the dimension of the
search space. It also suffers from many of the same limitations as FindMinimum. It is
not well suited for discrete problems and others where derivatives or secants give little
useful information about the problem.
3.7.4 Figures
Figure 26 refers to the problem analyzed in lemma 3.13. We computed the optimal 3-
state EM strategies forα ∈
{
1
20
, 2
20
, ..., 19
20
}
, p ∈
{
1
20
, 2
20
, ..., 9
20
}
and the correspondingδα
using Mathematica. The corresponding payoff differences,u
(
σ∗em3
)
− u
(
σ∗em2
)
, shown
in table 5 in the appendix. Figure 26 showsu
(
σ∗em3
)
andu
(
σ∗em2
)
, whereu
(
σ∗em3
)
was
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interpolated from the set ofσ∗em3 payoffs computed with Mathematica. The point to note
is thatu
(
σ∗em3
)
> u
(
σ∗em2
)
in numerical testing that spanned the whole feasible region at
5% and10% increments ofα andp, respectively.
Figure 26:u
(
σ∗em3
)
andu
(
σ∗em2
)
with δ = δα
Figure 27 represents solutions to same problem as figure 16 except with the additional
constraint ofxs ≤ xs−1, ∀s = 2, 3, ..., n.
Figure 27: Constrainedn∗-EM: x∗1 (α) , ..., x
∗
n∗ (α) whenx
∗
s ≤ x
∗
s−1
Figures 28 and 29 illustraten∗-HSSGL equilibrium behavior asδ changes.
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Figure 28:
n∗-HSSGL favors asδ varies: View 1
Points: α = 0.3, p = 0.3, δ = 0.65, 0.67, ..., 0.95
Figure 29:
n∗-HSSGL favors asδ varies: View 2
Points: α = 0.3, p = 0.3, δ = 0.65, 0.67, ..., 0.95
Figures 30 and 31 illustraten∗-HSSGL equilibrium behavior asα changes.
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Figure 30:
n∗-HSSGL favors asα varies: View 1
Points: δ = 0.9, p = 0.3, α = 0.1, 0.12, ..., 0.74
Figure 31:
n∗-HSSGL favors asα varies: View 2
Points: δ = 0.9, p = 0.3, α = 0.1, 0.12, ..., 0.74
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3.7.5 Tables
p u x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8 x9 x10
.30 .404 .599 .500 .427 .383 .334 .288 .253
.31 .418 .615 .516 .442 .395 .347 .302 .266
.32 .432 .631 .532 .457 .406 .360 .316 .279
.33 .446 .645 .548 .471 .418 .373 .329 .292
.34 .460 .647 .555 .479 .426 .381 .338 .303
.35 .474 .623 .532 .462 .411 .376 .329 .290 .258
.36 .488 .637 .547 .475 .422 .387 .341 .303 .270
.37 .502 .650 .560 .488 .433 .397 .353 .315 .282
.38 .516 .658 .571 .499 .442 .406 .363 .325 .293
.39 .530 .654 .574 .503 .447 .411 .368 .330 .302
.40 .544 .641 .557 .489 .437 .404 .364 .324 .290 .262
.41 .558 .653 .570 .502 .448 .413 .374 .335 .301 .273
.42 .572 .663 .582 .513 .459 .421 .383 .345 .312 .283
.43 .586 .664 .587 .519 .465 .426 .390 .352 .319 .292
.44 .599 .659 .588 .522 .468 .430 .393 .356 .323 .300
.45 .613 .656 .579 .514 .463 .423 .396 .356 .321 .291 .265
.46 .627 .666 .590 .525 .473 .432 .404 .365 .331 .301 .275
.47 .641 .673 .599 .534 .481 .439 .411 .373 .339 .310 .284
.48 .655 .668 .600 .537 .484 .442 .414 .377 .344 .314 .291
.49 .669 .663 .600 .538 .487 .445 .417 .380 .347 .318 .299
Table 3:n∗-EM and favors above socially efficient size:x∗s(p) > 1/2, α = 0.5, δ = 0.9
p u x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8 x9 x10
.30 .403 .500 .500 .443 .393 .343 .282 .192
.31 .417 .500 .500 .448 .398 .349 .285 .205
.32 .431 .500 .500 .453 .403 .354 .289 .217
.33 .445 .500 .500 .458 .407 .360 .292 .229
.34 .459 .500 .500 .465 .412 .374 .326 .257 .184
.35 .473 .500 .500 .470 .416 .378 .332 .261 .195
.36 .487 .500 .500 .474 .421 .383 .337 .264 .207
.37 .501 .500 .500 .478 .425 .387 .342 .268 .218
.38 .515 .500 .500 .483 .430 .392 .348 .270 .228
.39 .528 .500 .500 .493 .440 .400 .357 .275 .230
.40 .542 .500 .500 .490 .439 .404 .362 .321 .244 .196
.41 .556 .500 .500 .494 .443 .407 .366 .327 .248 .206
.42 .570 .500 .500 .496 .446 .411 .370 .330 .251 .217
.43 .584 .500 .500 .500 .455 .418 .379 .334 .255 .221
.44 .598 .500 .500 .500 .458 .421 .382 .336 .263 .225
.45 .612 .500 .500 .499 .461 .424 .385 .338 .271 .230
.46 .626 .500 .500 .500 .462 .424 .394 .354 .310 .236 .209
.47 .640 .500 .500 .500 .470 .431 .400 .361 .311 .240 .214
.48 .654 .500 .500 .500 .473 .434 .403 .365 .313 .248 .218
.49 .668 .500 .500 .500 .475 .436 .406 .368 .315 .256 .222
Table 4:n∗-EM with social efficiency constraint on favor size:x∗s(p) ≤ 1/2, α = .5, δ = .9
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α p = .05 p = .1 p = .15 p = .2 p = .25 p = .3 p = .35 p = .4 p = .45
.05 .007 .014 .020 .027 .034 .041 .048 .055 .061
.10 .006 .012 .018 .024 .030 .036 .042 .048 .054
.15 .005 .011 .016 .022 .027 .032 .038 .043 .048
.20 .005 .010 .015 .019 .024 .029 .034 .039 .044
.25 .004 .009 .013 .017 .022 .026 .031 .035 .039
.30 .004 .008 .012 .016 .020 .024 .027 .031 .035
.35 .004 .007 .011 .014 .018 .021 .025 .028 .032
.40 .003 .006 .009 .012 .016 .019 .022 .025 .028
.45 .003 .006 .008 .011 .014 .017 .019 .022 .025
.50 .002 .005 .007 .010 .012 .014 .017 .019 .022
.55 .002 .004 .006 .008 .010 .012 .015 .017 .019
.60 .002 .004 .005 .007 .009 .011 .012 .014 .016
.65 .001 .003 .004 .006 .007 .009 .010 .012 .013
.70 .001 .002 .004 .005 .006 .007 .008 .010 .011
.75 .001 .002 .003 .004 .005 .006 .007 .008 .009
.80 .001 .001 .002 .003 .004 .004 .005 .006 .006
.85 .001 .001 .002 .002 .003 .003 .004 .004 .005
.90 .000 .001 .001 .001 .002 .002 .002 .003 .003
.95 .000 .000 .000 .001 .001 .001 .001 .001 .001
Table 5: 3-EM dominates 2-EM:u(σ∗em3) − u(σ
∗
em2) whenδ = δα
p u x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7
.03 .034 .083
.07 .084 .175 .104
.11 .137 .319 .207
.15 .190 .445 .309
.19 .245 .446 .318 .243
.23 .300 .446 .332 .269 .204
.27 .356 .524 .395 .326 .263
.31 .410 .508 .395 .352 .269 .219
.35 .466 .582 .439 .386 .309 .283
.39 .522 .559 .452 .383 .337 .280 .238
.43 .577 .608 .500 .422 .374 .321 .278
.47 .633 .592 .493 .421 .379 .328 .282 .247
Table 6:n∗-EM data for figure 8:u andx∗1(p), ..., x
∗
n∗(p), α = 0.5, δ = 0.85
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p ICC1 ICC2 ICC3 ICC4 ICC5 ICC6 ICC7
.03 0
.07 0 0
.11 0 0
.15 0 0
.19 0 0 .001
.23 0 0 0 .003
.27 0 0 0 .002
.31 0 0 0 .001 .003
.35 0 0 0 .001 .003
.39 0 0 0 0 .003 .004
.43 0 0 0 0 .003 .003
.47 0 0 0 0 .001 .004 .004
Table 7:n∗-EM: ICC for figure 8,α = 0.5, δ = 0.85
δ u x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8 x9
.37 .428 .055
.41 .433 .076
.45 .438 .103
.49 .444 .136
.53 .449 .176
.57 .453 .224
.61 .458 .165 .110
.65 .465 .216 .149
.69 .472 .280 .199
.73 .478 .359 .265
.77 .484 .336 .266 .200
.81 .491 .450 .354 .293
.85 .498 .492 .402 .347 .296
.89 .505 .515 .443 .392 .356 .311 .275
.93 .512 .595 .541 .494 .454 .426 .397 .366 .338 .313
Table 8:n∗-EM data for figure 12:u andx∗1(δ), ..., x
∗
n∗(δ), α = 0.6, p = 0.4
163
δ ICC1 ICC2 ICC3 ICC4 ICC5 ICC6 ICC7 ICC8 ICC9
.37 0
.41 0
.45 0
.49 0
.53 0
.57 0
.61 0 0
.65 0 0
.69 0 0
.73 0 0
.77 0 0 .002
.81 0 0 .001
.85 0 0 0 .002
.89 0 0 0 0 .001 .002
.93 0 0 0 0 0 0 .001 .002 .001
Table 9:n∗-EM: ICC for figure 12.α = 0.6, p = 0.4
α u x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8 x9
.20 .658 .689 .555 .512 .406 .343 .290 .238 .204 .231
.24 .639 .686 .590 .461 .390 .356 .275 .213 .180 .225
.28 .620 .648 .573 .415 .365 .315 .234 .217 .218
.32 .602 .653 .535 .419 .346 .291 .238 .229
.36 .584 .649 .513 .407 .343 .277 .255
.40 .568 .639 .481 .384 .328 .261 .219
.44 .551 .604 .458 .371 .305 .251
.48 .535 .509 .391 .332 .261 .208
.52 .520 .501 .384 .318 .257
.56 .504 .506 .388 .323
.60 .490 .420 .327 .267
.64 .474 .331 .271 .210
.68 .462 .364 .290
.72 .448 .275 .219
.76 .434 .341
.80 .424 .237
Table 10:n∗-EM data for figure 14:u andx∗1(α), ..., x
∗
n∗(α), δ = 0.8, p = 0.4
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α ICC1 ICC2 ICC3 ICC4 ICC5 ICC6 ICC7 ICC8 ICC9
.20 .035 .009 0 0 0 .001 .002 0 0
.24 .024 .001 0 0 0 .001 .003 .003 0
.28 .018 0 0 0 0 .002 .004 .001
.32 .012 0 0 0 .002 .004 .002
.36 .008 0 0 0 .003 .002
.40 0 0 0 0 .004 .005
.44 0 0 0 .002 .004
.48 0 0 0 .002 .005
.52 0 0 0 .003
.56 0 0 0
.60 0 0 0
.64 0 0 0
.68 0 0
.72 0 0
.76 0
.80 0
Table 11:n∗-EM: ICC for figure 14,δ = 0.8, p = 0.4
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u
x
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.0
8
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32
.7
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.6
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.5
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.4
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.4
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.3
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.3
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.3
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.3
63
.3
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71
.2
31
.1
91
.1
51
.1
20
.0
98
.0
80
.1
62
.2
25
.2
26
.0
9
.7
26
.7
16
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α
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p u x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8 x9 x10 x11 x12 x13 x14
.01 .014 .135 .043
.02 .029 .225 .095 .028
.03 .044 .299 .136 .078 .023
.04 .060 .403 .177 .107 .042
.05 .076 .498 .218 .137 .068
.06 .093 .580 .258 .166 .099
.07 .109 .602 .255 .213 .101 .078
.08 .125 .612 .289 .233 .119 .102
.09 .142 .615 .321 .251 .138 .129
.10 .158 .630 .336 .265 .195 .102 .101
.11 .175 .631 .363 .282 .210 .117 .125
.12 .191 .631 .390 .298 .224 .132 .149
.13 .208 .629 .415 .314 .238 .147 .174
.14 .225 .625 .439 .329 .252 .162 .199
.15 .241 .634 .433 .320 .293 .185 .124 .173
.16 .258 .631 .456 .337 .303 .197 .136 .195
.17 .275 .648 .490 .361 .316 .213 .152 .210
.18 .292 .643 .479 .358 .321 .258 .168 .120 .186
.19 .309 .645 .502 .375 .331 .269 .180 .132 .205
.20 .326 .680 .548 .407 .348 .285 .197 .149 .208
.21 .342 .683 .556 .420 .357 .294 .208 .166 .212
.22 .359 .680 .555 .412 .351 .329 .233 .167 .132 .208
.23 .376 .686 .567 .428 .362 .336 .243 .177 .147 .211
.24 .393 .686 .568 .438 .370 .342 .251 .186 .161 .215
.25 .410 .685 .568 .448 .378 .347 .259 .194 .176 .220
.26 .427 .683 .567 .458 .386 .353 .266 .202 .191 .225
.27 .444 .691 .583 .461 .391 .360 .306 .226 .172 .158 .215
.28 .461 .690 .582 .470 .398 .365 .312 .233 .179 .172 .220
.29 .478 .689 .581 .479 .406 .370 .318 .240 .187 .186 .224
.30 .495 .687 .580 .487 .413 .375 .323 .247 .194 .200 .228
.31 .512 .686 .577 .495 .420 .380 .328 .254 .202 .214 .233
.32 .529 .687 .582 .503 .428 .386 .334 .261 .209 .231 .236
.33 .546 .690 .588 .501 .423 .383 .363 .284 .223 .181 .197 .229
.34 .563 .689 .586 .508 .430 .388 .367 .290 .229 .188 .210 .233
.35 .580 .689 .588 .516 .438 .394 .371 .296 .236 .194 .225 .236
.36 .597 .700 .615 .526 .453 .406 .378 .306 .246 .201 .244 .236
.37 .614 .694 .596 .524 .446 .402 .379 .334 .265 .212 .177 .206 .231
.38 .631 .693 .596 .531 .453 .407 .383 .339 .270 .219 .183 .219 .235
.39 .648 .704 .623 .539 .466 .420 .391 .347 .280 .227 .188 .239 .235
.40 .665 .703 .624 .540 .471 .424 .395 .350 .285 .232 .198 .243 .238
.41 .682 .701 .624 .540 .476 .428 .398 .354 .289 .238 .209 .247 .241
.42 .699 .707 .630 .549 .475 .427 .398 .380 .312 .255 .210 .178 .237 .234
.43 .716 .705 .630 .550 .480 .432 .401 .383 .316 .260 .215 .187 .240 .237
.44 .733 .704 .630 .550 .485 .436 .405 .385 .320 .264 .220 .197 .244 .240
.45 .750 .703 .630 .550 .489 .440 .408 .388 .324 .269 .225 .207 .247 .242
.46 .767 .701 .630 .549 .494 .444 .411 .390 .327 .273 .230 .216 .251 .245
.47 .785 .699 .630 .549 .498 .448 .414 .393 .331 .278 .235 .226 .254 .248
.48 .802 .706 .637 .561 .500 .450 .418 .398 .359 .299 .250 .212 .197 .243 .240
.49 .819 .705 .637 .560 .504 .454 .421 .400 .362 .303 .255 .217 .206 .246 .243
Table 14:n∗-EM data for figure 17:u andx∗1(p), ..., x
∗
n∗(p) whenα<α. α = 0.2, δ = 0.85
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